THE  CHATTANOOC 
CAMPAIGN 


WISCONSIN  HISTORY  COMMISSION 


LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA. 

RECEIVED    BY  EXCHANGE 
Class 


THE    CHATTANOOGA    CAMPAIGN 


Of   THE 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 

UFORH 


WISCONSIN  HISTORY  COMMISSION:    ORIGINAL  PAPERS,  No.  4 

THE    CHATTANOOGA    CAMPAIGN 

With  especial  reference  to  Wisconsin's 
participation  therein 


BY  MICHAEL  HENDRICK  FITCH 

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL  OF  THE  TWENTY-FIRST  WISCONSIN  INFANTRY 

BREVET  COLONEL  OF  VOLUNTEERS,  AUTHOR  OF  "ECHOES 

OF  THE  CIVIL  WAR  AS  I  HEAR  THEM  " 


WISCONSIN    HISTORY    COMMISSION 
MARCH,  1911 


,.* 


TWENTY-FIVE   HUNDRED   COPIES  PRINTED 


A  u  u    4    !  y  I  i 
EXCHAJNG^ 

Copyright,  1911 

THE  WISCONSIN  HISTORY  COMMISSION 
(in  behalf  of  the  State  of  Wisconsin) 


Opinions  or  errors  of  fact  on  the  part  of  the  respective  authors  of  the  Commission's 
publications  (whether  Reprints  or  Original  Narratives)  have  not  been  modified  or 
corrected  by  the  Commission.  For  all  statements,  of  whatever  character,  the  Author 
alone  is  responsible 


DEMOCRAT  PRINTING  CO.,  STATE  PRINTER 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

WISCONSIN  HISTORY  COMMISSION          .        .  ix 

INTRODUCTION xi 

THE  CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN  : 

Chapter  I.     The  Preliminary  Campaign         .  1 

Organization            .          .          .          .          .  11 

Organization  of  the  Confederate  Army     .  33 

The  advance  of  the  Union  Army       .          .  39 

Chapter    II.     The    Chickamauga    Campaign 

and  Battle 51 

The  Confederate  line  on  September  20       .  95 
The  Confederate   attack  upon  the   Union 

right 104 

Wisconsin  troops  at  Chickamauga     .          .  126 
Chapter  III.     The  occupation  and  battles  of 

Chattanooga        .          .          .          .          .155 
The  Battle  of  Lookout  Mountain      .          .  194 
Wisconsin  troops  in  the  Battle  of  Mission 
ary  Ridge            .....  225 

INDEX  235 


o 


MAPS 

PAGE 
The  Chattanooga  Campaign        .          .         Frontispiece 

Chickamauga,  September   19,   1863     .          .  .82 

Chickamauga,  morning  of  September  20,  1863  '.     98 

The  fatal  order  to  Wood,  at  Chickamauga     .  .112 

Chickamauga,  evening  of  September  20,   1 863  .    114 

Chattanooga  and  Vicinity,  November,  1 863  .  .    1 94 


WISCONSIN  HISTORY  COMMISSION 

(Organized  under  the  provisions  of  Chapter  298, 
Laws  of  1905,  as  amended  by  Chapter  378, 
Laws  of  1907  and  Chapter  445,  Laws  of 
1909) 

FRANCIS  E.  McGOVERN 
Governor  of  Wisconsin 

CHARLES  E.  ESTABROOK 

Representing    Department    of    Wisconsin,    Grand 
Army  of  the  Republic 

REUBEN  G.  THWAITES 

Superintendent  of  the  State  Historical  Society  of 
Wisconsin 

CARL  RUSSELL  FISH 

Professor  of  American  History  in  the  University  of 
Wisconsin 

MATTHEW  S.  DUDGEON 

Secretary  of  the  Wisconsin  Library  Commission 


Chairman,  COMMISSIONER  ESTABROOK 
Secretary  and  Editor,  COMMISSIONER  THWAITES 
Committee  on  Publications,  COMMISSIONERS  THWAITES 
AND  FlSH 

[ix] 


Of    THE 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 


INTRODUCTION 

After  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  in  the  East,  and 
the  siege  of  Vicksburg  in  the  West,  attention  was 
riveted  during  the  later  summer  and  autumn  of 
1863  on  the  campaign  around  Chattanooga. 
Seated  on  the  heights  along  the  southern  border 
of  Tennessee,  that  city  commanded  highways 
running  through  the  very  heart  of  the  Confed 
eracy.  The  result  at  Gettysburg  had  demon 
strated  that  no  Southern  army  could  invade  the 
North;  the  Union  victory  at  Vicksburg  deter 
mined  that  the  Mississippi  should  run  unhindered 
to  the  sea.  The  battles  of  Chickamauga,  Look 
out  Mountain,  and  Missionary  Ridge  not  only  de 
cided  that  Kentucky  and  Tennessee  should 
remain  in  the  Union,  but  they  opened  the  way  for 
Sherman's  advance  on  Atlanta  and  his  March  to 
the  Sea,  which  cut  the  Confederacy  in  two  and 
made  Lee's  surrender  a  necessity. 

The  War  between  the  States  saw  no  more  stub 
born  fighting  than  raged  on  September  1 9th  and 

[xi] 


20th  around  the  old  Cherokee  stronghold  of 
Chickamauga.  Two  months  later,  occurred  the 
three  days'  battle  around  the  hill  city  of  Chatta 
nooga.  In  all  these  events,  the  citizen  soldiers  of 
Wisconsin  played  a  conspicuous  part,  which  is 
herein  described  by  a  participant  and  student  of 
these  famous  contests.  In  these  battles  the  repu 
tations  of  officers  were  made  and  unmade,  and 
from  them  emerged  the  great  generals  who  were 
to  carry  the  Union  arms  to  complete  victory — 
Thomas,  Sherman,  Sheridan,  and  Grant. 

Colonel  Fitch,  the  author  of  this  volume,  began 
his  service  July  16,  1861,  as  Sergeant-Major  of 
the  Sixth  Wisconsin ;  he  was  commissioned  First- 
Lieutenant  in  October  following,  and  in  the  suc 
ceeding  April  was  appointed  Adjutant  of  the 
Twenty-first;  he  became,  in  succession,  Major 
and  Lieutenant-Colonel  of  that  regiment,  and  in 
March,  1865,  was  brevetted  Colonel  of  Volun 
teers  "for  gallant  and  meritorious  services  during 
the  war."  He  served  chiefly  with  the  Army  of 
Potomac,  Army  of  Virginia,  Army  of  Ohio,  and 
Army  of  Cumberland.  He  commanded  his  regi 
ment  from  July  1 ,  1 864;  and  on  the  March  to  the 
Sea ;  and  in  the  Carolinas  headed  a  wing  of  the 

[xii] 


brigade,  consisting  of  the  Twenty-first  Wiscon 
sin,  the  Forty-second  Indiana,  and  the  One  Hun- 
dred-and-fourth  Illinois.  Later,  he  was  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  Second  Brigade  of  the 
Fourteenth  Army  Corps.  He  now  lives  at 
Pueblo,  Colorado. 

The  maps  illustrating  the  text  are  adaptations 
from  John  Fiske's  The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the 
Civil  War  (Boston,  1900),  which  we  are  per 
mitted  to  use  through  the  generosity  of  the  pub 
lishers,  Houghton  Mifflin  Company. 

The  Commission  is  also  under  obligations  to 
the  editorial  staff  of  the  Wisconsin  Historical  So 
ciety  for  having  seen  the  volume  through  the  press. 
The  index  was  compiled  by  Dr.  Louise  Phelps 
Kellogg,  a  member  of  that  staff;  the  proof-read 
ing  has  been  the  work  chiefly  of  Misses  Annie  A. 
Nunns  and  Daisy  G.  Beecroft. 

R.  G.  T. 

WISCONSIN  HISTORICAL  LIBRARY 
MARCH,  1911 


[xiii] 


Of    THE 

UNIVERSITY 

OF 


The  Chattanooga  Campaign 


CHAPTER  I 

The  Preliminary  Campaign 

The  Union  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  com 
manded  by  Major-General  William  S.  Rose- 
crans,  was,  in  June,  1863,  encamped  at  Mur frees- 
boro,  Tennessee,  thirty-two  miles  south  of  Nash 
ville.  It  had  been  lying  here  since  January  5, 
1863,  having  marched  from  the  adjacent  field  of 
Stone's  River.  The  Confederate  Army  of  the 
Tennessee,  was,  at  the  same  time,  in  camp  near 
Tullahoma,  forty  miles  south  of  Murfreesboro* 
The  Confederates  had  been  defeated  at  Stone's 
River,  and  had  fallen  back  to  Tullahoma  at  the 
same  time  the  Union  forces  had  taken  up  their 
camp  at  Murf  reesboro. 

I  will  designate  the  campaign  of  the  latter  army, 
beginning  on  June  23,  1863,  by  marching  from 
i  [i] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Murfreesboro,  as  the  "Chattanooga  Campaign  of 
1863."  The  various  engagements  in  that  cam 
paign,  beginning  with  Hoover's1  and  Liberty- 
gaps2  on  June  24,  down  to  that  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  at  Chattanooga,  on  November  25,  are  in 
cidents  of  that  campaign,  and  necessary  parts  of 
it.  A  description  of  the  campaign  immediately 
preceding,  which  started  when  General  Rosecrans 
assumed  command  of  the  army  of  the  Cumber 
land  at  Bowling  Green,  Kentucky,  in  October, 
1862,  and  ended  with  the  victory  of  the  Union 
forces  in  the  battle  of  Stone's  River,  and  the  occu 
pation  of  Murfreesboro — would  give  a  prelimin 
ary  historical  setting. 

In  fact,  a  full  history  of  the  Chattanooga 
campaign  may  well  include  the  entire  move 
ments  of  the  army  under  General  Buell,  from 
October  1 ,  1 862,  when  it  marched  out  of  Louis^ 
ville,  Kentucky,  in  pursuit  of  Bragg's  army. 
The  latter  was  then  supposed  to  be  in  the  vicin 
ity  of  Frankfort,  the  capital  of  that  State,  engaged 


1  Nineteen  miles  southeast  of  Murfreesboro. 

2  Thirteen  miles  south  of  Murfreesboro,  five  west  of  Hoover's  Gap. 

[2] 


THE  HISTORICAL  SETTING 

in  the  inglorious  occupation  of  coercing  the  legis 
lature  to  pass  an  ordinance  of  secession.  It  was 
also  trying  to  recruit  its  ranks  from  the  young  citi 
zens  of  Kentucky,  and  was  restocking  its  commis 
sary  from  the  rich  farms  of  the  blue-grass  region. 
Buell  found  it,  on  October  8,  at  Perryville, 
seventy-five  miles  southeast  of  Louisville.  He 
drove  it  out  of  Kentucky,  and  then  marched 
to  Bowling  Green,  on  the  railroad  between  Louis 
ville  and  Nashville,  where  in  the  same  month  he 
was  superseded,  as  commander,  by  Rosecrans. 

The  Atlanta  campaign,  immediately  following 
that  of  Chattanooga — beginning  on  May  4,  1 864, 
and  ending  in  the  capture  of  Atlanta  on  Septem 
ber  8  of  that  year — gives  a  subsequent  historical 
setting:  a  connection  in  time  as  well  as  in  space, 
to  the  operations  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
in  1863.  By  referring  to  these  several  important 
military  campaigns  of  the  war,  the  reader  may  ob 
tain  a  synchronous  perspective  of  the  most  import 
ant  events  in  the  Middle  West,  in  the  department 
occupied  by  that  army. 

A  larger  setting  can  be  given  to  this  campaign 
for  the  capture  of  Chattanooga,  by  framing  it  into 

[3] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

the  two  military  fields  of  the  Potomac  on  the  east, 
and  the  Tennessee  on  the  west.  The  Army  of 
the  Potomac  was  opposed  to  General  Lee's  forces. 
It  operated  generally  between  Washington, 
D.  C.,  and  Richmond,  Virginia,  the  latter  being 
the  objective.  At  the  time  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  marched  out  of  Murfreesboro,  Lee 
had  taken  advantage  of  the  defeat  of  the  army 
under  Hooker  from  May  1  to  3,  1 863,  at  Chancel- 
lorsville,  Virginia,  and  invaded  Maryland  and 
Pennsylvania.  He  was  decisively  defeated  in 
the  battle  of  Gettysburg,  on  July  3  following,  by 
Major-General  George  C.  Meade,  which  closed 
his  campaigning  into  the  North.  The  old  field 
north  of  Richmond  was  reoccupied  by  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  then  in  command  of  Meade,  as 
successor  to  Hooker.  It  was  the  latter  who,  in 
October,  brought  the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  corps 
from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland,  at  Chattanooga. 

On  the  west  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland, 
was  the  field  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  Its 
task  was  the  opening  of  the  Mississippi  River. 
At  this  time,  General  U.  S.  Grant  was  in  com- 

[4] 


THE  PRINCIPAL  FACTORS 

mand,  and  had  his  army  at  Vicksburg.  That 
stronghold  surrendered  to  him  on  July  4.  Thus 
the  great  river  was  opened.  This  left  the  greater 
part  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  free  to  cooper 
ate  in  the  autumn  with  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  in  the  battles  around  Chattanooga;  and  from 
that  date  to  assist  in  the  Atlanta  campaign,  and 
the  March  to  the  Sea,  the  following  year. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  victory  crowned  all 
three  of  the  great  armies  during  the  time  of  the 
Chattanooga  campaign.  The  confidence  and  dis 
cipline  of  the  Union  forces,  increased  at  this  time; 
the  discovery,  by  the  governing  powers  at  Wash 
ington,  of  those  of  the  general  officers  who  dis 
played  the  most  ability;  the  placing  of  such  offi 
cers  in  the  command  of  the  Union  armies ;  and  the 
gradual  weakening  of  the  secession  armies,  were 
the  principal  factors  contributing  to  the  final  end 
of  the  war.  The  resulting  campaigns  of  1864 
and  the  early  part  of  1865,  sufficed  to  crush  the 
most  powerful  rebellion  in  history. 

During  its  long  occupancy  of  Murfreesboro,  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  been  somewhat  re 
cruited;  its  equipment  was  restored  to  its  former 

[5] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

condition;  and  it  had  also  been  very  much  im 
proved,  as  well  as  reorganized.  During  this  time 
the  formidable  Fortress  Rosecrans  was  built  at 
Murfreesboro,  so  that  a  small  force  might  con 
tinue  to  hold  the  place  after  the  army  moved  on. 
This  fort  proved  of  great  value  during  the 
Hood  campaign  against  Franklin  and  Nashville, 
in  November  and  December,  1864.  Nashville 
had  to  be  permanently  occupied.  In  fact,  the 
line  of  railway  running  from  Louisville  through 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee  to  Chattanooga,  through 
Bowling  Green,  Nashville,  Murfreesboro,  Tulla- 
homa,  and  Bridgeport,  formed  the  line  for 
carrying  supplies,  as  well  as  the  line  of  opera 
tions.  This  line,  about  three  hundred  and  forty 
miles  long,  had  to  be  defended  and  kept  open,  as 
the  Union  Army  advanced.  As  part  of  it — if 
not  the  whole — lying  in  southern  Kentucky  and 
Tennessee,  was  in  the  enemy's  country,  it  was 
necessary  to  build  and  man  as  the  army  advanced, 
a  line  of  forts  and  block  houses,  for  the  protection 
of  this  railroad  from  Nashville  to  Chattanooga. 

By  glancing  at  a  good  map,  the  reader  can 
see  the  immense  difficulty  involved  in  the  mainte- 

[6] 


A  DIFFICULT  TASK 

nance  and  defense  of  this  line  of  supplies  consist 
ing  of  but  a  single-track  railroad.  The  task  re 
quired  the  services  of  about  a  fourth  of  the  entire 
army.  The  field  of  operations  contained  no 
navigable  rivers  parallel  with  the  line  of  advance, 
upon  which  gunboats  might  assist  the  army  in  its 
conflicts  with  the  enemy,  and  by  which  the  rail 
road  could  be  assisted  in  carrying  supplies.  Two 
somewhat  important  streams  traversed  the  field, 
or  rather  ran  at  right  angles  to  it — the  Cumber 
land,  on  which  Nashville  is  located;  and  the 
Tennessee,  flowing  past  Chattanooga.  These 
run  westward  from  the  Cumberland  Mountains, 
and  for  very  small  craft  plying  for  limited  dis 
tances  only,  were  navigable  within  the  field  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland.  But  they  were  of 
practically  no  use  to  the  Union  Army,  except  at 
Chattanooga  after  its  occupation — when  for  a 
time,  supplies  were  thus  transported  from  Bridge 
port  and  Stevenson  pending  the  repairing  of  the 
railway  from  those  places.  There  were  also  two 
smaller  streams  in  southern  Tennessee,  running  at 
right  angles  to  the  line  of  operation,  called  the 
Duck  and  the  Elk.  It  was  necessary  that  the 

[7] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Union  commander  consider  these  in  his  advance 
from  Murfreesboro,  for  they  were  fordable  only 
in  places,  and  not  even  there  when  floods  were 
rampant.  They  were  bridged  on  the  main  wagon 
roads,  but  these  bridges  were  easily  destroyed  by 
the  enemy.  In  its  campaigns  from  Louisville, 
Kentucky,  to  Chattanooga,  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  did  not  have  any  assistance  from  the 
navy. 

In  this  sketch,  it  is  not  necessary  to  give  a  tedious 
account  of  the  most  difficult  natural  obstacles, 
such  as  streams,  mountains,  and  distances.  These 
are  apparent  upon  the  study  of  any  good  map. 
But  mention  must  be  made,  that  the  Union  Army 
faced  a  chain  of  mountains  lying  between  it  and 
Chattanooga,  at  the  northwestern  edge  of  which 
then  lay  the  Confederate  Army.  This  is  the 
plateau  of  the  Cumberland  Mountains,  extending 
in  a  southwest  direction  from  West  Virginia  to 
northern  Alabama,  and  covering  what  is  known  as 
East  Tennessee.  This  plateau  is  about  2,200 
feet  above  tidewater. 

Chattanooga  is  the  commercial  gateway 
through  which  run  both  the  Tennessee  River  and 

[8] 


IMPORTANCE  OF  CHATTANOOGA 

the  railways  from  north,  east,  and  south.  It  lies 
near  the  junction  of  the  boundary  line  between 
Alabama  and  Georgia,  with  the  south  line  of 
Tennessee,  at  the  eastern  edge  of  the  Cumberland 
Mountains,  where  the  Tennessee  River,  flowing 
westward,  cuts  through  the  range.  It  is  in  a  direct 
southeast  line  from  Nashville.  The  occupation 
of  Chattanooga  by  the  Union  Army  cut  the  Con 
federacy  asunder.  Hence,  the  struggle  for  this 
position  became  a  fierce  one.  It  cost  both  sides 
strenuous  campaigns,  an  immense  number  of  lives, 
and  the  destruction  of  an  incalculable  amount  of 
property.  Its  possession  by  a  Union  Army  was 
an  inhibition  of  any  serious  Confederate  invasion 
into  Middle  Tennessee  or  Kentucky.  The  ob 
ject  of  the  Chattanooga  campaign  was,  therefore, 
the  capture  of  that  city;  and  ultimately,  the  de 
struction  of  the  Confederate  Army.  Should  the 
capture  of  the  city  be  accomplished,  but  the  army 
of  the  Confederate  escape,  Chattanooga  could  be 
made  the  sub-base  of  a  new  campaign,  which 
would  effectually  dismember  the  Confederacy, 
and  greatly  hasten  its  downfall.  Such  was  the 
Union  theory,  and  this  actually  occurred. 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Followed  by  the  "March  to  the  Sea/'  the  At 
lanta  campaign  dismembered  the  enemy's  domain 
and  made  possible  the  end  of  the  war.  Lee's  sur 
render  would  not  have  occurred  at  the  time  it  did 
(April,  1 865) ,  if  the  homes  of  his  soldiers  in  the 
Carolinas,  Georgia,  Tennessee,  and  Alabama 
had  not  been  invaded  by  the  Western  armies  of 
the  Union ;  and  his  rear  threatened  by  Sherman's 
troops.  These  results  were  made  possible  only 
by  the  capture  and  continued  possession  of  Chatta 
nooga. 

After  Sherman  had  marched  through  Georgia 
and  South  Carolina,  and  penetrated  North  Caro 
lina,  with  a  large  part  of  the  old  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  and  troops  from  other  armies,  thous 
ands  of  Lee's  army  deserted,  and  lined  the  roads 
leading  back  to  their  homes.  When  captured 
and  paroled,  as  they  were  in  immense  numbers,  by 
Sherman's  "bummers,"  they  invariably  said  that 
they  left  Lee  when  Richmond  was  abandoned; 
and  would  not  longer  fight  for  a  Confederacy  that 
could  not  defend  their  homes.  Love  of  home  is 
greater  than  love  of  country;  unless  the  state  or 
nation  can  protect  the  homes  from  invasion  and 

[10] 


ACCOUNT  OF  THE  COUNTRY 

desecration,  there  is  little  incentive  for  its  volun 
teers  to  fight  for  the  abstract  principles  of  pa 
triotism. 

A  description  of  the  contour  of  the  field,  from 
Murfreesboro  to  the  Chickamauga,  would  be  only 
an  interminable  and  profitless  account;  it  being  a 
tangle  of  flat  and  rolling  land,  from  Murfrees 
boro  to  the  gaps  in  the  first  hills,  where  the  enemy 
was  met;  and  thenceforth  steep  mountains  and 
deep  valleys.  But  the  grand  strategy  subse 
quently  adopted  by  Rosecrans,  depended  so  en 
tirely  upon  this  contour,  that  when  each  separate 
movement  or  battle  shall  hereafter  be  described, 
a  somewhat  minute  account  of  the  country  con 
tiguous  to  that  particular  military  event  will  be 
given. 

ORGANIZATION 

After  the  battle  of  Stone's  River  and  while 
lying  at  Murfreesboro,  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  was  reorganized.  As  previously  stated, 
Rosecrans  joined  it  as  the  successor  of  Buell,  at 
Bowling  Green,  in  October,  1862.  Stone's 
River  was  the  army's  first  battle  under  Rosecrans. 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

In  that,  the  army  was  called  the  Fourteenth  Corps, 
Department  of  the  Cumberland;  and  it  was  di 
vided  into  three  divisions — the  centre,  right,  and 
left  wings.  General  George  H.  Thomas  com 
manded  the  centre,  General  Alexander  McD. 
McCook  the  right,  and  General  Thomas  L.  Crit- 
tenden  the  left.  In  the  new  organization,  the 
command  was  called  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land,  and  divided  into  three  corps,  the  Four 
teenth,  the  Twentieth,  and  the  Twenty-first. 
Thomas  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the 
Fourteenth,  General  McCook  to  the  Twentieth, 
and  Crittenden  to  the  Twenty-first. 

Rosecrans  came  to  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  with  considerable  prestige.  He  was  then 
forty-three  years  old,  having  graduated  from  West 
Point  in  1842.  As  brigadier-general  he  had 
gained  the  battle  of  Rich  Mountain,  Virginia,  in 
July,  1861  ;  won  the  battle  of  Carnifex  Ferry, 
Virginia,  in  September  of  the  same  year;  as  com 
mander  of  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi  was  victor 
ious  in  the  battles  of  luka  in  September,  1 862,  and 
of  Corinth  in  October  following.  He  came  to  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  with  a  record  of  un- 

[12] 


GENERAL  ROSECRANS 

broken  successes  behind  him.  He  was  genial, 
and  had  untiring  industry.  His  heart  and  head 
were  devoted  to  the  Union  cause.  His  troops 
saw  him  frequently.  He  was  a  lover  of  appro 
bation,  and  had  the  confidence  of  his  generals, 
and  the  love  of  his  rank  and  file.  The  men  affec 
tionately  nicknamed  him  "Old  Rosy,"  and  that 
was  his  usual  cognomen  with  the  whole  army. 
He  was  a  strategist  of  high  order.  A  study  of  his 
Chattanooga  campaign  will  show  his  eminent  abil 
ity,  in  so  maneuvering  as  to  compel  the  enemy  to 
fight  in  the  open.  When  an  engagement  was  thus 
brought  on,  and  the  actual  combat  occurred,  he 
lacked  (in  those  which  he  fought  with  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland)  the  proper  supervision  of  his 
line  of  battle.  He  too  implicitly  relied  upon  his 
subordinates.  During  the  whole  of  the  Chatta 
nooga  campaign  his  strategy  was  of  the  first  or 
der;  but  at  both  Stone's  River  and  Chickamauga, 
the  right  of  his  line  was  too  attenuated;  in  both 
engagements,  disaster  occurred  to  this  part  of  his 
troops. 

The  chief  ot  staff  to  Rosecrans  was  General 
James  A.  Garfield,  who  was  then  thirty-one  years 

[13] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

old,  brainy  and  very  energetic.  Although  not  a 
graduate  of  West  Point,  he  was  possessed  of  de 
cided  military  instincts.  Before  the  war  he  was 
an  instructor  in,  and  later  president  of,  Hiram  Col 
lege,  Ohio;  and  later  was  a  member  of  the  Ohio 
Senate.  Entering  the  army  as  lieutenant-colonel 
of  an  Ohio  regiment,  he  defeated  Humphrey  Mar 
shall  in  the  battle  of  Middle  Creek,  Eastern  Ken 
tucky,  January  1 0,  1 862,  and  was  that  year  pro 
moted  to  be  a  brigadier-general.  Able  and  con 
scientious  as  an  officer,  he  was  perhaps  rather  too 
democratic  and  academic  to  become  a  typical  sol 
dier.  He  became  very  nervous  at  the  delay  in 
moving  from  Murfreesboro,  and  instituted  an  in 
quiry  into  the  reasons,  both  for  and  against  an  earl 
ier  advance  on  Tullahoma.  A  majority  of  the 
subordinate  generals  in  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland  supported  General  Rosecrans  in  his  delay. 
Later  on,  notice  will  be  taken  of  Garfield's  service 
in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  and  his  retirement 
to  a  seat  in  Congress. 

Next  to  Rosecrans,  the  most  important  figure 
among  the  subordinate  commanders  was  Thomas. 
He  was  then  forty-seven  years  old,  and  a  graduate 

[14] 


GENERAL  THOMAS 

of  West  Point  in  1 840.  Between  that  time  and 
the  Civil  War,  he  served  in  the  war  with  Mexico, 
and  against  the  Indians  in  the  West.  At  the  be 
ginning  of  the  War  between  the  States  he  was 
major  of  the  Second  Cavalry,  of  which  Albert 
Sidney  Johnston  was  colonel,  Robert  E.  Lee  lieu 
tenant-colonel,  and  William  J.  Hardee  senior 
major.  Thomas  was  the  only  field  officer  of  that 
regiment  who  remained  loyal  to  the  Union.  He 
was  commissioned  colonel  of  the  regiment,  reor 
ganized  it,  and  during  the  first  battle  of  Bull 
Run  served  in  General  Patterson's  detachment, 
in  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  He  was  commis 
sioned  brigadier-general  in  August,! 861 ,  and  was 
sent  to  Kentucky  to  serve  in  the  then  Army  of  the 
Ohio  (afterwards  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland) , 
under  General  Robert  Anderson  of  Fort  Sumter 
fame.  Thomas  organized  the  first  real  little 
army  of  that  department  at  camp  Dick  Robinson, 
Kentucky,  between  Danville  and  Lexington ;  and 
in  January,  1862,  with  this  force  defeated  the 
Confederate  troops  under  Zollicoffer,  at  Mill 
Springs,  Kentucky,  on  the  Cumberland  River. 
This  force  and  this  place  were  then  the  extreme 

' 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

right  of  the  Confederate  line  of  defense,  of  which 
Forts  Donelson  and  Henry,  in  Tennessee,  and 
Paducah,  Kentucky,  constituted  the  left.     This 
line  was  fortified,  and  extended  through  Bowling 
Green.     A  month  after  General  Thomas  had 
turned  its  right  at  Mill  Springs,  General  Grant 
also  turned  its  left,  by  capturing  both  Forts  Don 
elson  and  Henry.     This  necessitated  the  estab 
lishment  of  a  new  Confederate  line  farther  south, 
the  evacuation  of  Kentucky,  and  the  eventual  loss 
to  the  Confederates  of  Middle  Tennessee.     Just 
before  the  battle  of  Perryville,  Kentucky,  the 
President  offered  General  Thomas,  on  September 
29,  1 862,  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland  at  Louisville,  but  he  declined  it.     Buell 
was  in  command  of  the  army  during  the  battle  of 
Perryville;   after  which  he  was  superseded  by 
Rosecrans.     Thomas  was  a  soldier,   pure  and 
simple,  having  never  resigned  from  the  army  after 
his  graduation  from  the  Military  Academy.     He 
had  shown  great  ability  in  the  recent  battle  of 
Stone's  River,  as  well  as  in  every  position  in 
which  he  was  placed,  prior  to  that  battle.     It 
will  be  seen,  further  on,  what  important  move- 

[16] 


OTHER  OFFICERS 

ments  he  directed  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga, 
which  saved  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  from 
imminent  disaster. 

General  McCook,  who  commanded  the  Twen 
tieth  Corps,  belonged  to  the  younger  class  of  West 
Point  graduates,  of  which  General  Sheridan  was 
a  type.  He  graduated  in  1853,  and  was  thirty- 
two  years  old  in  April,  1863.  He  was  a  hand 
some  man,  of  striking  presence,  and  commanded 
with  some  dramatic  effect. 

General  Crittenden,  commanding  the  Twenty- 
first  Corps,  was  then  a  year  older  than  Rosecrans 
—forty-four  years.  He  was  not  a  graduate  of 
West  Point,  but  had  served  as  a  volunteer  in  the 
Mexican  War.  He  was  a  son  of  U.  S.  Senator 
John  J.  Crittenden,  of  Kentucky. 

The  Fourteenth  Corps  was  made  up  of  four 
divisions.  These  were  commanded  respectively 
by  Major-General  Lovell  H.  Rousseau,  Major- 
General  James  S.  Negley,  Brigadier-General 
John  M.  Brannan,  and  Major-General  Joseph  J. 
Reynolds.  Each  of  these  divisions  contained 
three  brigades,  and  three  light  field  batteries. 

2  [17] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

The  brigades  were  generally  composed  of  four 
regiments,  but  sometimes  of  five. 

The  Twentieth  Corps  contained  three  divi 
sions,  commanded  respectively  by  Brigadier-Gen 
eral  Jefferson  C.  Davis,  Brigadier-General  Rich 
ard  W.  Johnson,  and  Major-General  Philip  H. 
Sheridan.  These  were  made  up  of  brigades  of 
four  and  five  regiments  of  infantry  and  three  bat 
teries  of  artillery. 

The  Twenty-first  Corps  likewise  was  organ 
ized  into  three  divisions,  commanded  by  Briga 
dier-General  Thomas  J.  Wood,  Major-General 
John  M.  Palmer,  and  Brigadier-General  Hor 
atio  P.  Van  Cleve,  each  with  three  brigades  and 
several  batteries.  The  artillery  of  each  division 
of  the  army  was  commanded  by  a  chief  of  artil 
lery. 

All  of  the  cavalry  were  organized  into  a  separ 
ate  corps,  commanded  by  Major-General  David 
S.  Stanley.  This  was  divided  into  two  divisions ; 
the  First  was  composed  of  two  brigades,  and  com 
manded  by  Brigadier-General  Robert  B.  Mitch 
ell;  the  Second,  also  of  two  brigades,  was  com 
manded  at  first  by  Brigadier-General  John  B.  Tur- 

Fi81 


RESERVE  CORPS 

chin.  Prior  to  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  Tur- 
chin  was  assigned  to  an  infantry  brigade.  These 
cavalry  brigades  were  much  larger  than  the  infan 
try  brigades,  for  they  contained  five  or  six  regi 
ments.  Generally  there  was  a  battery  attached 
to  each  brigade  of  cavalry. 

On  June  8,  1 863,  a  reserve  corps  was  organized, 
with  Major-General  Gordon  Granger  in  com 
mand.  It  contained  three  divisions,  commanded 
by  Brigadier-General  James  D.  Morgan,  Briga 
dier-General  Robert  S.  Granger,  and  Brigadier- 
General  Absalom  Baird,  respectively.  The  last- 
named  was  afterwards  transferred  to  the  First  Di 
vision,  Fourteenth  Corps,  being  succeeded  by 
General  James  B.  Steedman.  It  was  the  duty  of 
this  reserve  corps  to  guard  the  communications  in 
the  rear  of  the  army;  but  it  was  also  subject,  in 
emergency,  to  be  ordered  to  the  front,  as  will  be 
seen  further  on — for  example,  when  General 
Granger  with  three  brigades,  marched  from 
Bridgeport,  Alabama,  to  Rossville  Gap,  Georgia, 
and  assisted  very  greatly  in  the  battle  of  Septem 
ber  20,  at  Chickamauga.  In  this  reserve  corps 
should  also  be  included  certain  miscellaneous 

[19] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

troops,  scattered  in  forts  along  the  line  of  the  Louis 
ville  &  Chattanooga  railroad,  such  as  Nashville, 
Clarksville,  and  Gallatin,  Tennessee.  At  this 
time  Colonel  Benjamin  J.  Sweet  of  the  Twenty- 
first  Wisconsin  Infantry  was  in  command  of  the 
forces  at  Gallatin.  He  had  been  wounded  se 
verely  in  the  battle  of  Perryville,  Kentucky,  on 
October  8,  1 862,  and  was  not  able  to  endure  active 
service  at  the  front. 

The  First  Brigade  of  the  Third  Division,  re 
serve  corps,  was  stationed  at  Fort  Donelson,  Ten 
nessee,  and  commanded  by  Colonel  William  P. 
Lyon,  of  the  Thirteenth  Wisconsin  Infantry,  that 
regiment  being  a  part  of  the  garrison.  The  First 
Wisconsin  Cavalry,  commanded  by  Colonel  Os 
car  H.  LaGrange,  was  attached  to  the  Second 
Brigade  of  the  First  Division  of  the  cavalry  corps. 
Captain  Lucius  H.  Drury,  of  the  Third  Wisconsin 
Battery,  was  chief  of  artillery  to  the  Third  Divi 
sion  of  the  Twenty-first  Corps. 

This  organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  remained  substantially  the  same,  until  after 
the  battle  of  Chickamauga.  Sometime  in  the 
latter  part  of  July,  or  first  part  of  August,  General 

[20] 


SOME  PERSONAL  ESTIMATES 

Rousseau  received  leave  of  absence,  and  General 
Absalom  Baird  was  assigned  on  August  24  to 
command  the  First  Division  of  the  Fourteenth 
Corps  in  his  stead.  Baird  remained  in  command 
of  this  division  until  after  the  battle  of  Chick- 
amauga,  when  Major-General  Lovell  H.  Rous 
seau  again  took  the  command.  Rousseau  was 
a  loyal  Kentuckian,  who  at  the  very  beginning 
of  hostilities  had  raised  a  regiment  for  the  service 
of  the  Union.  He  was  then  forty-five  years  old 
and  had  served  in  the  Mexican  War.  He 
was  a  spectacular  officer  of  great  bravery,  who  is 
entitled  to  much  credit  for  his  unflinching  devo 
tion  to  the  Union,  under  circumstances  which 
made  other  men  desert  our  cause. 

Major-General  John  M.  Palmer  of  Illinois,  a 
lawyer  of  eminence  in  his  State,  was  an  officer  of 
more  than  usual  ability.  He  was  not  a  West 
Point  graduate,  and  was  forty-six  years  old. 

General  Granger  was  then  forty-two  years  old, 
a  graduate  of  West  Point  in  the  class  of  1845, 
and  had  fought  in  the  Mexican  War.  It  will  be 
noticed  that  many  of  the  general  officers  of  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  served  in  the  Mexican 

[21] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

War.  The  experience  they  then  acquired  in  the 
field,  in  actual  campaigning,  and  by  some  of 
them  in  actual  battle,  undoubtedly  served  to  give 
to  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  much  of  its  esprit 
de  corps,  and  its  general  success  in  winning  battles 
and  in  holding  the  territory  over  which  it  marched. 
General  Granger  was  an  unusually  able  and  gal 
lant  officer.  Later  on,  it  will  be  told  what  im 
portant  service  he  rendered  General  Thomas  in 
the  battle  of  Chickamauga. 

Major-General  Philip  H.  Sheridan  was  then 
thirty-two  years  old.  He  graduated  at  West 
Point,  rather  low  in  his  class,  in  1853.  At  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  he  was  promoted  to  a 
captaincy.  In  May,  1 862,  he  was  commissioned 
colonel  of  cavalry  in  the  volunteer  service,  and 
brigadier-general  of  volunteers  July  1 ,  1 862,  be 
ing  made  a  major-general  on  December  31 ,  1862. 
He  had  commanded  a  division  in  the  battle  of 
Perry ville,  Kentucky,  in  October,  1 862,  and  was 
at  Stone's  River  December  31,1 862,  to  January 
3,  1863.  He  is  entitled  to  this  special  notice 
more  for  what  he  became,  than  for  what  he  had 
done  prior  to  the  Chattanooga  campaign.  He 

[22] 


SOME  PERSONAL  ESTIMATES 

had  as  yet  shown  no  extraordinary  ability  as  a 
commander.  His  age  was  the  same  as  that  of  his 
corps  commander,  General  McCook,  and  they 
graduated  in  the  same  class  at  West  Point. 

Generals  Absalom  Baird,  John  M.  Brannan, 
Jefferson  C.  Davis,  Thomas  J.  Wood,  R.  W. 
Johnson,  and  David  S.  Stanley  were  all  officers 
of  the  old  regular  army,  soldiers  by  profession, 
whose  minds  were  not  distracted  from  their  duties 
in  the  field  by  politics  or  academic  proclivities. 
They  were  brave  and  always  at  the  front,  working 
for  success  with  military  spirit.  All  of  them 
served  faithfully  until  the  close  of  the  war.  Davis, 
Wood,  and  Stanley  afterwards  commanded  corps 
—commanded  them  ably  and  with  notably  unas 
suming  manners.  There  was  no  taint  about  these 
officers  of  "playing  to  the  galleries."  They  were 
not  expecting  applause,  and  did  their  work  without 
brass  bands  or  reporters  to  sound  their  achieve 
ments  to  the  country.  Such  were  the  officers  of 
this  great  central  army. 

What  of  the  musket  bearers?  Who  were 
they?  Where  did  they  come  from?  Were 
they  soldiers  by  profession  or  merely  citizens  in 

[23] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

arms  for  a  special  purpose?  I  have  already  said 
that  very  many  of  the  general  officers  of  the  Army 
of  the  Cumberland  were  of  the  regular  army. 
The  United  States  regular  army  was  represented 
only,  however,  by  one  brigade  of  the  regular 
troops,  namely,  the  Third  Brigade  of  the  First  Di 
vision  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  commanded  by 
Brigadier-General  John  H.  King.  Thus  almost 
the  entire  rank  and  file  of  the  army  were  volun 
teers.  The  regiments  were  filled  and  officered 
by  the  executives  of  the  different  states.  The  men 
were  mustered  into  the  service  of  the  General 
Government  as  volunteers  for  three  years  or  during 
the  war.  These  volunteers  were  citizens  of  the 
states,  and  each  company  elected  its  officers  among 
those  who  had  originally  enlisted  as  privates. 
The  musket  bearers  were  men  from  all  callings 
in  life — farmers,  mechanics,  merchants,  teach 
ers,  students,  and  laborers.  They  were  the  voters 
who  made  up  the  political  divisions  of  the  town 
ships,  counties,  and  states,  whose  ultimate  power 
lay  in  their  voting  franchise  which  they  shared 
with  the  men,  who — for  various  reasons — re 
mained  at  their  homes  during  the  war.  The  vol- 

[24]  * 


/  Of    T»£ 

|    UNIVERS 


THE  VOLUNTEERS 

unteer-regiments  which  composed  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  were  mostly  from  the  states  of 
Ohio,  Indiana,  Illinois,  Michigan,  Kentucky, 
Wisconsin,  and  Minnesota;  Pennsylvania  had 
three  infantry  and  two  cavalry  regiments;  Mis 
souri  had  two  regiments,  and  Kansas  one;  Tennes 
see  was  represented  by  several  regiments.  The 
great  bulk  of  the  troops  came,  however,  from  the 
states  north  of  the  Ohio  River — the  Northwest 
Territory.  No  drafted  men  in  the  army  partook 
in  the  Chattanooga  Campaign  of  1863.  These 
volunteers  sought  the  service  and  understood  what 
it  involved.  Very  few  of  them  knew  what  regi 
mentation  meant,  and  the  great  majority  had  never 
before  handled  a  musket.  But  they  were  young 
and  teachable.  They  readily  learned  the  drill, 
and  became  good  marksmen.  These  soldiers  real 
ized  very  soon  that  a  clean  musket,  plenty  of  am 
munition,  and  obedience  to  orders,  composed  the 
military  moral  code  of  efficiency.  By  the  laws 
of  their  states,  they  were  entitled  to  vote  for  officers 
and  affairs  at  home,  and  to  have  their  votes  counted, 
just  as  if  they  had  been  cast  at  home.  The  sol 
diers  received  during  the  prolonged  war  as  many 

[25] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

furloughs  as  were  compatible  with  the  exigencies 
at  the  front,  and  thus  they  were  occasionally  en 
abled  to  visit  the  folks  at  home  during  their  stren 
uous  service.  The  intelligence  of  the  private  sol 
dier  was  often  superior  to  that  of  his  officer.  Never 
theless  he  obeyed  faithfully  that  officer's  com 
mands,  because  he  fully  understood  that  discipline 
could  be  maintained  only  by  implicit  obedience 
and  the  object  of  his  service,  viz :  the  suppression 
of  a  rebellion  be  accomplished.  Many  of  these 
volunteers  enlisted  directly  from  the  public  schools, 
which  they  were  attending.  They  had  been 
taught  the  history  of  their  country;  how  its  inde 
pendence  from  the  tyranny  of  a  foreign  power  had 
been  gained  by  the  valor  and  patriotism  of  Wash 
ington  and  his  volunteers,  that  by  the  discipline  and 
perseverence  of  the  revolutionary  soldiers  the  sov 
ereignty  of  a  foreign  king  had  been  transferred  to 
the  citizens  of  their  native  land ;  that  a  new  foe  was 
now  trying  to  dismember  the  nation,  and  that  the 
corner  stone  of  the  Union  was  the  principle,  that 
all  power  is  derived  from  the  people.  These  vol 
unteers  were  convinced  that  no  power  had  the 

right  to  protect  the  maintenance  and  perpetuation 

[26] 


WISCONSIN'S  CONTINGENT 

of  slavery.  They  were  soldiers  therefore  until  the 
Union  was  re-established;  and  they  tacitly  re 
solved  to  fight  until  slavery  was  abolished.  Such 
was  the  personnel  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land. 

Wisconsin  was  well  and  ably  represented  in  this 
army  by  the  following  organizations,  viz:  The 
First,  Tenth,  Fifteenth,  Twenty-first,  and  Twen 
ty-fourth  volunteer  infantry;  the  First  Cavalry; 
and  the  Third,  Fifth,  and  Eighth  light  batteries. 

The  First  Wisconsin  Infantry  was  a  noted  regi 
ment  in  more  than  one  way.  It  served  as  the  only 
three-months  regiment  from  Wisconsin,  and  was 
organized  under  President  Lincoln's  first  call  for 
75,000  men.  It  was  mustered  out  after  the 
ninety  days'  service  August  21,  1861,  and  reor 
ganized  under  the  second  call  for  three  years'  ser 
vice.  This  second  mustering  was  completed  Oct 
ober  19,  1861.  The  regiment  proceeded  from 
Milwaukee  to  Louisville,  Kentucky,  and  the  vol 
unteers  served  during  the  next  three  years  in  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland.  It  was  active  in  various 
parts  of  Tennessee  during  the  first  year  of  its  ser- 


27] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

vice,  marching  as  far  as  Bridgeport,  Alabama,  to 
which  place  it  returned  during  the  campaign  of 
Tullahoma.  John  C.  Starkweather  was  its  first 
colonel.  He  was  made  commander  of  the  brig 
ade  when  it  was  reorganized  at  Murfreesboro,  and 
Lieutenant-Colonel  George  B.  Bingham  com 
manded  the  regiment.  This  regiment  had  fought 
in  both  the  battles  of  Perryville  and  Stone's  River. 
It  was  assigned  to  the  Second  Brigade  of  the  First 
Division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps. 

The  Tenth  Wisconsin  Infantry  was  mustered 
into  the  service  October  14,  1861 ,  at  Milwaukee. 
Alfred  R.  Chapin  was  its  first  colonel.  Proceed 
ing  to  Louisville,  Kentucky,  it  became  part  of  the 
future  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  and  advanced 
with  General  O.  M.  Mitchell's  forces  to  Steven 
son  and  Huntsville,  Alabama,  in  the  spring  and 
summer  -of  1862.  The  regiment  returned  to 
Louisville  in  September  with  Buell's  army  and 
engaged  in  the  battles  of  Perryville  and  Stone's 
River.  When  the  reorganization  at  Murfrees 
boro  took  place  this  regiment  became  a  part  of 
Scribner's  Brigade  of  Rousseau's  Division  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps.  Almost  side  by  side  with  the 

[28] 


WISCONSIN'S  CONTINGENT 

First  and  Twenty-first  infantries,  it  took  part  in  all 
engagements. 

The  Fifteenth  Wisconsin  Infantry  was  a  Scan 
dinavian  regiment,  and  its  first  colonel  was  Hans 
C.  Heg.  It  was  mustered  into  the  service  on  Feb 
ruary  1 4,  1 862,  at  Madison.  It  had  taken  part  in 
the  siege  of  Island  Number  Ten.  It  did  not  join 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  until  just  before  the 
battle  of  Perryville,  in  which  it  took  active  part,  as 
in  the  battle  of  Stone's  River.  In  the  reorganiza 
tion  at  Murf  reesboro,  it  became  a  part  of  the  Third 
Brigade — and  was  commanded  by  its  colonel, 
Hans  C.  Heg,  of  the  First  Division,  Twentiet! 
Corps. 

The  Twenty-first  Wisconsin  Infantry  was  or 
ganized  at  Oshkosh,  in  August,  1 862,  and  on  Sep 
tember  11,1 862,  it  joined  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland  at  Louisville,  Kentucky.  Benjamin  J. 
Sweet  was  its  first  colonel;  he  was  so  severely 
wounded  in  the  battle  of  Perryville  as  to  be  dis 
abled  for  further  field  service.  This  regiment  was 
brigaded  with  the  First  Wisconsin  Infantry  at 
Louisville,  and  served  also  in  the  battles  of 
Perryville  and  Stone's  River.  At  the  time  of 

[29] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

the  reorganization  at  Murfreesboro  it  was  com 
manded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Harrison  C.  Ho- 
bart,  and  it  was  assigned  to  the  Second  Brigade  of 
the  First  Division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps. 

The  Twenty-fourth  Wisconsin  Infantry  was 
mustered  into  the  service  at  Milwaukee,  August 
21,  1862.  It  proceeded  to  Louisville,  where  it 
became  a  part  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
This  regiment  engaged  in  the  battles  of  Perryville 
and  Stone's  River,  and  was  assigned  to  the  First 
Brigade,  Third  Division,  Twentieth  Corps  in  the 
reorganization  at  Murfreesboro;  its  commander 
was  Lieutenant-Colonel  Theodore  S.  West. 

The  First  Wisconsin  Cavalry  was  mustered  in 
to  the  service  at  Kenosha,  on  March  8,  1 862,  with 
Edward  Daniels  as  its  first  colonel.  It  was  sent 
to  Benton  Barracks,  near  St.  Louis.  There  and 
in  various  parts  of  Missouri  its  first  year  of  service 
was  performed.  On  June  14,  1863,  at  Nash 
ville,  it  was  made  a  part  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland,  with  which  it  was  from  that  time  identi 
fied  until  the  close  of  its  service.  This  regiment's 
activity  in  the  Tullahoma  campaign,  the  Chicka- 
mauga  campaign,  and  in  pursuit  of  Confederate 

[30] 


WISCONSIN'S  CONTINGENT 

cavalry  in  the  Sequatchie  Valley  on  October  2, 
1863,  and  along  the  line  of  communication  during 
the  battles  around  Chattanooga  is  mentioned  in 
more  appropriate  places,  relating  to  the  general 
movements  of  the  army.  It  was  commanded  by 
Colonel  Oscar  H.  LaGrange,  and  assigned  to  the 
Second  Brigade,  First  Division,  Cavalry  Corps, 
during  the  reorganization. 

The  Third  Wisconsin  Light  Battery  was  mus 
tered  into  the  service  at  Racine,  Wisconsin,  Octo 
ber  10,  1 861 .  Lucius  H.  Drury  was  its  first  cap 
tain.  The  regiment  went  first  to  Louisville,  then 
to  Nashville,  whence  it  marched  with  Buell's 
army  in  order  to  reinforce  General  Grant  at  Shiloh. 
It  was  engaged  in  the  battles  of  Perryville  and 
Stone's  River.  The  regiment  was  assigned  to  the 
Third  Brigade,  Third  Division  of  the  Twenty- 
first  Corps,  and  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Courtland  Livingston. 

The  Fifth  Wisconsin  Battery  was  mustered  into 
the  service  at  Racine,  October  1,  1861.  Oscar 
F.  Pinney  was  its  first  captain.  March  16, 
1 862,  it  arrived  at  St.  Louis.  Afterwards  it  pro- 
ceded  to  New  Madrid,  Missouri  (on  the  Missis- 

[31] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

sippi  River) ,  and  became  a  part  of  General  John 
Pope's  army,  in  the  reduction  of  Island  Number 
Ten.  It  was  also  active  at  the  siege  of  Corinth, 
and  marched  about  two  hundred  miles  from  luka, 
Mississippi,  to  Nashville,  Tennessee,  where  the 
regiment  joined  the  forces  of  General  Buell.  On 
the  northward  march  in  September,  1 862,  these 
forces  engaged  in  the  battles  of  Perryville  and 
Stone's  River ;  the  service  of  the  Fifth  Wisconsin 
Battery  was  of  the  most  active  and  valuable  kind. 
It  was  commanded  by  Captain  George  Q.  Gard 
ner,  and  was  assigned  to  the  First  Brigade,  First 
Division,  of  the  Twentieth  Corps. 

The  Eighth  Wisconsin  Battery  was  mustered 
into  the  service  on  January  8,  1 862,  and  moved  to 
St.  Louis  on  March  8,  1862.  Its  first  captain 
was  Stephen  J.  Carpenter.  It  formed  a  part  of 
the  force  that  moved  to  Forts  Leavenworth  and 
Riley,  Kansas,  in  April  and  May,  1 862,  whence 
it  moved  to  Columbus,  Kentucky,  and  finally 
took  part  in  the  campaign  at  Corinth  and  luka, 
Mississippi.  From  there  it  marched  to  Nash 
ville,  and  Louisville,  engaging  in  the  battles  of 
Perryville  and  Stone's  River.  It  was  com- 

[32] 


THE  CONFEDERATES 

manded  by  John  D.  McLean,  lieutenant,  and 
was  assigned  to  the  Third  Brigade,  First  Division 
of  the  Twentieth  Corps. 

ORGANIZATION  OF  THE  CONFEDERATE  ARMY 

The  Confederate  Army  which  confronted  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  on  June  24,  1863,  was 
officially  called  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  It 
was  divided  into  four  corps— two  of  infantry  and 
two  of  cavalry.  General  Leonidas  Polk  com 
manded  one  infantry  corps,  and  General  Wil 
liam  J.  Hardee  the  other.  The  cavalry  corps 
were  commanded  by  General  Joseph  Wheeler, 
and  General  N.  B.  Forrest.  In  addition  to  the 
artillery,  attached  to  the  regular  corps,  there  was 
also  a  reserve  artillery.  In  General  Bragg's  return 
of  the  "aggregate  present"  of  his  army  in  the  field 
on  June  20,  1 863,  his  figures  are  55,070.  His  re 
serve  troops  were  not  included  in  this  statement; 
they  were  scattered  throughout  the  districts  of  Ten 
nessee  and  northern  Alabama. 

At  this  same  date  the  return  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  was  7 1 ,409  of  all  arms — exclusive 

3  [33] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

of  the  reserve  corps— as  "aggregate  present."  It 
will  be  noticed  later  on,  that  the  Confederates 
greatly  increased  their  numbers  prior  to  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga,  but  that  the  Union  Army  re 
ceived  no  reinforcements;  on  the  contrary,  it  lost 
heavily  by  sickness  as  the  army  advanced. 

General  Bragg  was  at  that  time  forty-six  years 
old.  He  had  distinguished  himself  in  the  Mexi 
can  War.  He  commanded  the  Confederate 
Army  in  both  the  battles  of  Perryville  and  Stone's 
River.  He  did  not  win  either  of  these,  having 
in  both  of  them  abandoned  the  field  to  the  Union 
forces. 

Perhaps  the  most  distinguished  officer  in 
Bragg's  army  was  Major-General  John  C.  Breck- 
enridge.  He  was  more  distinguished,  however, 
as  a  politician,  than  as  a  military  leader.  He 
was  forty-two  years  old.  Before  the  war  he  had 
been  a  member  of  Congress,  vice  president  of  the 
United  States,  and  in  1860  the  presidential  can 
didate  of  the  Southern  democrats.  At  the  break 
ing  out  of  the  war,  he  was  a  United  States  Sena 
tor  from  Kentucky.  He  was  a  Confederate  offi 
cer  at  Shiloh  in  April,  1862,  and  commanded  the 


CONFEDERATE  COMMANDERS 

right  wing  of  the  Southern  forces  at  Stone's  River. 

General  Leonidas  Polk  was  fifty-seven  years 
old  in  1863.  He  was  a  bishop  of  the  Episcopal 
church.  He  graduated  from  West  Point  in 
1827,  but  resigned  his  commission  in  the  army  in 
the  same  year.  He  entered  the  Confederate 
Army  as  a  major-general,  but  was  soon  promoted 
to  lieutenant-general. 

General  William  J.  Hardee  was  forty-seven 
years  old  at  this  time.  He  graduated  from  West 
Point  in  the  class  of  1 838.  He  served  with  dis 
tinction  in  the  Mexican  War.  He  entered  the 
Confederate  service  as  colonel,  commanded  a  corps 
at  Shiloh  in  1 862 ;  was  appointed  lieutenant-gen 
eral  in  October,  1862;  and  commanded  the  left 
wing  of  the  Southern  Army  at  Perryville. 

General  Simon  Bolivar  Buckner,  another  offi 
cer  in  the  Confederate  Army,  was  forty  years  old, 
and  a  West  Pointer.  He  surrendered  Fort  Don- 
elson  to  General  Grant  in  February,  1 862. 

Of  the  two  Confederate  cavalry  commanders, 
General  Nathan  B.  Forrest  was  by  far  the 
greater.  He  was  a  rough,  uneducated  man,  but 
of  great  force  as  a  partisan  leader.  When  Lord 

[351 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Wolseley  was  at  the  head  of  the  British  Army,  he 
said  of  Forrest  that  he  was  the  ablest  cavalry 
leader  that  was  produced  by  our  War  between  the 
States.  He  was  personally  brave,  possessed  a 
fine  physique,  and  had  sufficient  magnetism  to  in 
spire  the  soldiers  of  his  command  to  great  activity 
and  endurance.  During  the  war  twenty-nine 
horses  were  shot  under  him,  and  he  took  active  part 
in  thirty-one  encounters,  it  has  been  stated.  He 
was  wounded  several  times. 

The  rank  and  file  of  the  Confederates  were 
made  up  of  the  citizens  of  the  Southern  states,  In 
much  the  same  manner  that  the  Union  Army  was 
composed  of  Northern  citizens.  They  fought 
with  a  certain  fanaticism,  for  what  they  deemed 
their  rights.  It  is  singular,  that  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  so  universal  a  desire  to  dissolve  the 
Union  seized  the  great  majority  of  the  white  people 
of  the  South,  although  they  might  not  be  slave 
owners.  They  made  most  efficient  soldiers  and 
suffered  many  hardships,  unknown  to  the  soldiers 
of  the  Union  Army.  The  martial  temperament,  in 
herited  as  well  as  acquired  through  personal  hab 
its,  was  more  predominant  in  the  South  than  in 

[36] 


CONFEDERATE  RANK  AND  FILE 

the  North.  The  Southerners  lived  largely  a 
country-life  before  the  war;  they  rode  horseback, 
hunted  with  hounds,  and  had  become  more  famil 
iar  with  firearms  than  the  Northerners.  The 
practice  of  duelling  continued  longer  with  them 
than  with  the  men  of  the  North,  who  were  not 
as  fiery  tempered  as  those  of  the  South.  These 
traits  made  them  soldiers  by  nature;  they  liked 
to  serve  in  the  field,  and  were  therefore  difficult 
to  conquer.  They  seemed  more  lithe  and  active, 
than  the  staid  volunteers  from  the  colder  North. 
They  have  claimed,  that  they  were  largely  out 
numbered;  that  is  true  in  the  aggregate,  but  not 
so  true  on  the  firing  line.  The  battles  of  Stone's 
River  and  Chickamauga  illustrate  these  facts. 
The  numbers  in  both  armies  were  quite  evenly 
matched.  During  the  last  year  of  this  war 
there  was  little  difference  in  the  fighting  qualities 
of  the  veteran  regiments  on  both  sides.  The  re 
bellion  was  put  down  according  to  the  rules  of 
warfare,  and  whatever  that  result  may  have  cost 
in  numbers,  it  was  worth  the  price.  Not  every 
revolt  against  authoritative  power  has  been  sup 
pressed  by  superior  numbers,  not  even  that  of  the 

[37] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

thirteen  colonies  against  England's.  At  first,  the 
power  of  England  seemed  so  overwhelming,  that 
scarcely  any  one  expected  that  colonial  independ 
ence  could  be  gained.  Foreign  nations  did  not 
believe  that  this  rebellion  could  be  suppressed, 
notwithstanding  the  superiority  in  numbers  of  the 
Union  Army. 

The  wonderful  thing  about  it  is,  that  Lincoln 
coin  persevered  to  the  end,  against  discouragements 
and  disasters  which  seemed,  at  the  time,  to  be  in 
surmountable.  Fortunately  there  was  no  compro 
mise,  the  rebellion  was  simply  crushed,  no  terms 
were  made ;  and  no  promises  given  to  embarrass  the 
reconstruction.  Of  course,  it  required  large  armies 
and  grim  determination  to  reach  the  goal.  The 
great  fact  is,  not  that  the  Union  armies  outnumber 
ed  the  Confederate  forces,  but  that  the  Union  itself 
was  restored.  The  war  was  merciless;  all  wars 
are.  Mercy,  pity,  and  the  extension  of  the  hand 
of  helpfulness  came  after  the  war  was  over,  not 
while  it  was  going  on.  Each  side  did  all  it  could 
to  fight  and  win  its  battles.  The  North  had  the 
larger  number  of  citizens  from  which  to  draw,  and 
of  course,  availed  itself  of  that  advantage.  The 

[38] 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FRONT 

South  would  have  put  larger  armies  into  the  field  if 
it  could  have  done  so;  it  did  use  every  available 
man,  however,  and  fought  its  best.  The  South 
might  have  conquered  the  Union  by  overwhelm 
ing  forces,  could  such  have  been  secured,  but  avail 
able  men  were  lacking.  At  all  events,  the  rebel 
lion  was  crushed  by  means  of  legitimate  warfare, 
and  the  Union  was  restored. 

THE  ADVANCE  OF  THE  UNION  ARMY 

The  Confederate  Army,  commanded  by  Gen 
eral  Braxton  Bragg,  lay  in  front  of  Tullahoma,3 
where  Bragg  had  his  headquarters.  There  was  a 
large  entrenched  camp  at  the  junction  of  the  Nash 
ville  &  Chattanooga  railroad.  This  camp  and 
the  McMinnville  branch  was  each  a  secondary 
depot  for  commissary  stores,  while  the  base  of  sup 
plies  was  at  Chattanooga.  Its  front  was  covered 
by  the  defiles  of  the  Duck  River,  a  deep  narrow 
stream  edged  by  a  rough  range  of  hills,  which 
divides  the  "Barrens"  from  the  lower  level  of 
Middle  Tennessee.  The  Manchester  Pike 


Forty  miles  south  of  Murfreesboro. 

[39] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

passes  through  these  hills  at  Hoover's  Gap,  nine 
teen    miles    south    of    Murfreesboro,    ascending 
through  a  long  and  difficult  canon  to  the  "Bar 
rens".     The  Wartrace  road  runs  through  Liberty 
Gap,  thirteen  miles  south  of   Murfreesboro   and 
five  miles  west  of  Hoover's.     There  were  other 
passes  through  these  hills,  but  the  enemy  held  all 
of  them.     Bragg's  main  position  was  in  front  of 
Shelbyville,  about  twenty-eight  miles  southwest  of 
Murfreesboro,  and  was  strengthened  by  a  redan 
line  extending  from  Horse  Mountain,  located  a 
little  to  the  north  of  Shelby  ville,  to  Duck  River  on 
the  west,  covered  by  a  line  of  abatis.     The  road 
from  Murfreesboro  to  Shelbyville  was  through 
Guy's  Gap,  sixteen  miles  south  of  Murfreesboro. 
Folk's  corps  was  at  Shelbyville,  Hardee's  held 
Hoover's,  Liberty,  and  Bellbuckle  gaps,  all  in 
the  same  range  of  hills.     It  was  not  wise  to  move 
directly  against  the  entrenched  line  at  Shelbyville, 
therefore  Rosecrans's  plan  was  to  turn  the  Con 
federate  right  and  move  on  to  the  railroad  bridge, 
across  Elk  River,  nine  miles  southeast  of  Tulla- 
homa.     To  accomplish  this,  it  was  necessary  to 
make  Bragg  believe   that  the  advance  would  be 

[40] 


UNION  DISPOSITIONS 

by  the  Shelbyville  route.  The  following  dispo 
sitions  were  therefore  made:  General  Granger's 
command  was  at  Triune  on  June  23,  fifteen  miles 
west  of  Murfreesboro;  some  infantry  and  cavalry 
advanced  that  same  day  toward  Woodbury 
seventeen  miles  to  the  east  of  Murfreesboro; 
simultaneously  Granger  sent  General  Mitchell's 
cavalry  division  on  the  Eaglesville  and  Shelby 
ville  Pike,  seventeen  miles  southwest  of  Murfrees 
boro,  in  order  to  make  an  attack  on  the  enemy's 
cavalry,  and  to  drive  the  enemy's  infantry  guards 
on  their  main  line.  General  Granger,  with  his 
own  infantry  troops  and  Brannan's  division, 
moved — with  ten  days  rations — to  Salem.4 

On  June  24,  Granger  moved  to  Christiana,  a 
small  village  a  few  miles  southwest  of  Murfrees 
boro,  south  of  Salem,  towards  Shelbyville.  On 
the  same  day  Palmer's  division,  and  a  brigade  of 
cavalry,  were  ordered  to  move  to  the  vicinity  of 
Bradyville,  fourteen  miles  southeast  of  Murfrees 
boro  ;  his  advance  columns  were  to  seize  the  head  of 
the  defile  leading  up  to  the  "Barrens"  by  an  ob- 


*  A  small  village,  but  a  few  miles  southwest  of  Murfreesboro. 

[41] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

scure  road  to  Manchester  thirty-five  miles  south 
east,  and  by  way  of  Lumley's  Stand  seven  miles 
east  of  Hoover's  Gap.  General  Mitchell  ac 
complished  his  work  after  a  sharp  and  gallant 
fight.  McCook's  corps  advanced  on  the  Shelby- 
ville  road,  and  turning  to  the  left,  six  miles  out, 
moved  two  divisions  via  Millersburg,  a  small  vil 
lage  eleven  miles  south  of  Murfreesboro.  By 
advancing  on  the  road  to  Wartrace5  he  seized  and 
held  Liberty  Gap. 

Five  companies  of  the  Thirty-ninth  Indiana 
mounted  infantry  opened  the  fight  for  Liberty 
Gap  on  June  24 ;  they  were  followed  by  Wil- 
lich's  brigade.  General  R.  W.  Johnson,  in  his 
report"  says:  "Here  I  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
General  Willich  a  portion  of  the  Second  Brigade, 
Colonel  Miller  commanding,  who  sent  the 
Seventy-seventh  Pennsylvania  and  the  Twenty- 
ninth  Indiana  to  the  right  of  the  Fifteenth  Ohio, 
then  to  change  direction  to  the  left,  sweeping  the 
hillside  on  which  the  Confederates  were  posted. 
This  movement  was  handsomely  executed.  As 


5  A  village  eight  miles  east  of  Shelbyville,  on  the  railroad. 
''Rebellion  Records,  Serial  No.  34,  p.  483. 

[42] 


SUCCESSFUL  MOVEMENTS 

soon  as  the  change  to  the  left  had  been  made, 
General  Willich  ordered  his  entire  line  forward. 
Under  his  own  eye  and  management,  the  Con 
federates  were  driven  at  every  point,  their  camps 
and  camp  equipages  falling  into  our  hands,  and 
Liberty  Gap  was  in  our  possession."  The  next 
morning  Carlin's  and  Post's  brigades  of  Davis's 
division  came  to  Johnson's  support.  The  Con 
federates  attacked  quite  fiercely,  but  were  re 
pulsed,  and  finally  retired.  The  enemy  here  was 
Cleburne's  division ;  he  reported  a  loss  of  1 21 . 

General  Thomas  advanced  on  the  Manchester 
Pike  with  the  Fourteenth  Corps  in  order  to  make 
an  attempt  to  take  possession  of  Hoover's  Gap. 
Major-General  Crittenden  was  to  leave  Van 
Cleve's  division  of  the  Twenty-first  Corps  at 
Murfreesboro,  concentrate  at  Bradyville,  fourteen 
miles  southeast  of  Murfreesboro,  and  there  await 
orders.  All  these  movements  were  executed 
with  success  in  the  midst  of  a  continuous  rain, 
which  so  softened  the  surface  of  the  roads,  as  to 
render  them  next  to  impassable.  The  advance  of 
the  Fourteenth  Corps  on  Hoover's  Gap,  June  24, 
was  Wilder's  brigade  of  mounted  infantry,  of 

[43] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Reynolds's  division ;  it  was  followed  by  the  other 
two  brigades  of  the  same  division.  Wilder  struck 
the  enemy's  pickets  within  two  miles  of  his  camp 
at  Murfreesboro  and  drove  them  through  Hoov 
er's  Gap  to  McBride's  Creek.  The  two  rear 
brigades  moved  up  and  occupied  the  Gap.  Soon 
afterwards  Wilder's  brigade  was  attacked  by  a 
portion  of  Stewart's  division ;  this  brought  the  rest 
of  Reynolds's  division,  and  eventually  the  regular 
brigade  of  Rousseau's  division  to  his  assistance. 

On  June  25  and  26,  Rousseau's,  Reynolds's, 
and  Brannan's  divisions  cooperated  in  an  advance 
on  the  enemy ;  after  a  short  resistance  the  enemy 
fled  to  Fairfield,  five  miles  southwest  of  Hoover's 
Gap,  towards  which  place  the  Union  pickets  had 
advanced. 

The  First  and  the  Twenty-first  Wisconsin  in 
fantry  were  actively  engaged  at  Hoover's  Gap, 
but  suffered  no  casualties.  The  Seventy-ninth 
Pennsylvania,  in  the  same  brigade,  lost  twelve 
men,  one  wounded.  General  John  T.  Wilder's 
brigade  lost  sixty-one  men  killed  and  wounded. 

On  June  27,  Gordon  Granger  captured  Guy's 
Gap  and  the  same  evening  took  Shelby ville, 

[44] 


RAINY  WEATHER 

the  main  Confederate  Army  having  retreated. 
The  Union  headquarters  reached  Manchester 
on  June  27.  Here  the  Fourteenth  Corps  concen 
trated  during  the  night.  Part  of  McCook's  ar 
rived  on  the  25th ;  the  rest  of  it  did  not  reach  Man 
chester  before  the  night  of  the  29th.  The  troops 
and  animals  were  very  jaded.  Crittenden's 
Twenty-first  Corps  was  considerably  delayed. 
The  troops  encountered  continuous  rains  and  bad 
roads,  and  the  last  division  did  not  arrive  at  Man 
chester  before  June  29,  although  an  order  to  march 
there  speedily  was  received  on  the  26th.  On  ar 
rival  it  was  badly  worn  out. 

The  forces  were  at  last  concentrated  on  the 
enemy's  right  flank,  about  ten  miles  northeast 
of  Tullahoma.  During  the  incessant  rain  of 
June  30,  an  effort  was  made  to  form  them  into 
position  in  anticipation  of  an  attack  by  the 
enemy.  The  wagons  and  horses  could  scarcely 
traverse  the  ground,  which  was  quite  swampy. 
Fortunately  the  enemy's  forces  suffered  like 
wise.  What  was  trial  and  hardship  to  one  of 
the  armies — on  account  of  the  weather — was 
equally  detrimental  to  the  other  side.  That 

[45] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

army  which  could  overcome  quickly  and  victori 
ously  the  climatic  conditions,  had  the  best  chances 
to  win  in  the  martial  contest.  In  forming  a  line 
at  Manchester  to  resist  an  attack,  the  Fourteenth 
Corps  occupied  the  centre,  with  one  division  in 
reserve,  the  Twentieth  Corps  on  the  right  and 
the  Twenty-first  on  the  left.  The  last  two  corps 
had  each  one  division  in  reserve.  The  Union 
Army  was  on  the  right  flank  of  the  Confederate 
line  of  defense,  and  of  course  expected  to  be  at 
tacked.  But  it  was  not. 

In  the  meantime  Stanley's  cavalry,  supported 
by  General  Gordon  Granger's  infantry  and  all 
troops  under  Granger's  direction,  had  attacked 
the  enemy  at  Guy's  Gap — sixteen  miles  south  of 
Murfreesboro  and  five  miles  west  of  Liberty 
Gap — and  had  driven  the  Confederate  troops 
back  to  their  entrenchments.  Then,  finding  that 
the  enemy's  main  army  had  fallen  back,  Stanley 
captured  the  gap  by  a  direct  and  flank  movement 
with  only  three  pieces  of  artillery.  The  cavalry 
unexpectedly  captuerd  Shelbyville  with  a  num 
ber  of  prisoners,  a  quantity  of  arms,  and  the 
commissary  stores.  The  reports  of  this  cavalry 

[46] 


THE  ENEMY  RETREATS 

battle  show  the  retreat  of  the  enemy  to  Tullahoma 
forty  miles  southeast  of  Murfreesboro,  where  it 
was  supposed  that  he  intended  to  make  a  stand. 
But  on  July  1 ,  General  Thomas  ascertained  that 
the  enemy  had  retreated  during  the  night  from 
Tullahoma.  Some  Union  divisions  occupied 
Tullahoma  about  noon  that  same  day,  while 
Rousseau's  and  Negley's  divisions  pushed  on  by 
way  of  Spring  Creek  overtaking  late  in  the  after 
noon  the  rear  guard,  with  which  these  divisions 
had  a  sharp  skirmish. 

On  July  2,  the  pursuit  was  made  by  the  Four 
teenth  and  Twentieth  corps.  The  bridge  over 
the  Elk  River  had  been  burned  by  the  enemy 
while  retreating.  The  stream  had  risen  and  the 
cavalry  could  barely  ford  the  river.  On 
July  3,  Sheridan's  and  Davis's  divisions  of  the 
Twentieth  Corps,  having  succeeded  in  crossing 
the  Elk  River,  pursued  the  enemy  to  Cowan,  on 
the  Cumberland  plateau,  eighteen  miles  southeast 
of  Tullahoma.  Here  it  was  learned  that  the 
enemy  had  crossed  the  mountains;  and  that  only 
cavalry  troops  covered  its  retreat.  Meanwhile 
the  Union  Army  halted  to  await  needed  supplies, 

[47] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

which  had  to  be  hauled  by  wagon  from  Murf rees 
boro  over  miserable  roads.     These  supplies  had 
to  be  stored  at  the  railway  station,  nearest  to  the 
probable  battle  field ;  and  before  the  army  could 
advance  over  the  Cumberland  plateau — where  a 
battle  would  probably  soon  ensue — the  railway 
had  to  be  repaired.     General   Rosecrans  in   his 
official  report  says:      "Thus  ended  a  nine  days' 
campaign,  which  drove  the  enemy  from  two  forti 
fied  positions  and  gave  us  possession  of  Middle 
Tennessee,  conducted  in  one  of  the  most  extra 
ordinary  rains  ever  known  in  Tennessee  at  that 
period  of  the  year,  over  a  soil  that  became  almost 
a    quicksand."      He    claims — perhaps    justly — 
that  it  was  this  extraordinary  rain  and  bad  roads, 
which   prevented   his   getting  possession   of  the 
enemy's    communications,    and    debarred    him 
from  forcing  the  Confederate  Army  to  fight  a  dis 
astrous  battle.     He  speaks  very  highly  of  James 
A.  Garfield,  his  chief  of  staff,  saying:     "He 
possesses  the  instincts  and  energy  of  a  great  com 
mander." 

The   Union    losses    during    the    "Tullahoma 

"Rebellion  Records,  Serial  No.  34;  p.  408. 

[48] 


BRAGG'S  DISPATCH 

Campaign"  —thus  named  in  the  official  rec 
ord — were  as  follows:  14  officers  killed,  and 
26  wounded;  71  non-commissioned  officers  and 
privates  killed,  and  436  wounded;  13  missing. 
Total,  85  killed,  462  wounded,  and  1 3  missing. 
1,634  prisoners  were  taken,  some  artillery  and 
small  arms  of  very  little  value;  3,500  sacks  of 
corn  and  cornmeal  were  secured. 

On  July  3,  General  Braxton  Bragg  sent  the  fol 
lowing  dispatch  from  Bridgeport,  Alabama— 
twenty-eight  miles  directly  west  from  Chatta 
nooga — to  Richmond,  Virginia :  "Unable  to  ob 
tain  a  general  engagement  without  sacrificing  my 
communications,  I  have,  after  a  series  of  skir 
mishes,  withdrawn  the  army  to  this  river.  It  is 
now  coming  down  the  mountains.  I  hear  of  no 
formidable  pursuit.'"  The  Confederate  Army 
crossed  the  mountains  to  the  Tennessee  River 
and  on  July  7,  1863,  encamped  near  Chat 
tanooga.  The  Union  Army  went  into  camp 
along  the  northwestern  base  of  the  Cumberland 
plateau.  The  object  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland  for  the  ensuing  campaign  was  Chatta- 

8  Ibid.,  p.  584. 

4  [49l 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

nooga;  the  Tullahoma  campaign  was  only  a  small 
part  of  the  greater  one  which  had  yet  to  take  place. 

In  the  Tullahoma  campaign  the  Tenth  Wis 
consin  Infantry  lost  3  enlisted  men,  wounded, 
and  the  First  Wisconsin  Cavalry  2  enlisted 
men.  All  the  Wisconsin  troops  bore  their  full 
share  of  the  fatigues  of  the  campaign,  but  only  the 
losses  mentioned  were  reported. 

There  was  one  feature  of  the  Tullahoma  cam 
paign  that  was  very  peculiar.  A  part  of  the 
Union  Army  had  the  previous  year  passed  over 
this  same  region,  while  marching  to  the  relief  of 
Grant  at  Shiloh.  Now  returning  by  the  way  of 
Chattanooga,  where  Buell  had  marched  on  his 
way  back  to  Louisville,  they  again  came  to  this 
section  of  the  country  where  the  inhabitants  mostly 
sympathized  with  the  South.  They  were  sur 
prised  and  shocked  in  1862  when  the  hated 
Yankees  invaded  their  towns  and  farms.  The 
Confederate  authorities  told  them,  that  another  in 
vasions  would  never  occur,  that  they  could  plant 
their  crops  and  pursue  their  business  without  fear. 
Therefore,  when  their  country  was  again  overrun 
by  the  Union  Army  in  1863,  their  confidence  in 
the  Confederate  generals  was  quite  shaken. 

[So] 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Chicfyamauga  Campaign  and  Battle 

A  distinguished  Confederate  general — speak 
ing  of  the  importance  of  the  city  of  Chattanooga 
to  the  Confederacy — said :  "As  long  as  we  held 
it,  it  was  the  closed  doorway  to  the  interior  of 
our  country.  When  it  came  into  your  [the 
Union's]  hands  the  door  stood  open,  and  however 
rough  your  progress  in  the  interior  might  be,  it  still 
left  you  free  to  march  inside.  I  tell  you  that  when 
your  Dutch  general  Rosecrans  commenced  his 
forward  movement  for  the  capture  of  Chatta 
nooga  we  laughed  him  to  scorn ;  we  believed  that 
the  black  brow  of  Lookout  Mountain  would 
frown  him  out  of  existence;  that  he  would  dash 
himself  to  pieces  against  the  many  and  vast  natural 
barriers  that  rise  all  around  Chattanooga;  and  that 
then  the  northern  people  and  the  government  at 
Washington  would  perceive  how  hopeless  were 
their  efforts  when  they  came  to  attack  the  real 

[51] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

South."  With  regard  to  the  claim  that  Chicka- 
mauga  was  a  failure  for  the  Union  arms,  he  said: 
"We  would  gladly  have  exchanged  a  dozen  of 
our  previous  victories  for  that  one  failure."  It  is 
correctly  said,  that  even  Richmond  was  but  an 
outpost,  until  the  success  of  the  Union  armies — in 
the  centre  of  the  Confederacy — left  Lee's  legions 
nowhere  to  go,  when  they  were  expelled  from 
Richmond.9  This  was  accomplished  or  made  pos 
sible  only  by  the  operations  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  in  the  Chattanooga  Campaign  of 
1863. 

After  the  retreat  of  the  Confederate  Army  of 
the  Tennessee  from  the  region  about  Tullahoma, 
across  the  Cumberland  Plateau  to  Chattanooga, 
Rosecrans  established  his  headquarters  at  Win 
chester,  Tennessee.10  He  began  the  repair  of  the 
railroad  back  to  Murfreesboro  and  forward 
to  Stevenson,  Alabama,  ten  miles  southeast 
of  Bridgeport  and  eight  miles  north  of  the  Ten 
nessee  River.  The  three  corps  were  put  into 

9  The   above  quotations  are   taken   from   some    letters  of  W.  S. 
Furay,  a    former    war  correspondent,  published  in    the    Cincinnati 
Gazette  of  1888. 

10  Sixteen  miles  southeast  of  Tullahoma,  near  Decherd. 

[52] 


THE  UNION  ADVANCE 

camp  in  their  normal  order.  The  Twentieth 
Corps  occupied  the  country  adjacent  to  Win 
chester;  the  Fourteenth  Corps  the  region  near  to 
Decherd;11  the  Twenty-first  Corps  occupied  the 
country  near  McMinnville.1"  Detachments  were 
thrown  forward  as  far  as  Stevenson.  The 
campaign  had  so  far  been  mere  child's  play, 
compared  with  what  lay  before  the  army  in  the 
next  movement  against  Chattanooga  and  the  Con 
federate  Army.  The  straight  line  of  the  plateau 
is  thirty  miles  across  from  Winchester  to  the 
Tennessee  River;  the  distance  is  perhaps  forty 
miles  by  the  available  roads.  The  railroad  after 
reaching  the  summit  of  the  plateau  followed 
down  Big  Crow  Creek  to  Stevenson,  then  turned 
sharply  up  the  valley  of  the  Tennessee,  crossing 
the  river  at  Bridgeport  to  the  South  side ;  then 
winding  among  numerous  hills,  which  constitute 
the  south  end  of  the  Sand  Mountain,  continued 
around  the  northern  nose  of  Lookout  Moun 
tain,  close  to  the  river  bank,  into  Chattanooga. 


11  Thirteen  miles  southeast  of  Tullahoma  on  railway. 

12  Forty  miles  southeast  of  Murfreesboro  and  thirty-five  miles  north 
east  of  Tullahoma. 

[53] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Bridgeport  is  on  the  Tennessee  River  twenty-eight 
miles  in  a  straight  line  west  of  Chattanooga. 
Just  opposite,  towards  the  northern  nose  of  Sand 
Mountain,  on  the  north  side  of  the  river,  is  the 
southern  end  of  Walden's  Ridge  which  extends 
northward  from  the  river,  and  parallel  with  the 
plateau,  from  which  it  is  separated  by  the  Sequat- 
chie  River  and  Valley.  In  short  the  Cumberland 
Mountains  are  here  a  series  of  ridges  and  valleys 
which  run  from  northeast  to  southwest  in  a 
uniform  trend,  parallel  with  each  other.  The 
Tennessee  River  rises  in  southwestern  Virginia, 
and  runs  between  the  Cumberland  Plateau  and 
Sand  Mountain;  but  between  Chattanooga  and 
Bridgeport  it  cuts  a  zigzag  channel  towards  the 
west,  between  Sand  Mountain  and  Walden's 
Ridge,  which  is  the  name  given  to  that  portion  of 
the  ridge  lying  on  the  north  of  the  river.  What 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  intended  to  do  was 
to  cross  the  ridge,  called  the  Cumberland  Plateau, 
then  the  river,  and  the  Sand  Mountain  into  Look 
out  Valley  and  then  the  Lookout  Ridge,  in  order 
to  reach  the  Chattanooga  Valley  south  of  Chatta 
nooga.  Such  a  movement  would  force  Bragg  to 

[54] 


TOPOGRAPHY  OF  THE  REGION 

march  out  of  the  city  to  defend  his  communica 
tions.  These  ridges  are  all  linked  together  at 
different  places.  Sand  and  Lookout  at  Valley 
Head,  Alabama;  the  Cumberland  Plateau  and 
Walden's  at  the  head  of  Sequatchie  Valley  and 
River.  Pigeon  Mountain  is  a  spur  of  Lookout 
Ridge.  Chattanooga  is  located  on  the  south  side 
of  the  river,  between  the  northern  nose  of  Look 
out  and  Missionary  Ridge.  The  latter  is  a  separ 
ate  and  low  ridge  about  three  miles  southeast  of 
Chattanooga.  Without  a  map  it  will  be  difficult 
for  the  reader  to  perceive  the  rugged  and  almost 
impassable  field  of  operations,  which  General 
Rosecrans  faced,  while  his  army  lay  at  the  north 
western  base  of  the  Cumberland  Plateau,  waiting 
for  suitable  preparation  for  the  intended  cam 
paign. 

There  was  an  alternative  line  of  advance  open 
to  Rosecrans,  namely  to  cross  the  plateau  into  the 
Sequatchie  Valley,  or  to  march  around  the  head 
of  the  valley  at  Pikeville,  then  over  Walden's 
Ridge,  and  thus  attack  Chattanooga  directly 
from  the  north;  or,  to  cross  the  river  above 
and  to  the  east  of  Chattanooga,  at  the  north  end 

[55] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

of  Missionary  Ridge,  that  is,  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Hiawassie  River.  This  last  route  would  have 
exposed  his  line  of  retreat  or  communications,  and 
he  therefore  chose  to  operate  at  his  right  and  enter 
into  the  valley  south  of  Chattanooga. 

Early  in  August  the  railroad  was  repaired  to 
Stevenson  and  Bridgeport;  also  the  branch  to 
Tracy  City  on  the  plateau. 

Sheridan's  division  of  the  Twentieth  Corps  was 
pushed  forward  to  Stevenson  and  Bridgeport. 
The  commissary  and  quartermaster-stores  were  ac 
cumulated  at  Stevenson  as  rapidly  as  possible. 
By  the  8th  of  August  these  supplies  were  suf 
ficient  in  quantity  to  justify  a  distribution  of  them 
to  the  different  commands,  preparatory  to  an  ad 
vance  across  the  river  and  over  the  difficult  ridges, 
that  lay  at  almost  right  angles  to  the  line  of  move 
ment.  The  advance  of  the  main  army  began 
August  16. 

The  Fourteenth  Corps  crossed  along  the  rail 
road  line,  or  near  to  it.  Its  advance  was  soon  at 
Stevenson  and  some  of  it  at  Bridgeport.  The 
Twenty-first  Corps — which  formed  the  left  of  the 
army  at  McMinnville — crossed  by  the  way  of 

[56] 


BRAGG'S  STRATEGY 

Pelham,  a  small  village  on  the  plateau,  to  Thur- 
man's  in  the  Sequatchie  Valley.  Minty's  cavalry 
covered  the  left  flank  by  way  of  Pikeville,  a  village 
at  the  head  of  Sequatchie  Valley.  The  Twenti 
eth  Corps  also  came  to  Stevenson  and  its  vicinity, 
but  by  another  route — to  the  right — than  that  taken 
by  the  Fourteenth,  namely,  via  Bellefont,  ten  miles 
southwest  of  Stevenson,  and  Caperton's  Ferry, 
which  is  the  river  point  nearest  to  Stevenson. 

All  these  crossings  of  the  plateau  were  made 
without  resistance  by  the  enemy,  although  there 
were  small  Confederate  cavalry  outlooks  here  and 
there,  which  fell  back  when  the  Union  troops  ap 
peared.  It  seemed  as  if  Bragg  desired  to  have  the 
Union  Army  advance  as  far  as  possible  from  its 
base  of  supplies  into  the  mountain  gorges  and  over 
a  long  and  difficult  line  of  communications.  That 
course  would  afford  him  a  better  chance,  as  his 
army  being  reinforced  would  be  in  better  condi 
tion  to  successfully  attack  and  destroy  the  Union 
Army. 

In  order  to  save  the  hauling  of  full  forage  for 
the  animals,  General  Rosecrans  had  delayed  his 
movement  until  the  corn  should  be  sufficiently  ripe. 

[57] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

No  detail  seemed  wanting  in  the  preparations  for 
the  difficult  campaign.  Enough  ammunition  was 
provided  for  at  least  two  battles,  and  twenty-five 
days  rations  for  the  troops  were  hauled  in  wagons. 
The  Tennessee  River  had  to  be  crossed  by  the 
different  corps;  in  order  to  conceal  this  movement 
and  deceive  the  enemy  at  Chattanooga,  Hagen's 
brigade  of  Palmer's  division,  and  Wagner's  of 
Wood's  of  the  Twenty-first  Corps,  accompanied 
by  Wilder's  mounted  infantry  of  Reynolds's  divi 
sion,  crossed  Walden's  Ridge  from  the  Sequat- 
chie  Valley  into  the  valley  of  the  Tennessee. 
These  troops  made  ostentatious  demonstrations 
upon  Chattanooga  from  the  north  side  of  the  river. 
Wilder — with  four  guns  of  Lilly's  battery — ap 
peared  suddenly  before  Chattanooga,  threw  some 
shells  into  the  city,  sunk  the  steamer  "Paint  Rock," 
lying  at  the  city  landing,  then  ascending  the  river, 
feigned  to  examine  the  crossings,  making  fre 
quent  inquiry  as  to  their  difficulty  and  the  charac 
ter  of  the  country.  On  the  other  side  of  the  river 
east  of  Chattanooga,  General  Cleburne  was  sent 
by  Bragg  to  make  preparations  for  defending  the 
crossings  against  the  supposed  advance  of  Rose- 

[58] 


ROSECRANS'S  INTENTIONS 


crans's  army.  He  fortified  the  ferry  crossings. 
General  Buckner — who  commanded  in  East  Ten 
nessee  against  the  forces  of  Burnside — expressed 
as  his  opinion  on  August  21 ,  that  General  Rose- 
crans  would  cross  above  the  mouth  of  Hiawassie 
River — a  stream  flowing  northwards — and  trans 
fer  his  forces  into  Tennessee  on  its  south  bank, 
some  thirty-five  miles  northeast  of  Chattanooga. 
Buckner 's  army  was  at  the  point  mentioned. 

Rosecrans's  intention  was,  however,  to  cross  at 
Caperton's  Ferry — near  Bridgeport  and  not   far 
from  Stevenson — and  at  Shellmound ;  these  places 
are  from  twenty  to  forty  miles  below  and  to  the 
west  of  Chattanooga.     On  August  20  at  day 
break,  Heg's  brigade,  of  Davis's  division  of  the 
Twentieth  Corps,  in  which  served  the  Fifteenth 
Wisconsin  Infantry,  crossed  in  pontoon  boats  at 
Caperton's  Ferry,  drove  away  the  enemy's  cavalry 
and  occupied  the  southern  bank.     Here  a  twelve 
hundred  feet  pontoon  bridge  was  soon  completed, 
and   Davis's   divison  of  the   Twentieth   Corps, 
crossed  and  advanced  to  the  foot  of  Sand  Moun 
tain,   preceded   by   cavalry.     Johnson's   division 
of   the   same   corps   crossed   the   following   day 

F591 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

on  the  same  bridge.  Sheridan's  division  of  the 
Twentieth  Corps  crossed  at  Bridgeport  on  a 
bridge  constructed  by  them  of  pontoons  and  tres- 
sels;  it  was  2,700  feet  long.  Baird's — formerly 
Rousseau's — and  Negley's  divisions  of  the  Four 
teenth  Corps  followed  Sheridan's  division.  The 
Twenty-first  Corps  marched  down  the  Sequat- 
chie  Valley  and  crossed  at  Battle  Creek,  nine 
miles  up  the  river  from  Bridgeport.  Hazen's, 
Wagner's,  and  Wilder's  brigades  were,  as  before 
mentioned,  in  the  Tennessee  Valley  to  the  north 
of  Chattanooga,  and  did  not  cross  with  their  corps. 
The  whole  movement  across  the  river  began  on 
August  29  and  ended  on  September  4.  The 
Third  brigade  of  Van  Cleve's  division  of  the 
Twenty-first  Corps  was  left  at  McMinnville  as  a 
garrison.  The  railway  was  protected  by  the  re 
serve  corps ;  the  Fourteenth  Corps  was  ordered  to 
concentrate  in  Lookout  Valley  and  to  send  imme 
diate  detachments  to  seize  Cooper's  and  Stevens's 
gaps  of  Lookout  Mountain,  the  only  passable 
routes  to  McLemore's  Cove,  down  which  runs  the 
west  Chickamauga  Creek  in  a  northeasterly  direc 
tion,  towards  Chattanooga.  The  Twentieth 

[60] 


SAGACIOUS  MOVEMENTS 

Corps  was  to  move  to  Valley  Head  at  the  head  of 
Lookout  Valley,  and  seize  Winston's  Gap  forty 
miles  south  of  Chattanooga.  The  Twenty-first 
Corps  with  the  exception  of  Hazen's  and  Wag 
ner's  infantry  and  Minty's  cavalry — which  were 
still  north  and  east  of  Chattanooga — were  to 
march  to  Wauhatchie,  at  the  lower  end  of  Look 
out  Valley,  near  Lookout  Mountain,  and  to  com 
municate  with  the  Fourteenth  Corps  at  Trenton 
in  the  same  valley,  and  threaten  Chattanooga  by 
way  of  the  Tennessee  River  via  the  nose  of  Look 
out  Mountain.  The  cavalry  crossed  at  Caperton's 
and  at  a  ford  near  Island  Creek,  in  Lookout 
Valley,  from  which  point  they  reconnoitered 
towards  Rome,  Georgia,  fifty-five  miles  south 
of  Chattanooga,  via  Alpine.  This  last  men 
tioned  hamlet  is  forty-two  miles  south  of 
Chattanooga.  In  the  absence  of  Major-General 
Stanley — the  chief  of  cavalry — its  movements 
were  not  prompt.  If  the  reader  will  refer  to  a 
good  topographical  map  of  the  region  around 
Chattanooga,  he  will  see  how  sagacious  these 
movements  were,  and  what  grand  strategy  they 
displayed.  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was 

[61] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

stretched  in  line  through  the  whole  length  of  Look 
out  Valley,  between  Sand  Mountain  and  Lookout 
Mountain,  on  the  south  side  of  the  Tennessee 
River;  it  faced  east  towards  the  Chattanooga 
Valley,  with  only  one  range  between  them  and 
the  Confederate  line  of  retreat  and  supplies;  while 
on  the  northeast  side  of  Chattanooga  was  a  Union 
force  of  several  brigades  to  prevent  any  counter 
movement  by  the  Confederates  upon  the  Union 
line  of  supplies. 

After  crossing  the  Tennessee  River,  Rosecrans 
continued  his  feints  to  make  Bragg  think  that  the 
real  movement  was  the  feigned  one.  He  had  sent 
Wagner's  infantry,  and  Wilder's  and  Minty's 
cavalry  brigades  to  report  to  Hazen  with  a  force 
amounting  to  about  7,000.  Hazen  caused  the 
enemy  to  believe  that  the  whole  army  was  there, 
intending  to  cross  the  river  above  Chattanooga. 
This  was  done  by  extensive  firings,  marchings, 
countermarchings,  and  by  bugle  calls,  at  widely 
separated  points;  while  Wilder  moved  his  artil 
lery  continuously  across  openings  in  sight  from  the 
opposite  bank. 

The  Confederates  occupied  in  force  the  point 

[62] 


EVACUATION  OF  CHATTANOOGA 

of  Lookout  Mountain  at  Chattanooga.  To  carry 
this  by  an  attack  of  the  Twenty-first  Corps  seemed 
too  risky;  therefore  the  original  movement  was 
continued,  namely,  against  the  line  south  of  Chat 
tanooga,  over  Lookout  Ridge,  south  of  the  point 
where  it  was  held  in  force.  The  cavalry  was  or 
dered  to  advance  on  the  extreme  right  to  Summer- 
ville,  in  Broomtown  Valley,  a  village  eighteen 
miles  south  of  Lafayette,  Georgia.  McCook 
was  to  support  this  movement  by  a  division  thrown 
forward  to  the  vicinity  of  Alpine  forty-two  miles 
southwest  of  Chattanooga.  These  movements 
were  made  on  September  8  and  9. 

General  Thomas  crossed  his  corps  over  Prick's, 
Cooper's,  and  Stevens's  gaps  of  Lookout  Moun 
tain,  to  McLemore's  Cove. 

These  movements  forced  Bragg  to  evacuate 
Chattanooga  on  September  8.  Then  Crittenden 
with  the  Twenty-first  Corps  and  its  trains  marched 
the  same  day  around  the  point  of  Lookout  and 
camped  that  night  at  Rossville,  at  the  gap  through 
Missionary  Ridge,  five  jinnies  south  of  Chatta 
nooga.  Through  this  gap  runs  the  wagon  road 
from  Lafayette  to  Chattanooga. 


[63] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

General  Rosecrans  claimed  to  have  evidence 
that  Bragg  was  moving  towards  Rome,  and  had 
therefore  ordered  Crittenden  to  hold  Chattanooga 
with  one  brigade,  call  all  the  troops  of  Hazen's 
command  across  from  the  north  side  of  the  river, 
an  follow  the  enemy's  retreat  vigorously. 

On  September  1  1 ,  Crittenden  was  ordered  to 
advance  as  far  as  Ringgold,  but  not  farther,  and 
to  make  a  reconnoisance  as  far  as  Lee  and  Gor 
don's  Mill.13  Crittenden's  report  as  well  as  other 
evidence  convinced  General  Rosecrans  that  Bragg 
had  only  gone  as  far  as  Lafayette — twenty-five 
miles  south  of  Chattanooga — and  then  halted. 
General  Crittenden's  whole  corps  was  therefore 
sent  to  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill,  where  he  found 
Bragg's  rear  guard.  He  was  ordered  to  com 
municate  with  General  Thomas,  who  by  that  time 
had  reached  the  eastern  foot  of  Lookout  Mountain 
in  McLemore's  Cove,  at  the  eastern  base  of 
Stevens's  gap.  Wilder 's  mounted  brigade  fol 
lowed  and  covered  the  Twenty-first  Corps  in  its 

18  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill  is  twelve  miles  south  of  Chattanooga, 
on  the  Chickamauga  River,  where  the  Lafayette  and  Chattanooga 
wagon  road  crosses  that  stream.  Ringgold  is  fifteen  miles  southeast 
of  Chattanooga,  on  the  east  of  Chickamauga,  and  is  a  railway  station. 

[64] 


THE  ENEMY  ADVANCING 

movements  to  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill,  and  had  a 
severe  fight  with  the  enemy  at  Leet's  tan  yard,  five 
miles  to  the  southeast.  Although  Bragg  made 
his  headquarters  at  Lafayette  in  his  retreat  from 
Chattanooga,  his  rear  guard  did  not  get  beyond 
Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill. 

On  September  1 0  Negley's  division  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps  marched — after  having  crossed 
the  ridge — from  the  foot  of  Stevens's  Gap,  across 
McLemore's  Cove,  towards  Dug  Gap  in  the 
Pigeon  Mountains  and  then  directly  towards  La 
fayette.  Dug  Gap  is  six  miles  west  of  Lafayette. 
Negley  found  this  gap  heavily  obstructed,  but 
Baird's  division  came  to  his  support  on  the  morning 
of  September  1  1 .  They  became  convinced  by 
some  sharp  skirmishing,  which  occurred  on  the 
llth,  that  the  enemy's  forces  were  advancing; 
and  therefore  fell  back  from  Davis's  cross-roads  to 
a  good  position  near  the  foot  of  Stevens's  Gap. 
These  two  officers  are  entitled  to  great  credit  for 
their  coolness  and  skill  in  withdrawing  their  divi 
sions  from  a  very  perilous  trap.  The  forces  of  the 
enemy  would  have  been  overwhelming  in  their 
immediate  front,  if  the  Confederates  had  been 

5  [65] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

more  expeditious  and  made  the  attack  on  the  after 
noon  of  September  10  or  on  the  morning  of  the 
1 1  th.  Hindman,  Buckner,  and  Cleburne,  with 
several  divisions  were  there,  but  failed  to  cooper 
ate  in  an  attack  at  the  right  time.  The  obstruc 
tions  placed  in  the  gap  by  the  Confederates  fav 
ored  Negley  and  Baird. 

On  September  12  Reynolds's  and  Brannan's 
divisions  following  over  the  mountain  closed  up 
to  Negley  and  Baird.  Bragg's  army  was  at 
Lafayette,  near  Dug  Gap,  in  force.  Having  of 
ficial  information  that  Longstreet  was  coming  from 
Virginia  with  large  reinforcements,  and  having 
already  received  troops  from  Mississippi  and  the 
eastern  part  of  Tennessee,  Bragg  halted  in  his  re 
treat.  He  was  preparing  to  give  battle  to  the 
Union  forces  at  the  first  good  opportunity. 

Two  divisions  of  Joseph  E.  Johnston's  troops 
from  Mississippi  and  Buckner's  Corps  from  Ten 
nessee — where  Burnside's  forces  were — had  join 
ed  Bragg  before  he  moved  north  from  Lafayette 
to  Chickamauga,  where  he  was  joined  by  three 
divisions  of  Longstreet's  Corps  from  Virginia  on 
the  18th,  if  not  earlier.  At  the  same  time  Hal- 

[66] 


BRAGG  IS  REINFORCED 

leek,  chief  of  the  army  at  Washington,  D.  C., 
telegraphed  Rosecrans  September  11,  1863,  as 
follows:  "It  is  reported  here  by  deserters  that  a 
part  of  Bragg's  army  is  reinforcing  Lee.  It  is  im 
portant  that  the  truth  of  this  should  be  ascertained 
as  early  as  possible."' 

The  fact  stands  out  in  bold  relief,  that  the  Con 
federate  Government  at  Richmond  hastened  rein 
forcements  to  General  Bragg;  while  the  Wash 
ington  Government  sent  none  to  Rosecrans,  al 
though  Burns Jde  was  in  the  eastern  part  of  Tennes 
see  with  16,000  troops,  and  was  at  that  time  at 
leisure.  Because  the  force,  lately  in  his  front,  had 
reinforced  Bragg  at  Lafayette,  Burnside  did 
not  obey  Halleck's  order  to  join  Rosecrans;  on  the 
contrary,  he  drove  Buckner's  force,  which  united 
with  Bragg;  thus  Burnside  enabled  Buckner's  men 
to  take  part  against  the  Union  Army  in  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga. 

Bragg  in  his  official  report,  says:     "During  the 

"Rebellion  Records,  Serial  No.  52,  p.  530.  In  Genera 
Halleck's  report  (id.,  Serial  No.  50,  p.  34),  he  says,  that  the 
abandonment  of  Chattanooga  without  defense  gave  plausibility  to 
these  reports  by  spies  and  deserters,  that  Lee  was  being  reinforced 
from  Bragg. 

[67] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

9th  it  was  ascertained  that  a  column,  estimated 
at  from  4,000  to  8,000  had  crossed  Lookout 
Mountain   into   the   cove   by   way   of   Cooper's 
and  Stevens's  gaps.     Thrown  off  his  guard  by 
our  rapid  movement,  apparently  in  retreat,  when 
in  reality  we  had  concentrated  opposite  his  center, 
and  deceived  by  the  information,  by  deserters  and 
others  sent  into  his  lines,  the  enemy  pressed  on  his 
columns  to  intercept  us,  and  thus  exposed  him 
self  in  detail."       He  says  further  that  he  or 
dered  Hindman,  Cleburne,  and  Buckner  to  join 
and  attack  the   forces — Negley  and   Baird — at 
Da  vis's  cross  roads,  near  Dug  Gap;  but  because 
Dug  Gap  was  obstructed  by  felled  timber,  which 
required  twenty- four  hours  to  remove,  and  because 
Buckner,  when  he  joined  Hindman,  wanted  to 
change  the  plans,  Negley  and  Baird  had  been  al 
lowed  to  move  back  in  a  position  not  wise  to  fol 
low.     Bragg  drew  Buckner,  Hindman,  and  Cle 
burne  back  to  Lafayette  and  prepared  to  move  in 
order  to  attack  Crittenden  at  Lee  and  Gordon's 
Mill.     Folk's  and  Walker's  corps  were  moved 
immediately  in  that  direction. 


?.,  Serial  No.  51,  p.  27. 

[68 


WISCONSIN  TROOPS  AT  DUG  GAP 

The  only  Wisconsin  troops  in  the  affair  at  Dug 
Gap  on  September  1 0  and  1 1  were  the  First, 
Tenth,  and  Twenty-first  Infantry.  Lieutenant 
Robert  J.  Nickles  of  the  First  Wisconsin  Infan 
try,  aide  to  General  J.  C.  Starkweather,  command 
ing  the  brigade,  was  killed  when  reconnoitering 
alone  the  enemy's  skirmishers.  This  was  the 
only  casualty  to  the  Wisconsin  troops. 

On  September  1 2,  General  Leonidas  Polk  was 
ordered  to  attack  Crittenden  the  next  day,  at  Lee 
and  Gordon's  Mill.  Polk  would  not  attack 
however,  without  reinforcements.  Bragg  spent 
the  next  five  days  getting  his  army  in  position  along 
the  west  Chickamauga  Creek,  and  on  its  east  side 
from  the  north  end  of  Pigeon  Mountains  to  Reed's 
Bridge.  Brigadier-General  B.  R.  Johnson,  who 
had  been  holding  Ringgold  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Chickamauga  with  one  brigade,  moved  on  the 
18th  to  Reed's  Bridge  on  the  west  Chickamauga; 
this  caused  his  force  to  become  the  extreme  right 
of  Bragg's  line.  While  Forrest's  and  Pegram's 
cavalry  covered  the  extreme  right  at  Reed's 
Bridge,  Walker's  Corps  formed  on  the  left  of  B. 
R.  Johnson's,  opposite  Alexander's  Bridge;  Buck- 

[69] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

ner's  was  next  to  Thedf ord's  Ford ;  Folk's  oppo 
site  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill,  and  Hill's  Corps  was 
on  the  extreme  left,  near  Glass's  Mill.  Wheeler's 
Cavalry  protected  the  left  flank,  and  was  ordered 
to  annoy  the  troops  in  McLemore's  Cove  so  much 
that  Bragg's  movement  would  not  be  discovered. 
With  B.  R.  Johnson's  movement  from  Ringgold 
came  two  brigades — just  arrived  from  Missis 
sippi — and  three  of  Longstreet's  from  Virginia. 
The  other  two  brigades  from  Virginia  came  on 
the  19th  in  time  to  take  active  part,  the  Confed 
erate  Army  being  in  position  on  the  east  side  of 
west  Chickamauga  Creek;  and  Crittenden's  Corps 
near  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill  on  the  west  side. 
Bragg  was  finally  ready  for  attack;  and  on  the 
night  of  the  17th  issued  his  order  of  battle, 
namely,  that  each  body  of  troops  should  cross  the 
creek  at  the  nearest  practicable  bridge  or  ford,  turn 
to  the  left,  and  sweep  up  the  Chickamauga  to 
wards  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill.  This  would 
bring  the  troops  upon  the  left  flank  of  Crittenden's 
forces.  Leonidas  Polk  was  to  attack  in  front, 
across  the  stream,  while  Hill  was  ordered  to  pre 
vent  the  Union  forces  in  McLemore's  Cove  from 

[70] 


HOW  BRAGG  FAILED 

reinforcing   Crittenden.     It   will    be    seen    how 
Bragg's  plan  of  attack  failed  completely.     The 
Chickamauga  Creek  or  River  rises  at  the  head  of 
McLemore's  Cove,  and  runs  northeast,  emptying 
into  the  Tennessee  River  about  five  miles  above 
Chattanooga.     Therefore,  to  retreat  to  Chatta 
nooga,  or  to  cut  off  the  Union  Army  from  it,  the 
Confederate  Army  had  to  cross  on  the  west  side 
of    Chickamauga.     The    road    from    Lafayette 
to    Chattanooga— on    which    the    Confederates 
marched — runs  on  the  east  side  of  and  parallel 
with  Pigeon  Mountains  and  the  river,  and  crosses 
the  river  at  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill.     The  road  on 
which  the  Union  troops  at  Stevens's  gap  marched, 
runs  down  the  cove  on  the  west  side  of  the  river  and 
Pigeon  Mountains,  past  Crawfish  Springs,  near 
which  it  branches  to  McFarland's  Gap  and  to 
Kelly's  farm  on  the  Lafayette  road,  three  miles 
north  of  Lee  and  Gordon's ;  this  distance  is  about 
sixteen  miles.     The  Pigeon  Mountains  dwindle 
away  into  the  level  country  some  miles  south  of 
Lee  and  Gordon's. 

The  order  of  battle  issued  by  Bragg  on  Sep 
tember  1 7,  was  not  immediately  executed,  on  ac- 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

count  of  some  resistance  made  by  Wilder's  mount 
ed  infantry  and  Minty's  cavalry  at  Reed's  and 
Alexander's  bridges. 

The  activity  of  Minty  and  Wilder,  and  the 
bold  front  shown  by  the  troops  of  Crittenden  at 
and  about  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill,  prevented  a 
serious  attack  by  General  Leonidas  Polk,  who  was 
in  front  of  that  position.  These  facts  together 
with  the  affair  at  Dug  Gap  and  the  presence 
of  McCook's  Corps  at  Alpine  caused  the  Con 
federate  Army  to  hesitate;  thus  General  Rosecrans 
was  given  time  to  concentrate  his  whole  army — not 
Crittenden's  Corps  only — at  Chickamauga,  across 
the  Lafayette  road,  between  the  Confederate 
Army  and  Chattanooga.  Bragg's  plan  was  to  at 
tack  Crittenden's  left  and  rear,  throwing  it  back 
upon  the  centre — General  Thomas's — before  Crit 
tenden  could  be  reinforced,  and  then  to  thrust 
his  army  between  Rosecrans  and  Chattanooga. 
Rosencrans's  plan  was  to  prevent  such  a  disaster. 
Late  in  the  afternoon  of  September  18,  the  first 
Confederate  troops  crossed  the  Chickamauga  to 
wards  the  west;  this  movement  was  still  going  on 


[72] 


A  DANGEROUS  MANEUVER 

on  the  morning  of  the  1 9th,  when  something  unex 
pected  happened  to  Bragg's  Army. 

About  two-thirds  of  the  Confederate  Army 
had  crossed  and  was  facing  towards  Lee  and 
Gordon's  Mill,  when  at  9  o'clock  a  brisk  engage 
ment  commenced  with  Forrest's  cavalry  on  the 
right  of  the  Confederate  line  at  Jay's  Mill,  near 
Reed's  Bridge. 

While  these  movements  of  the  Confederate 
Army  were  being  inaugurated  from  Lafayette 
down  on  the  east  side  of  Chickamauga,  the  Union 
Army,  at  the  foot  of  Stevens's  Gap  in  the  cove  and 
McCook's  Twentieth  Corps,  twenty  miles  away 
near  Alpine,  had  to  get  together  and  join  Critten- 
den's  Twenty-first  Corps  at  Lee  and  Gordon's 
Mill. 

While  waiting  to  receive  sufficient  information 
to  convince  him  that  Bragg  had  halted  at  Lafay 
ette,  Rosecrans  had  on  September  11  or  1 2  greatly 
widened  the  distance  between  his  corps.  It  was  a 
very  dangerous  maneuver  to  face  Bragg,  and  had 
a  more  enterprising  general  been  in  command  of 
the  Confederate  Army,  the  result  would  probably 
have  been  fatal  for  the  Union  forces.  General  D. 

[73] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

H.  Hill  says  in  a  Century  Magazine  article,  that 
Bragg  was  confused  by  the  rapid  movements  of 
the  Union  Corps;  the  presence  of  McCook's 
Corps,  south  of  Lafayette,  at  Alpine,  held  Bragg 
for  a  while  at  that  place.  He  was  not  well  in 
formed  as  to  the  movements  of  Rosecrans's 
Army.16 

Bragg,  by  failing  to  attack  the  detached  Four 
teenth  Corps  nearest  him  in  McLemore's  Cove, 
and  afterwards  to  march  towards  the  more  distant 
detached  Twenty-first  Corps  at  Lee  and  Gordon's 
gave  the  Union  commander  an  opportunity  to 
concentrate,  and  place  his  united  army  across  the 
road  from  Lafayette  to  Chattanooga,  at  Kelly's 
farm  between  Rossville  and  Lee  and  Gordon's 
Mill.  How  was  this  movement  done? 

While  it  took  Bragg  five  days — from  Septem 
ber  1 2  to  1 7 — to  concentrate  his  army  from  Lafay 
ette  and  Ringgold  near  Lee  and  Gordon's,  it 
required  the  same  length  of  time  for  McCook  to 
march  his  corps  from  the  vicinity  of  Alpine  to  con 
nect  it  with  Thomas  at  the  foot  of  Stevens's  Gap 

leSee  Robert  U.  Johnson  and  C.  C.  Buel  (eck),  Battles  and 
Leaders  of  the  Civil  War  (N.  Y.,  1884-87),  vol.  3. 

[74] 


SERIOUS  MISTAKES 

in  the  cove.  There  was  a  distance  of  forty  miles 
from  flank  to  flank  of  the  Union  Army,  that  is, 
from  Alpine  to  Lee  and  Gordon's.  But  McCook 
marched  fifty-seven  miles  by  the  route  he  took  In 
order  to  connect  with  Thomas.  General  Rose- 
crans  in  his  official  report  says:  "He  [General 
McCook]  had,  with  great  prudence,  already 
moved  his  trains  back  to  the  rear  of  Little  River,  on 
the  mountain,  but  unfortunately,  being  ignorant  of 
the  mountain  road,  moved  down  the  mountain  at 
Winston's  Gap,  down  Lookout  Valley  to  Cooper's 
Gap,  up  the  mountain,  and  down  again,  closing 
up  with  General  Thomas  on  the  1 7th."] 

Looking  back  at  this  scattering  of  Rosecrans's 
forces  by  the  sendingof  McCook's  Corps  to  Alpine 
—twenty  miles  southwest  of  Lafayette — one  can 
understand  that  such  tactics  were  serious  mistakes. 
General  Rosecrans  thought  himself  justified  for  the 
movement  upon  the  supposed  correctness  of  the  in 
formation  he  had  received,  namely,  that  Bragg's 
Army  was  in  full  retreat  towards  Rome,  Georgia. 
It  is  apparent,  however,  that  a  reconnoisance  of  the 
cavalry  to  Alpine  and  Summerville  would  have 

17  Rebellion  Records,  Serial  No.  50,  p.  54. 

[75] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

accomplished  the  same  result  as  the  corps  of  infan 
try  which  was  sent.  The  alternative  before  Rose- 
crans,  when  he  discovered  the  retreat  of  the  Con 
federate  Army,  was  to  concentrate  the  Fourteenth 
and  Twentieth  corps  at  Chattanooga,  occupy 
Rossville  Gap  with  a  strong  outpost,  well  en 
trenched,  and  Lookout  Mountain  with  another  en 
trenched  detachment;  he  could  then  have  waited 
for  further  developments.  It  is  hardly  probable 
that  Bragg  would  have  attacked  him  after  having 
received  his  reinforcements,  but  would  perhaps 
have  fallen  back  on  his  line  of  supplies  at  some 
point  in  the  rear.  Before  that  could  have  occurred, 
however,  the  reinforcements  that  Rosecrans  after 
wards  received  would  have  been  able  to  protect 
his  line  of  communications. 

By  the  evening  of  the  17th  the  Union  troops 
were  substantially  within  supporting  distance,  but 
not  yet  in  line  to  resist  an  attack  by  the  enemy  upon 
Crittenden  at  Lee  and  Gordon's,  but  orders  were 
immediately  given  to  move  the  Fourteenth  and 
Twentieth  corps  towards  the  northeast,  down  the 
west  Chickamauga  River,  in  order  to  cover  the 
Lafayette  road,  somewhere  near  Crittenden's 


OCCUPATION  OF  CHATTANOOGA 

Corps.     The  position  of  the  troops  and  narrow 
ness  of  the  roads  retarded  the  march. 

It  must  be  kept  in  mind,  that  the  movements 
which  Rosecrans  made  after  he  discovered  that 
Bragg  had  halted  at  Lafayette,  were  for  the  pur 
pose  of  concentrating  upon  Chattanooga ;  and  that 
the  route  Rosecrans  took  after  the  junction  of  the 
Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  corps  was  perhaps  the 
shortest  route  he  could  take  to  Chattanooga,  while 
he  could  at  the  same  time  watch  the  enemy.  He 
encountered  Bragg's  force  at  Chickamauga  and 
was  forced  to  fight  there.  This  was,  therefore, 
the  battle  for  Chattanooga.  He  gained  his  point 
—the  military  occupancy  of  Chattanooga — but  it 
required  two  battles  to  win  it;  those  of  Chicka 
mauga  and  the  three  days  fight  immediately 
around  Chattanooga. 

During  the  1 8th  Minty's  cavalry,  in  position 
east  of  Reed's  Bridge,  was  attacked  by  Bushrod 
Johnson's  troops  coming  from  Ringgold,  and 
Wilder's  mounted  infantry  at  Alexander's,  by 
Walker's  Corps.  Both  were  holding  bridges,  but 
were  driven  back  into  the  Lafayette  road.  Gen 
eral  Rosecrans's  plan,  as  given  in  orders,  was  that 

[77] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

General  Thomas  on  his  way  down  the  cove  road 
passing  Crawfish  Springs,  near  the  battle-field, 
should  post  General  Negley's  division  there,  re 
lieving  two  divisions  of  Crittenden's  Corps.  With 
the  remainder  of  his  corps,  he  was  to  march  by 
way  of  Widow  Glenn's  house  to  the  Lafayette 
road,  and  take  position  at  Kelly's  farm,  across 
this  road.  General  Crittenden  was  to  move 
Palmer's  and  Van  Cleve's  divisions,  relieved 
by  Negley,  to  the  left  of  his  line,  and  with 
them  prolong  his  left,  from  the  left  of  Wood's 
division,  so  as  to  cover  that  part  of  the  Lafayette 
road,  near  Lee  and  Gordon's.  McCook's  Corps 
was  to  follow  General  Thomas  and  take  tempor 
ary  position  at  Crawfish  Springs,  protecting  the 
right  of  the  Union  line,  and  to  keep  his  corps 
mainly  in  reserve. 

The  cavalry  was  to  close  on  McCook's  right, 
and  to  watch  the  crossings  of  the  Chickamauga  in 
that  region. 

The  Union  movements  began  on  the  morning  of 
the  1 8th,  but  were  so  slow,  that  McCook's  Corps 
only  reached  Pond  Spring  at  dark,  and  bivouaced 
there  for  the  night.  Crittenden's  two  divisions 

[78] 


UNION  MOVEMENTS 

reached  their  positions  on  the  Lafayette  road  near 
midnight.  In  view  of  the  accumulated  evidence, 
that  the  enemy  was  crossing  his  forces  over  the 
Chickamauga  below  Lee  and  Gordon's  on  the 
1 8th,  General  Thomas  pushed  forward  his  corps, 
uninterruptedly  during  the  night.  He  halted  his 
leading  division — Negley's — at  the  assigned  posi 
tion  near  Crawfish  Springs,  where  his  corps  rested 
for  two  hours  at  midnight  and  made  coffee.  From 
there  on  Baird's  division  was  in  the  lead,  and 
General  Thomas  and  staff  rode  with  General 
Baird  at  the  head  of  the  column.  This  was  a 
weird  night-march.  The  utmost  secrecy  was 
kept.  If  the  enemy — who  was  just  across  the 
river  not  far  away — had  discovered  the  movement, 
he  would  perhaps  also  have  marched  in  the  night 
and  occupied  the  place  for  which  General  Thomas 
was  aiming.  General  Hill's  Corps  and  Wheel 
er's  Cavalry  of  the  Confederate  Army  were  on 
the  east  side  of  the  Chickamauga,  in  order  to  pre 
vent  the  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth  corps  from 
making  this  march.  To  deceive  the  enemy  camp- 
fires  were  left  burning  in  the  camps  in  the  early 
evening;  in  fact  all  along  the  road  southwest  of 

[79] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Crawfish  Springs,  frequent  fires  were  kindled. 
Soon  after  leaving  Crawfish  Springs  the  column 
deflected  to  the  right  into  an  obscure  cross-country 
road,  which  led  to  Kelly's  farm.  Along  the 
windings  of  this  road,  some  of  the  hardest  fights 
of  the  1 9th  and  20th  took  place.  A  pond  after 
wards  known  as  "bloody  pond"  was  passed  soon 
after  leaving  Crawfish  Springs;  to  the  left,  and 
a  short  distance  from  this  pond,  General  William 
H.  Lytle  was  killed  September  20.  Still  further 
on  was  the  place  where  the  fatal  blunder  of  the 
20th  occurred — at  about  1  1  a.  m. — near  Brother- 
ton's  house;  General  T.  J.  Wood,  obeying  his 
interpretation  of  an  order  from  General  Rosecrans, 
having  withdrawn  from  the  line,  let  in  Longstreet's 
troops. 

This  road  runs  almost  entirely  through  thick 
hardwood  timber,  but  about  half  way  between 
Crawfish  Springs  and  Kelly's  farm,  there  was  a 
little  dwelling  in  the  midst  of  a  clearing,  known 
as  Widow  Glenn's.  Here  the  next  day,  General 
Rosecrans  lifted  the  name  of  the  widow  from  the 
depths  of  utter  obscurity  to  the  heights  of  national 
fame,  by  making  her  home  his  headquarters.  In 

[80] 


THE  HERO  OF  THE  CONFLICT 

fact,  the  whole  region  from  Missionary  Ridge,  on 
the  left  of  the  marching  column  as  far  as  Ross- 
ville  Gap  (four  miles  to  the  northwest)  to  the 
Chickamauga  on  the  east,  was  densely  wooded 
and  covered  with  heavy  undergrowth.  A  few 
small  farms  scattered  through  this  woodland  were 
tilled  by  the  obscurest  of  backwoodsmen,  who 
lived  in  small  log  cabins  or  small  frame  buildings. 
Their  names  would  never  have  been  known,  even 
in  Chattanooga  nine  miles  away,  had  it  not  been 
for  the  accidental  fighting  there  of  the  greatest 
battle  of  the  west.  Widow  Glenn's,  Kelly's 
farm,  Snodgrass  Hill,  McDonald's,  Poe's, 
Brotherton's,  Dyer's,  Vittetoe's,  and  Viniard's 
were  suddenly  made  historical  by  the  battle  of 
Chickamauga. 

General  George  H.  Thomas  was  a  very  sedate 
man.  There  was  about  him,  at  all  times,  the  very 
atmosphere  of  solid  merit  and  reserved  strength. 
As  he  rode  beside  General  Baird,  attended  by 
the  two  staff  corps,  there  was  no  indication 
that  he  was  conscious  of  his  high  position.  His 
modesty  was  always  conspicuous.  No  one  in 
the  long  line  of  troops  stretching  for  miles 

6  [81] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

behind  could  see  in  this  unpretentious  officer 
the  true  hero  of  the  coming  conflict,  who  would 
be  known  in  the  future  as  the  "Rock  of 
Chickamauga."  After  Negley's  division  was 
left  in  position  near  Crawfish,  there  remained  in 
the  marching  column  the  three  divisions  of  Baird, 
Brannan,  and  Reynolds.  Baird's  and  Brannan's 
had  three  brigades  each,  but  Reynolds's  had  only 
two ;  Wilder's  was  mounted  and  operated  as  cav 
alry,  wherefore  it  was  not  always  with  its  divi 
sion. 

About  daylight  on  September  1 9,  Baird's  divi 
sion  filed  across  the  Lafayette  road  near  Kelly's 
log  house,  stacked  arms,  and  commenced  to  pre 
pare  breakfast.  Forrest's  Confederate  cavalry 
lay  at  that  time  in  the  neighborhood  of  Jay's  Mill, 
one  mile  to  the  east,  near  Reed's  Bridge;  Hood's 
and  Walker's  corps  were  further  up,  or  west  to 
wards  Lee's  and  Gordon's  and  within  a  mile  and 
a  half  of  Crittenden's  left.  The  stream  was  in 
many  places  easily  fordable.  The  whole  Con 
federate  Army  was  across  the  Chickamauga  at 
sunrise  with  the  exception  of  Hindman's,  Brecken- 

ridge's,  and  Cleburne's  divisions.     Thomas  made 

[82] 


North 


ClIICKAMAUGA,     SEPTEMBER    19,     1863 


Adapted  from  Fiske's   The  Mississippi  Valley  in  the  Civil  War, 

p.  266 


GRANGER'S  MOVEMENTS 

temporary  headquarters  under  a  large  tree  by  the 
road  side;  while  waiting  for  the  closing  up  of  the 
rear  division,  he  lay  down  on  some  blankets,  and 
told  his  aide  not  to  let  him  sleep  more  than  an  hour. 
General  Gordon  Granger,  who  commanded 
the  reserve  corps,  had  been  ordered  by  Rosecrans 
on  September  13  to  bring  three  brigades  of 
this  corps — which"  happened  then  to  be  at 
Bridgeport,  Alabama,  guarding  that  point  of  the 
Union  line  of  supplies — to  the  Rossville  Gap. 
His  duty  was  to  guard  the  approaches  from  the 
south  and  east  and  to  generally  support  the  main 
army.  He  moved  with  his  usual  energy  and  ar 
rived  at  the  gap  on  September  14,  although  the 
distance  is  about  thirty-five  miles.  He  brought 
with  him  two  brigades  of  Steedman's  division, 
viz. :  Mitchell's  and  Whittaker's,  and  Daniel  Mc- 
Cook's  brigades  of  James  D.  Morgan's  division. 
Granger's  presence  in  the  front  of  Rossville  Gap  at 
McAffee's  Church  with  Whittaker's  brigade,  and 
his  sending  Daniel  McCook's  and  Mitchell's 
brigades  towards  Jay's  Mill  and  Reed's  Bridge, 
assisted  greatly  in  postponing  the  crossing  of  the 


83] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Confederate  forces  until  the  18th  and  thus  pre 
venting  an  attack  on  Crittenden's  left  flank. 

On  the  morning  of  the  1 9th  McCook's  brigade 
was  bivouacing  somewhere  near  Reed's  Bridge. 
McCook  rode  over  to  where  Thomas  was,  and 
said  hurriedly  he  must  speak  to  him.  He  told 
General  Thomas  that  a  Confederate  brigade  had 
crossed  at  Reed's  Bridge  and  that  his  (own) 
brigade  had  then  burned  this  bridge,  thus  this  de 
tached  brigade  could  be  captured,  if  General 
Thomas  would  send  forces  enough  to  do  it.  At 
that  moment  the  head  of  Brannan's  division  was 
approaching  in  rear  of  the  line  of  Baird's  division 
to  take  position  on  the  latter's  left.  Thomas  or 
dered  Brannan  to  reconnoitre  in  that  direction  with 
two  brigades  and  to  attack  any  force  met.  His 
advance  brigade — Croxton's — encountered  very 
soon  Forrest's  cavalry,  about  7:30  or  8a.m.  (some 
reports  say  9  a.  m.)  and  drove  it  more  than  half 
a  mile.  'This  vigorous  movement  disconcerted 
the  plans  of  the  enemy  to  move  on  our  left  and 
opened  the  battle  of  the  19th  September,"  says 
General  Rosecrans  in  his  official  report.18  Forrest 

18  Rosecrans's  report  in  Rebellion  Records,  Serial  No.  50,  p.  56. 


BRANNAN'S  RECONNAISANCE 

was  in  that  place  as  a  defense  of  Bragg's  right 
flank.  The  sudden  musketry  of  Croxton's  attack 
on  Forrest  far  to  the  right  of  the  Confederate 
commanders  startled  them  and  gave  them  the  first 
intimation,  that  Bragg's  order  did  not  meet  the 
situation. 

General  H.  V.  Boynton  says  that,  at  the  time 
the  isolated  Confederate  brigade  was  reported  as 
on  the  west  side  of  Chickamauga,  early  in  the 
morning  of  September  1 9,  two-thirds  of  the  Con 
federate  Army  were  on  the  west  side. 

It  was  6:30  a.  m.  when  Brannan  left  Kelly's 
and  moved  north ;  he  took  the  Reed's  Bridge  road 
for  the  capturing  of  the  isolated  brigade.  It  was 
between  8  and  9  a.  m.,  before  the  enemy  was 
struck. 

General  Forrest  called  immediately  for  assist 
ance.  Ector's  and  Wilson's  infantry  brigades  of 
Walker's  Corps  returned  down  the  stream  and 
drove  Croxton.  This  brought  Brannan  with  his 
two  remaining  brigades  forward;  he  in  turn  drove 
back  the  Confederate  force.  Brannan  in  his  re 
port19  says,  that  his  troops  came  upon  a  strong  force 


Ibid.,  p.  400. 

[85 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

of  the  enemy,  consisting  of  two  divisions  instead 
of  the  supposed  brigade.  Very  soon  Baird's  divi 
sion  was  sent  in  on  the  right  of  Brannan ;  this  at  first 
drove  the  Confederate  force  that  was  attacking 
Brannan,  but  in  turn  it  was  attacked  directly  on  its 
right  flank  and  rear  by  Liddell's  division,  which 
threw  it  into  temporary  confusion.  In  the  mean 
time  McCook's  Corps  arrived  on  the  field.  R. 
W.  Johnson's  division  of  that  corps  was  sent  in, 
at  noon,  on  Baird's  right;  it  struck  Cheatham's 
division  on  its  right  flank,  driving  it  back  in  confu 
sion.  Johnson's  was  overlapped  and  in  immediate 
danger,  when  General  John  M.  Palmer's  division 
of  Crittenden's  Corps,  relieved  the  right  of  his  divi 
sion  ;Crittenden  had  very  wisely  dispatched  Palm 
er's  division  toward  the  sound  of  the  firing  and  this 
burst  upon  the  enemy.  Palmer's  right  was  soon 
overlapped  when  Van  Cleve  from  Crittenden's 
Corps  came  to  the  rescue,  but  later  in  the  day  he 
also  was  beaten  back.  Then  Reynolds's  division 
of  Thomas's  corps  advanced  on  the  left  of  Pal 
mer's  division,  and  two  brigades  of  Van  Cleve's 
division  came  in  on  Palmer's  right.  Davis's  division 
of  McCook's  Corps  attacked  most  opportunely  and 

[86] 


WOUNDING  OF  HEG 

drove  the  enemy,  but  was  compelled  somewhat 
to  give  way.  In  this  attack  Colonel  Hans  C. 
Heg  of  the  Fifteenth  Wisconsin  Infantry  was 
mortally  wounded.  In  the  meantime  Crittenden's 
remaining  division  under  Wood  attacked  the 
Confederates  and  turned  the  tide.  Lee  and 
Gordon's  Mill  was  at  that  moment  uncovered, 
all  of  Crittenden's  Corps  having  marched  towards 
the  left.  About  3  o'clock  p.  m.  McCook  was  or 
dered  to  send  his  remaining  division  (Sheridan's) 
to  support  the  line  near  Wood  and  Davis,  and  to 
place  Lytle's  brigade  at  Lee  and  Gordon's  as  the 
extreme  right.  This  stayed  the  Confederate  ad 
vance  in  that  section. 

Lytle's  brigade  was  considered  sufficient 
at  that  time  to  hold  a  point- against  which  Bragg 
was,  at  first,  directing  his  whole  force.  This 
point — at  Lee  and  Gordon's — was  the  left  of 
the  Union  Army  on  the  1 8th ;  at  noon  on  the  1 9th 
it  was  the  right. 

Negley's  division,  which  had  been  posted  near 
Crawfish  Springs  the  night  before,  was  then  the 
only  Union  division  which  did  not  partake  in  the 
battle  at  first,  but  arrived  in  accordance  with  orders 

[87] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

on  the  field  about  4:30  p.  m.  He  was  ordered  to 
the  place,  from  which  VanCleve  had  been  driven, 
in  order  to  attack;  he  drove  the  enemy  steadily, 
while  Thomas  was  driving  him  on  the  Confeder 
ate  right ;  these  movements  continued  until  night. 

It  can  readily  be  perceived  that  the  battle  of  the 
1 9th  was  more  or  less  a  haphazard  fight,  neither 
side  being  aware  of  the  position  of  the  other.  The 
undergrowth  of  the  woods  was  so  dense  in  most 
places,  that  opposed  sides  could  not  perceive  each 
other  until  they  were  within  a  few  yards,  except  by 
the  firing.  It  was  unfortunate  that  Rosecrans  was 
not  present  with  Thomas,  when  the  latter's  corps 
crossed  the  Lafayette  road.  Before  an  attack  was 
made,  the  Twenty-first  Corps,  being  the  nearest 
one  to  the  Fourteenth,  should  have  been  formed 
on  the  right  of  the  Fourteenth,  both  in  a  com 
pact  line,  and  with  a  brigade  for  each  division 
in  reserve;  and  the  Twentieth  Corps — when  it 
closed  up  on  the  right  of  the  Twenty-first  in  the 
same  compact  order — should  have  advanced 
swiftly  upon  the  Confederates,  some  of  whom 
were  still  crossing  the  river,  and  some  with  their 
right  flanks  to  the  Union  line  of  attack.  It  is  pos- 

[88] 


A  HAND-TO-HAND  CONTEST 

sible  that  such  an  attack  would  have  driven  the 
Confederates  into  the  river  in  great  confusion ;  but 
an  attack  by  only  one  division  (Brannan's)  on 
Forrest's  cavalry  beyond  the  Confederate  right 
flank,  simply  notified  the  Confederate  command 
ers,  and  gave  them  ample  time  to  wheel  their  divi 
sions  into  the  proper  direction,  and  signalled  them 
where  to  attack.  General  Rosecrans  in  his  report 
does  not  mention  a  night  fight  that  occurred  on  the 
extreme  Union  left.  In  fact,  he  says,  there  was 
no  firing  after  dark.  Just  as  it  began  to  grow 
dark,  however,  Cleburne's  division  of  Hill's  Corps 
arrived  from  across  the  river.  He  boldly  and 
characteristically  marched  through  the  defeated 
and  prostrated  divisions  of  Walker  and  Cheatham, 
was  joined  by  two  brigades  of  Cheatham's  divi 
sion,  Jackson's,  and  Preston  Smith's,  and  then  at 
tacked  with  great  fierceness  the  Union  troops  under 
R.  W.  Johnson  and  Baird ;  they  covered  Johnson's 
front  and  lapped  over  on  Baird.  It  was  too  dark 
to  recognize  friend  from  foe,  and  it  was  more  or 
less  a  hand-to-hand  contest.  Finally  the  attack 
was  repulsed,  the  Union  troops  holding  the  field. 


89] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

The  Confederate  general,  Preston  Smith,  and  two 
of  his  staff  officers  were  killed. 

Some  idea  of  the  severity  of  the  fighting  on  the 
19th — the  charging  and  falling  back  of  both 
sides;  the  difficulty  in  keeping  alignments;  the  im 
possibility  of  officers  identifying  friend  or  foe;  the 
losing  of  artillery  batteries  and  single  pieces,  their 
recapture;  and  the  awful  slaughter  in  both  armies 
— can  be  obtained  only  by  reading  official  reports 
in  serial  numbers  50  and  5 1  of  Rebellion  Records. 
Its  intensity  can  be  estimated  from  the  follow 
ing  data.  Breckenridge's  division  was  not  in  the 
fight  of  September  19,  but  fought  on  the  20th 
only;  his  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was  1,075. 
Cleburne  was  in  the  night  fight  of  the  1 9th,  and 
was  as  active  as  Breckenridge  on  the  20th;  his 
loss  was  1 ,743  in  killed  and  wounded.  The 
total  difference  of  668  does  not  give  an  accurate 
comparison  of  the  two  days'  fighting,  but  does  give 
some  idea  of  the  awful  slaughter.  The  battle  of 
the  1 9th  was  fought  without  breastworks;  it  was  a 
square  stand-up  fight;  nearly  every  division  en 
gaged  on  both  sides,  first  attacked,  then  drove  its 
opponent,  and  after  falling  back  in  some  disorder, 

[90] 


KELLY'S  FARM 


reformed,  and  again  advanced,  until  the  day  and 
part  of  the  night  were  gone. 

The  surgeon-general  of  the  Union  Army  re 
ported  that  about  4,500  wounded  were  treated  af 
ter  this  battle  of  the  1 9th.  The  loss  in  killed  and 
wounded  must,  therefore,  have  reached  6,000,  but 
the  Union  reports  do  not  separate  the  losses  of  the 
19th  from  the  total. 

Late  in  the  afternoon  of  the  19th,  Brannan Y 
division  was  withdrawn  from  the  left  and  placed 
in  reserve,  or  rather  in  echelon  at  the  right  of  Rey 
nolds,  near  Brotherton's  house,  at  the  right  of 
Thomas's  line. 

During  the  night  of  the  1 9th  the  lines  of  both 
armies  were  readjusted.  That  of  the  Union  Army 
was  drawn  back.  Palmer  of  Crittenden's  Corps 
and  Johnson  of  McCook's,  who  had  reported  to 
General  Thomas  the  day  before,  were  ordered  to 
remain  under  his  direction.  He  placed  his  troops 
in  a  compact  line — facing  east  with  the  Lafayette 
road  in  his  rear — around  Kelly's  farm,  but  some 
distance  in  the  woods.  The  divisions  were  in  the 
following  order  from  left  to  right:  Baird,  Johnson, 
Palmer,  Reynolds,  and  Brannan;  Brannan  was 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

drawn  back  so  far,  however,  that  he  could  be  avail 
able  as  a  reserve  and  at  the  same  time  close  enough 
to  advance  quickly  to  the  front  line.  The  right 
and  left  were  both  refused.  Baird  had  no  re 
serve  ;  but  Johnson  and  Palmer  had  each  a  brigade 
in  reserve.  Each  division  was  formed  in  two 
lines,  and  both  were  protected  by  hastily  thrown 
up  log  breastworks.  The  artillery  was  in  battery 
between  brigades ;  this  line  was  not  broken  during 
the  battle  of  the  20th.  Reynolds's  line  crossed  the 
Lafayette  road  at  Poe's  house,  near  Brotherton's, 
and  from  there  to  Lee  and  Gordon's  neither  of  the 
armies  was  in  possession  of  the  road.  Reynolds 
had  Turchin's  brigade  in  line  and  King's  in  re 
serve.  Baird's  left  did  not  reach  to  the  Lafayette 
road.  Kelly  Field,  which  was  a  parallelogram 
about  half  a  mile  long  and  a  quarter  of  a  mile  wide, 
was  the  storm  centre  of  battle  during  September 
20.  Besides  the  immense  fighting  along  the  main 
line  of  log  works,  there  were  five  different  charges, 
in  rear  of  the  main  line  from  the  south  to  the  north 
side  by  five  different  Union  brigades.  These 
charges  were  made  against  the  Confederate  troops, 
which  had  turned  on  the  left  of  Baird's  line  and 

[92] 


THE 


gained  his  rear.  The  brigades  of  Stanley,  Van 
Derveer,  Gross,  Willich,  and  Turchin  made  these 
charges. 

The  right  of  the  Union  line  on  the  20th — from 
Brannan's  right — was  neither  compact  nor  pro 
tected.  During  the  night  of  the  19th,  or  early 
morning  of  the  20th,  the  four  divisions  of  Sheridan, 
Davis,  Wood,  and  Van  Cleve  had  been  moved  to 
the  eastern  slope  of  Missionary  Ridge,  a  mile  or 
more  from  the  Lafayette  road,  in  order  to  cover  the 
road  leading  from  Crawfish  Springs  to  McFar- 
land's  Gap,  west  of  Rosecrans's  headquarters. 
General  Rosecrans  says  he  rode  the  line  about 
daylight,  and  that  he  suggested  certain  changes  to 
McCook,  especially  that  he  keep  close  to  the  left, 
which  was  not  done,  however,  in  time  to  prevent 
disaster.  Negley  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps,  who 
was  in  line  on  the  right  adjoining  Brannan,  was  or 
dered  to  proceed  to  Thomas's  left,  but  only  two 
brigades,  John  Beatty's  and  Stanley's,  arrived,  one 
at  a  time;  both  were  driven  away  by  the  enemy. 
John  Beatty's  brigade — which  at  8:30  a.  m.  was 
placed  on  the  left  of  Baird,  so  as  to  reach  the  La 
fayette  road — was  not  fortified;  its  thin  line  was 

[93] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

swept  away  at  the  first  attack  by  the  enemy. 
Negley  was  expected  to  fill  this  gap  with  his  whole 
division,  and  Thomas  sent  request  after  request  for 
Negley 's  division.  There  was  so  much  readjust 
ment  going  on  at  the  wrong  time,  and  much  of  it 
not  going  on  at  any  time  in  the  troops  under  Mc- 
Cook  and  Crittenden  on  the  20th,  that  it  is  difficult 
now  to  try  to  place  them  up  to  1  1  a.  m.  Wood, 
with  his  two  brigades  from  the  reserve,  relieved 
Negley's  two  remaining  brigades  in  the  front  line, 
next  to  Brannan's  about  9:30  a.  m.,  his  brigade  be 
ing  a  little  withdrawn  in  echelon.  This  was  done 
to  enable  Negley  to  take  position  on  Baird's  left. 
About  11  a.  m.  Van  Cleve  marched  to  the  rear  of 
Wood  and  had  his  men  lie  down.  All  these 
troops  on  the  right — from  Reynolds's  right  to 
Sheridan's  the  extreme  right  of  the  Union  Army- 
were  very  thinly  drawn  out,  and  did  no  good  in  the 
day's  fight,  with  the  exception  of  one  full  brigade 
of  Wood's,  namely,  Harker's  ,  one  regiment  of 
Buell's  brigade,  and  a  few  regiments  from  other 
divisions,  which  will  be  mentioned  further  on. 
The  troops  had  done  excellent  service  the  day  be 
fore  ;  but  future  events  will  show  that  they  seemed 

[94] 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FORMATION 

to  be  paralyzed,  by  not  having  been  well  fortified 
and  compactly  placed  the  night  before.  This 
mistake  had  been  corrected  to  some  extent,  when 
the  disaster  came.  On  the  20th  the  troops  faced 
Longstreet,  a  most  sagacious  general,  who  was  ex 
ceedingly  energetic  in  taking  advantage  of  every 
defect  of  his  opponent's  line  and  every  blunder  in 
his  maneuvers. 

McCook  had  Davis's  and  Sheridan's  divisions 
still  on  his  extreme  right.  Crittenden  had  Van 
Cleve's  and  Wood's,  although  the  latter  was  in  the 
early  morning  supposed  to  be  in  reserve.  Wood 
came  into  the  front  line  as  stated,  but  Van  Cleve 
seems  not  to  have  found  a  place  there  on  the  20th. 

THE  CONFEDERATE  LINE  ON  SEPTEMBER  20 

The  Confederate  line  was  in  admirable  forma 
tion  on  the  morning  of  the  20th,  at  a  distance  of 
400  to  1 ,000  yards  east  of  the  Lafayette  road. 
From  its  right  to  its  left  it  may  be  described  as  fol 
lows:  General  Leonidas  Polk  commanded  the 
right  wing  which  was  formed  as  follows :  Forrest's 
cavalry  on  the  extreme  right,  3,500  strong,  a  large 

[95] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

part  of  it  dismounted;  and  next  to  him  Brecken- 
ridge's  division.  The  cavalry  and  two  infantry 
brigades  of  Breckenridge's  extended  beyond 
Baird's  left;  next  in  line  came  Cleburne's  division, 
in  reserve  behind  Breckenridge  was  Walker's  two 
divisions  of  five  brigades. 

General  Longstreet  commanded  the  left  wing 
of  the  Confederate  Army.  This  began  at  Cle 
burne's  left  with  Stewart's  division  opposite  Pal 
mer's  and  Reynolds's ;  then  came  B.  R.  Johnson's 
opposite  Brannan's  and  Wood's;  next  in  line  came 
Hindman's,  just  opposite  to  Davis,  and  Sheridan's, 
and  in  reserve  behind  Hindman's  was  Preston's. 
In  reserve  behind  B.  R.  Johnson's  were  Law's  or 
Hood's — until  Hood  was  wounded — and  Ker- 
shaw's  five  brigades  in  both.  Cheatham's  five 
brigades  were  in  reserve  behind  Stewart's  right,  but 
fought  only  the  Union  left,  both  on  the  1 9th  and 
20th.  At  3:30  p.  m.  Cheatham  went  to  the  ex 
treme  right  of  the  Confederate  Army.  The 
strength  of  the  whole  Confederate  formation  lay 
in  its  reserves;  they  were  used  with  consummate 
ability.  The  only  reserves  on  the  right  wing  of 
the  Union  Army  at  the  time  of  theConfederate  as- 

[96] 


THE  CONFEDERATE  FORMATION 

sault  was  Van  Cleve's  division — which  as  an  or 
ganized  division  did  not  fight  on  the  20th — and 
Wilder's  mounted  brigade. 

Longstreet  had  brought  with  him  from  Virginia 
two  divisions  of  Hood's  Corps — McLaws's  and 
Law's.  Of  McLaws's  division  only  Kershaw's 
and  Humphreys's  brigades  arrived  in  time  to  take 
part  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga.  Law  had 
three  brigades  in  his  division.  These  were  Rob 
ertson's,  Benning's,  and  another,  later  com 
manded  by  Colonel  James  L.  Sheffield. 

Bushrod  R.  Johnson's  division  belonged  to 
Buckner's  Corps  from  East  Tennessee.  Buck- 
ner's  Corps  included  also  Stewart's  and  Preston's 
divisions.  These  were  not  together  during  the 
battle,  but  were  presumably  under  direct  command 
of  General  Longstreet.  The  condition  of  Leon- 
idas  Folk's  old  corps,  was  almost  similar.  Cheat- 
ham's  division  of  five  brigades,  and  Hindman's  of 
three  brigades — of  Folk's  former  corps — were  sep 
arated,  and  operated  in  different  parts  of  the  field. 
Daniel  H.  Hill's  Corps  consisted  of  Cleburne's 
and  Breckenridge's  divisions;  these  acted  together, 
commanded  by  Hill  in  person.  General  W.  H. 

7  [97] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

T.  Walker's  Corps  was  composed  of  his  old  divi 
sion,  commanded  by  General  State  Rights  Gist, 
and  Liddell's  division  consisting  of  two  brigades 
— Govan's  and  Walthall's. 

It  will  be  understood  that  the  Confederate  forces 
were  large,  strongly  organized,  well  officered,  and 
extremely  well  placed  on  the  field.     Since  falling 
back  from  Tullahoma  the  following  reinforce 
ments  had  joined  Bragg:  Walker's  five  brigades 
from  Mississippi,  Buckner's  six  brigades  from  East 
Tennessee,  and  Hood's  five  brigades  from  Vir 
ginia,  besides  a  large  amount  of  artillery.     The 
coming  of  General  Longstreet  from  Virginia  was 
a  distinct  assistance  to  the  Confederate  Army. 
He  was  a  genuine  soldier  of  great  ability,  and 
capable  of  commanding  his  soldiers,  clearly  shown 
when  he  handled  the  left  Confederate  wing  on  the 
20th.     The  contrast  between  him  and  Leonidas 
Polk  was  very  much  in  evidence  on  the  20th. 
Longstreet  was  exceedingly  strong,  while  Polk 
was  very  weak.     The  Confederate  right  over 
lapped  the  Union  left  and  had  the  Union  right 
been  as  compactly  drawn  towards  its  left  as  it 
should  have  been,  the  Confederate  left  would  also 

[98] 


North 


\ 


ClIICKAMAUGA,    MORNING    OF    SEPTEMBER    20,    1863 

Adapted  from  Fiske's   The  Mississippi  Valldy  in  the  Civil  War, 

p.  268 


Of    THE 

[   UNIVERSITY    } 


THE  UNION  FRONT 

have  overlapped  that  flank.  The  Confederate 
Army  facing  the  Union  forces  on  the  morning 
of  the  20th  was  made  up  of  eleven  divisions  of 
infantry,  and  two  of  cavalry.  General  Rosecrans 
had  no  cavalry  on  his  left,  and  Wheeler's  Confed 
erate  cavalry  was  at  first  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Chickamauga  and  afterwards  on  the  west  side, 
watching  Mitchell's  Union  horsemen  near  Craw 
fish  Springs. 

General  Rosecrans  had  141  regiments  of  infan 
try,  1 8  of  cavalry,  and  36  batteries.  Bragg  had 
1 73  infantry  regiments,  1 1  of  cavalry — which 
were  dismounted  and  fought  as  infantry — 28  cav 
alry  regiments,  and  50  batteries. 

The  Union  front  of  battle  on  the  morning  of  the 
20th,  was  about  two  and  a  half  miles  in  length. 
Although  Bragg  had  ordered  the  attack  to  be 
commenced  on  his  right  at  daylight,  and  to  be 
continued  towards  the  left,  yet  it  was  9:30  o'clock 
before  Breckenridge  advanced  his  three  brigades, 
Adams's,  Stovall's,  and  Helm's  against  the  left  of 
Baird's  and  John  Beatty's  thin  line  beyond. 
Adams's  brigade  on  the  right  crossed  the  Lafay 
ette  road,  and  Stovall  struck  Beatty.  The  latter 

[991 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

had  to  give  way,  but  inflicted  terrible  punishment 
on  the  enemy. 

Part  of  Stovall's  brigade  came  against  the  reg 
ular  brigade,  but  made  no  impression.  Helm, 
the  left  of  Breckenridge's  line,  attacked  the  right 
of  the  regulars',  Scribner's  line.  The  Confed 
erate  line  was  shattered  and  went  to  pieces. 
Helm,  in  bravely  trying  to  rally  his  men  was 
killed ;  two  of  Helm's  colonels  were  also  killed, 
and  two  others  wounded. 

Adams's  brigade  was  gaining  the  rear  of 
King,  when  Stanley's  brigade  of  Negley's  long 
delayed  division  came  into  the  Kelly  field,  and 
formed  at  right  angles  with  the  road  and  the 
Union  line  swept  to  the  north,  past  King's  left, 
charged  into  the  woods  upon  Adams's  brigade, 
and  drove  it  away.  Sometime  during  their  attacks 
Adams  was  wounded  and  taken  prisoner.  Breck 
enridge's  attack  was  a  failure,  but  the  firing  by  the 
infantry  and  the  artillery  was  terrific  while  it 
lasted.  Cleburne's  division  advanced  while 
Breckenridge  was  still  in  the  fight;  his  attack  cov 
ered  part  of  Baird's  and  Johnson's.  Cleburne 
was  a  very  capable  officer;  brave  to  the  utmost; 

[too] 


FOLK'S  ATTACK 


still  his  attack  completely  failed.  Folk's  brigade 
of  that  division  assaulted  Starkweather.  With  re 
gard  to  this  attack  Polk  states  in  his  official  report20 
"My  line  from  right  to  left,  soon  became  furiously 
engaged,  the  enemy  pouring  a  most  destructive  fire 
of  canister  and  musketry  into  my  advancing  line — 
so  terrible  indeed,  that  my  line  could  not  advance 
in  face  of  it,  but  lying  down,  partially  protected  by 
the  crest  of  the  hill,  we  continued  the  fight  for  an 
hour  and  a  half." 

Cleburne  states  in  his  report21  "Folk's  brigade 
and  the  right  of  Wood's  encountered  the  heaviest 
artillery  fire  I  have  ever  experienced.  I  was  now 
within  short  canister  range  of  a  line  of  log  breast 
works,  and  a  hurricane  of  shot  and  shell  swept  the 
woods  from  the  unseen  enemy  in  my  front."  This 
charge  was  also  a  failure,  but  most  destructive  to 
the  Confederates.  Wood  reported22  a  loss  in  his 
brigade  of  96  killed  and  680  wounded.  The 
great  disparity  of  the  wounded,  in  comparison  with 
the  killed,  showed  that  the  Confederate  lines  did 


207tf.,  Serial  No.  51,  p.  177. 
Zllbid.,  p.  154. 
"find.,  P.  162. 


[101] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

not  get  very  close  to  the  Union  boys.  The  Union 
forces  were  so  pleased  with  having  repulsed  so 
forceful  an  attack,  that  they  sent  forward  a  strong 
skirmish  line.  General  Hill — who  was  forming 
from  the  reserves  a  stronger  second  attack — 
paused,  and  concluded  he  would  have  to  resist  an 
attack  from  the  Union  line. 

Walker's  reserve  corps  of  two  divisions  of  five 
brigades  was  therefore  moved  forward  and  distrib 
uted  along  the  broken  points  of  the  first  line.  Dur 
ing  the  day  successive  charges  were  made  from 
Palmer's  position  to  the  Union  left,  by  ten  Confed 
erate  brigades  along  the  Union  line,  which,  how 
ever,  they  could  not  penetrate,  nor  could  they 
get  very  close  to  the  breastworks.  Colquitt, 
commander  of  one  of  these  brigades,  fell  as 
well  as  several  of  his  officers,  and  General  Desh- 
ler  of  Cleburne's  division  was  killed.  Govan  of 
Walker's  troops  gained  the  rear  of  Baird's  division 
by  marching  around  Baird's  left  and  driving  away 
the  thin  unprotected  Union  line  at  that  poinL 
This  second  advance — which  was  actually  another 
phase  of  the  continuous  attack  from  9:30  to  nearly 
noon — had  extended  its  right  much  further  be- 

[I02l 


THOMAS  STANDS  FIRM 

yond  the  Union  left,  and  by  a  wide  left  wheel  it 
had  straddled  the  Lafayette  road.  One  brigade 
on  the  right  of  the  road,  another  on  the  left,  boldly 
threw  out  skirmishers  and  advanced  towards  Gen 
eral  Reynolds's  rear,  beyond  the  Kelly  house.  It 
was  a  very  threatening  and  dangerous  situation. 
The  Confederate  line  in  front — from  Baird  around 
to  Brannan — opened  a  heavy  fire  upon  the  barri 
cades.  It  looked  for  a  while,  as  if  the  movement 
would  succeed  in  destroying  the  heretofore  invin 
cible  line  of  General  Thomas's  troops ;  but  Thomas 
saw  every  movement  and  knew  the  weakness  of 
the  left  beyond  Baird.  Brannan  had  a  reserve 
brigade — Fred  Van  Derveer's — and  this  arrived 
just  in  time  to  form  in  front  of  the  Confederate  bri 
gades  in  the  Kelly  field.  It  changed  front  under 
fire,  charged  the  Confederate  line,  broke  it,  and 
finally  drove  it  clear  of  the  Union  left.  Then  the 
reserve  brigade  returned  to  a  point  near  the  Kelly 
house.  Van  Derveer's  brigade  had  come,  at  this 
time,  with  an  order  from  General  Rosecrans  to 
Brannan,  to  report  his  whole  division  to  Gen 
eral  Thomas.  It  was  under  the  supposition 
that  Brannan  had  done  so,  that  Rosecrans  soon  af- 

[103] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

ter  issued  the  fatal  order  to  Wood  to  close  up  on 
Reynolds.  But  the  enemy  had  gained  the  line, 
where  Beatty  had  before  stood.  Palmer  sent 
his  reserve  brigade  (Grose's),  in  accordance 
with  General  Thomas's  order;  his  brigade  formed 
double  lines,  and  with  cheers  they  charged  into 
the  woods  and  the  enemy  was  driven  away. 
Then  Barnes,  of  Van  Cleve's  division,  was  placed 
on  or  near  the  left ;  the  Union  left  was  henceforth 
safe. 

THE  CONFEDERATE  ATTACK  UPON  THE  UNION 

RIGHT 

About  1 1  o'clock  the  successive  attacks  of  the 
Confederate  divisions  from  the  left  to  the  right 
had  reached  Longstreet's  wing;  they  were  contin 
ued  with  a  charge  by  Stewart  upon  Reynolds's 
position;  it  involved  Hazen  or  Palmer,  who  had 
been  transferred  to  the  right  of  Reynolds  and  to 
the  left  of  Brannan.  This  was  the  beginning  of 
the  general  assault  on  the  Union  right,  which  came 
so  near  being  disastrous  to  General  Rosecrans's 
army.  This  attack  of  Stewart's  took  place  at  the 

time  when  Adams  and  Stovall  of  Breckenridge's 

[104] 


ATTACK  ON  UNION  RIGHT 

division  were  entering  the  open  Kelly  field  upon 
the  Confederate  right.  General  Stewart  acknowl 
edges,  in  his  report,  that  his  charge  was  repulsed 
with  great  slaughter.  The  division  next  to  Stew 
art  took  up  the  assault.  It  was  Bushrod  R.  John 
son's  supported  by  Law  and  Kershaw.  Just  before 
this  attack  an  aide  of  General  Thomas  had  come  to 
General  Rosecrans  to  ask  again  for  support  on  the 
left.  In  riding  close  to  the  line  between  General 
Reynolds's  and  General  Brannan's  divisions  he 
observed  that  the  latter — Brannan  being  in  echelon 
with  Reynolds — did  not  make  a  continuous  line, 
but  a  broken  one.  The  position  of  General  Bran- 
nan  was  nevertheless  just  as  effective,  and  perhaps 
more  so,  than  if  he  had  been  in  the  main  line. 
General  Thomas  J.  Wood's  division,  which  had 
just  replaced  Negley's  division,  was  next  to  the 
right  of  Brannan  but  in  the  main  line;  it  joined, 
however,  its  left  to  Brannan's  right;  wherefore  the 
aide  reported  to  General  Rosecrans  that  Reyn 
olds's  right  was  unprotected.  Brannan  had  been 
ordered  to  go  to  General  Thomas's  left,  but  on  ac 
count  of  being  threatened  with  an  attack  on  his 
front  he  remained  with  two  of  his  brigades,  and 

[105] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

sent  Van  Derveer's,  his  reserve  brigade.  Rose- 
crans  dictated  at  once  an  order  to  Wood,  "to 
close  upon  Reynolds  as  fast  as  possible  and  support 
him."  Thereupon  Wood  withdrew  from  the  line, 
and  marched  to  the  rear  of  Brannan,  just  as  the 
Confederate  charge,  under  B.  R.  Johnson,  reached 
its  old  front.  Rosecrans  issued  his  order  to  Wood 
supposing  that  Brannan  had  gone  with  his  whole 
division  to  the  Kelly  field.  Brannan  reported  what 
action  he  had  taken,  and  that  Reynolds  had  ap 
proved  it.  Rosecrans  gave  his  approval  instantly ; 
but  the  fatal  order  had  been  issued  to  Wood  some 
minutes  before,  and  consequently  his  division  was 
moving  out,  just  as  the  eight  brigades  made  the  at 
tack.  Longstreet  had  massed  these  brigades  op 
posite  the  Union  centre.  They  were  formed  in 
three  lines,  lapped  over  the  right  of  Brannan  and 
the  left  of  Davis — whose  division  was  on  the  right 
of  Wood — and  moved  close  to  the  gap;  they  wid 
ened  the  awful  space  left  by  Wood;  the  attack 
struck  Wood's  rear  brigade  (Buell's)  and  shat 
tered  it.  Brannan  who  was  a  very  able  comman 
der  threw  back  his  right,  but  lost  a  part  of  Con- 
nell's  brigade  in  this  movement.  With  great  skill 

[106] 


ATTACK  ON  UNION  RIGHT 

and  considerable  deliberation  he  reestablished  his 
line  on  the  Horse  Shoe  Ridge,  near  the  Snodgrass 
house,  on  a  line  nearly  perpendicular  to  the  one 
from  which  he  had  retreated.  Although  Wood's 
division  was  subjected  to  a  heavy  attack,  he — with 
the  aid.  of  General  Thomas,  who  had  just  come 
from  the  left  wing — succeeded  in  establishing  his 
remaining  troops  in  prolongation  of  Brannan's  new 
line,  and  in  reaching  towards,  but  not  entirely, 
Reynolds's  right,  which  retired  slightly.  Hazen's 
brigade  of  Palmer's  division  filled  up  the  gap  be 
tween  Reynolds  and  Wood,  thus  making  the 
Union  line  a  nearly  continuous  one  from  Snod 
grass  Hill  to  the  left  of  Baird,  where  Barnes's  bri 
gade  had  taken  position.  The  shape  of  the  line 
was  that  of  a  very  flattened  crescent,  with  the  con 
vex  side  towards  the  enemy ;  it  was  greatly  short 
ened,  however,  by  the  losses  of  the  1 9th,  and  the 
cutting  off  on  the  right  of  two  whole  divisions, 
Davis's  and  Sheridan's,  a  part  of  Wood's,  and 
some  of  Van  Cleve's.  These  were  now  beyond 
the  Confederate  line  and  were  attacked  by  heavy 
forces  while  on  the  march,  driving  them  from  the 

field.     Negley  with  his  remaining  brigade  was 

[107] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

caught  in  the  gap  from  whence  he  drifted  towards 
Brannan.  General  H.  V.  Boy n ton  said  about 
this  affair  on  this  part  of  the  field:  "Negley, 
gathering  up  much  artillery,  was  ordered  by 
General  Thomas  to  post  it  on  the  crest  over 
looking  the  field  in  front  of  Baird's  left,  but 
instead  he  took  it  to  Brannan's  right.  This 
was  a  good  position  for  it  and  it  could  have  been 
of  great  service  there  later,  when  the  Confederate 
line  made  an  advance  to  that  point,  but  he  retired 
with  it  in  haste  toward  Rossville,  ordering  all  the 
artillery  to  follow  him,  before  he  was  attacked/' 
Jefferson  C.  Davis  was  a  fine  and  brave  officer. 
He  had  only  two  brigades,  Carlm's  and  Heg's; 
the  latter  was  commanded  by  Martin,  for  Colonel 
Heg  had  been  mortally  wounded  the  day  before. 
These  brigades  had  done  some  wonderful  fighting 
on  the  day  before,  when  they  were  greatly  reduced. 
After  the  break  they  could  not  stand  against  the 
Confederate  charge,  wherefore  they  drifted 
towards  Rossville.  Davis  and  Sheridan  were 
both  on  the  move  by  the  left  flank  closing  up 
toward  the  left,  when  the  Confederate  charge 
struck  them.  Van  Cleve  with  his  remaining 

[108] 


ATTACK  ON  UNION  RIGHT 

brigades   in    motion — Barnes   had    gone   to   the 
left — was    thrown    into   disorder   by    the    rapid 
dash  of  some  artillery  through  the  ranks,  while 
a  portion  of  them  rallied  with  Wood.     Gen 
eral  Lytle  of  the  Sheridan  brigade  was  killed 
while  trying  to  rally  his  troops.     These  divisions 
and  brigades  went  back,  together  with  Wilder's 
mounted  brigade,  carrying  with  them  Generals 
Rosecrans,  McCook,  and  Crittenden,  who  at  that 
time  were  to  the  right  of  the  break.     The  line  of 
their  retreat  was  through  McFarland's  Gap  in  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  south  of  Rossville.     These  troops 
did  not  go  further  back  than  to  Rossville,  but 
Rosecrans,  McCook,  and  Crittenden  kept  on  to 
Chattanooga.     Boynton  says,  that  Sheridan's  di 
vision  was  in  good  order  when  it  arrived  at  Ross 
ville.     Davis  tried  his  best  to  reform  his  troops 
near  to  McFarland's  Gap;  he  did  march  them 
back  to  the  field,  but  reached  it  too  late  in   the 
evening.     In  the  neighborhood  of  the  two  gaps, 
McFarland's  and  Rossville,  were  some  ten  thou 
sand  fugitive  troops ;  the  way  was  open  for  them  to 
have  been  led  either  to  the  right  or  to  the  left  of  the 
Union  line.  But  who  was  there  who  had  rank  and 

[109] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

authority  enough  to  lead  them,  while  their  army 
and  corps  commanders  were  still  further  to  the  rear? 
James  A.  Garfield,  Gates  P.  Thruston,  chief  of 
McCook's  staff,  Surgeons  Gross  and  Perkins, 
medical  directors  of  the  Fourteenth  and  Twentieth 
corps,  rode  back  and  joined  General  Thomas. 
Sheridan  was  requested  by  Thruston,  the  adjutant- 
general  and  chief  of  staff  to  General  McCook,  at 
McFarland's  Gap — by  a  message  from  General 
Thomas — to  march  to  the  latter's  relief,  but  he 
insisted  on  marching  back  to  Rossville  and  from 
there  taking  the  Lafayette  road  to  the  left  flank  of 
the  army.23  This  was  a  most  out  of  the  way  road 
to  the  battlefield.  Sheridan  wanted  to  report 
quickly  to  General  Thomas  when  the  break  oc 
curred  and  was  doing  that  by  way  of  Rossville. 
It  was  dark  before  he  arrived  near  to  the  left ;  the 
Union  troops  had  then  begun  the  backwood  move 
ment. 

After  the  second  attack  on  the  left  by  Walker's 
and  Hill's  corps,  Breckenridge  again  came  in  be- 


23  See  General  Thruston's  report  in  Thomas  Budd  Van  Home, 
History  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  (Cincinnati,  1 875), 
vol.  i,p.  373;  also  General  Negley's  statement,  p.  376. 


ATTACK  ON  UNION  RIGHT 

hind  Baird,  but  was  repulsed  by  Van  Derveer, 
Grose,  and  Willich.  All  was  quiet  on  the  left, 
while  heavy  firing  continued  on  the  right,  when 
General  Thomas  rode  over  to  the  right  to  look  at 
matters  there.  This  occurred  during  the  adjust 
ment  after  the  break,  and  he  placed  what  remained 
of  Wood's  on  the  left  of  Brannan,  the  latter  hav 
ing  taken  his  position  prior  to  that  on  Horse  Shoe 
Ridge.  General  Thomas  did  not  return  to  the 
left  until  about  5:30  p.  m. 

There  had  been  no  intimation  to  the  four  com 
manders  on  the  left — Baird,  Johnson,  Palmer,  and 
Reynolds — that  everything  had  not  gone  well 
with  the  right.  They  could  get  no  message 
from  Thomas  for  two  or  three  hours.  At  this 
juncture,  fearing  another  assault  by  the  Confeder 
ate  lines,  and  supposing  that  Thomas  had  been 
cut  off  from  them,  Palmer,  Johnson,  and  Reynolds 
consulted  with  Baird  and  proposed  that  General 
Palmer,  as  the  senior  and  ranking  officer,  be 
placed  in  command  of  their  four  divisions  and 
march  them  off  the  field.  General  Baird  refus 
ing  to  join  them,  prevented  this  calamity.  Had 
this  been  done,  the  Confederate  right  wing, 

[in] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

confronting  them,  could  have  advanced  unim 
peded  in  the  rear  of  the  Union  troops  on  Snod- 
grass  Hill,  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  directly  in 
the  rear  of  the  Union  left.  In  view  of  what  hap 
pened  later  in  the  evening  with  regard  to  the  suc 
cessful  falling  back,  it  is  not  necessary  to  state 
what  a  probable  disaster  General  Baird  prevented. 
Longstreet  followed  the  drawing  back  of  the 
Union  right,  by  a  right  wheel  of  his  divisions, 
while  keeping  Preston's  division  in  reserve,  prob 
ably  in  order  to  be  ready  to  repel  quickly  any  at 
tack  upon  his  left  and  rear  by  Davis,  Sheridan, 
Wilder,  or  R.  B.  Mitchell.  There  was  no  need 
to  be  alarmed,  for  no  troops  approached  from  that 
quarter.  He  largely  outflanked  and  outnum 
bered  the  right  wing  of  Rosecrans.  General  Gar- 
field  had  brought  an  order  to  Thomas  from  Rose 
crans  to  take  command  of  the  army,  which  was 
left  on  the  field,  and  to  fall  back  to  Rossville,  to 
form  a  new  line,  and  to  hold  back  the  enemy  from 
Chattanooga.  Thomas  made  his  headquarters 
near  the  Snodgrass  house  and  directed  all  the 
movements  of  the  Union  forces  for  the  rest  of  the 
day.  He  determined  to  hold  the  present  line  at 

[112] 


North 


\ 


\ 


I 


i 


^Q  ~         ^REVNIOUDS     / 


SR  ACM  rs  AfM 


0         JjWOOD 

/ 


ttf 


X   « 


V 


THE  FATAL  ORDER  TO  WOOD,  AT  CHICKAMAUGA 


Adapted  from  Fiske's   The  Mississippi  VallOy  in  fhe,  Civil  War, 

p.  270 


ATTACK  ON  UNION  RIGHT 

least  until  night,  when  the  retreat  could  be  made 
with  less  danger.  To  meet  the  six  triumphant 
divisions  of  Longstreet,  the  available  troops  in  line 
were  Croxton's  and  part  only  of  Connell's  bri 
gades  of  Brannan's  division;  Wood,  with  only 
Marker's  brigade,  and  one  regiment  of  Buell's; 
his  other  regiments  seemed  to  have  faded  away, 
or  been  cut  off  in  the  break.  With  Wood's  line 
were  a  part  of  John  Beatty's  brigade,  a  part  of 
Stanley's,  and  the  Twenty-first  Ohio  of  Sirwell's: 
these  were  of  Negley's  division,  but  Negley  was 
not  with  them.  There  were  parts  of  the  Ninth 
and  Seventeenth  Kentucky,  Forty-fourth  In 
diana,  and  Thirteenth  Ohio  of  Van  Cleve's  divi 
sion,  but  no  division  commander  with  them. 

The  Forty-fourth  Indiana  of  Dick's  brigade, 
and  the  Seventeenth  Kentucky  of  Beatty's  bri 
gade,  and  both  of  Van  Cleve's — Barnes's  brigade 
being  still  on  the  left — were  the  only  regiments 
which  deflected  from  the  fugitives,  and  fell  in 
with  Wood's  and  Brannan's  line. 

Longstreet's  troops  attacked  these  fragments  re 
peatedly  with  tremendous  force,  but  were  repulsed 
with  great  loss.  Finally  one  of  Hindman's  bri- 

8  [113] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

gades  gained  a  position  on  Brannan's  right  and 
rear,  without  opposition,  for  no  troops  were  there  to 
oppose  them.  Negley  had  held  that  point  earlier 
with  ample  artillery  and  infantry  supports,  but 
he  was  then  in  Rossville.  Just  at  this  time, 
when  disaster  again  seemed  inevitable,  General 
Gordon  Granger  reported  to  General  Thomas; 
having  marched  his  troops  with  the  true  instincts  of 
a  soldier  from  McAffee's  church,  in  front  of  Ross 
ville  Gap  facing  Ringgold,  to  the  sound  of  the 
battle.  Thomas  ordered  him  to  the  right  of 
Brannan.  Two  large  brigades,  Whittaker's  and 
John  G.  Mitchell's,  were  commanded  by  the  gal 
lant  General  James  B.  Steedman;  these  formed 
in  line,  charged  up  the  hill  against  that  brigade 
which  had  gained  the  flank  of  Croxton,  and  drove 
it  pell-mell  back  down  the  hill  with  great  slaugh 
ter.  At  this  time,  Van  Derveer's  brigade  came 
from  the  Kelly  field,  where  it  had  done  such  fine 
service.  This  brigade  formed  on  Steedman's 
left  and  joined  in  the  attack.  When  this  com 
bined  force  struck  the  enemy  the  musketry  firing 
was  heavier  than  any  before  delivered.  It  lasted 
perhaps  twenty  minutes.  It  was  immediately  in 

["41 


North 


CHICKAMAUGA,  EVENING  OF  SEPTEMBER  20,  1863 

Adapted  from  Fiske's   The  Mississippi  V alloy  in  the  Civil  War, 

p.  274 


TH£ 

I   UNIVERSITY    ) 


ATTACK  ON  UNION  RIGHT 

the  rear  of  Baird's  division,  on  the  left,  about  three 
fourths  of  a  mile  away ;  could  not  be  seen  on  ac 
count  of  the  woods,  but  was  heard,  and  it  was  ter 
rific.  Twice  Hindman  reformed  at  a  safe  dis 
tance,  and  tried  to  recapture  the  hill,  but  being 
overwhelmed,  abandoned  any  future  efforts; 
these  brigades  formed  in  prolongation  of  Bran- 
nan's  right  and  fought  until  dark.  While  Sheri 
dan  was  marching  on  the  west  side  of  Missionary 
Ridge  towards  Rossville,  Granger  was  inarching 
on  the  east  side  of  it  towards  the  battle,  without 
other  orders  than  a  general  one,  given  days  before 
to  support  the  army.  They  both  must  have 
heard  the  firing,  and  should  have  marched  to  it; 
if  these  fugitive  troops  could  have  been  brought 
on  the  field  with  a  competent  commander,  what 
would  the  result  have  been?  How  could  they 
keep  away?  Would  not  the  Confederate  Army 
—which  was  so  nearly  used  up — have  been  glad 
to  fall  back  to  Rome? 

Hindman,  in  his  report24  speaks  in  the  follow 
ing  words  of  this  desperate  contest  on  the  Union 
right  lasting  over  four  hours,  viz.:  "I  have 

"Rebellion  Records,  Serial  No.  51,  p.  305. 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

never  known  Federal  troops  to  fight  so  well." 
General  Daniel  H.  Hill,  who  commanded  a  Con 
federate  corps  on  the  army's  right,  says  in  an  ar 
ticle  on  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  that  he  never 
saw  the  dead  so  thick  anywhere  as  he  did  on  the 
slopes  of  Snodgrass  Hill  after  the  attacks  by 
Longstreet's  several  divisions.25 

General  Garfield  after  returning  from  Rossville 
to  the  field,  rode  long  the  lines  of  his  old  brigade, 
now  Harker's  of  Wood's  division,  cheered  the  men 
with  muskets  and  gave  by  his  presence  the  evi 
dence  that  others  who  did  not  come  back  from 
the  rear  could  have  done  so.  Longstreet's  report 
states:  "Hood's  column  broke  the  enemy's  line 
near  the  Brotherton  house,  and  made  it  wheel  to 
the  right.  In  making  this  movement  Major  Gen 
eral  Hood  fell  severely  and  it  was  feared  mor 
tally  wounded  by  a  minie  ball  breaking  his 
thigh."  Law  succeeded  Hood  in  command. 
Longstreet  continues  as  follows:  "About  three 
o'clock  in  the  afternoon  I  asked  the  commanding 
general  for  some  of  the  troops  of  the  Right  Wing, 
but  was  informed  by  him  that  they  had  been  beaten 

25  See  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  vol.  3. 


ATTACK  ON  UNION  RIGHT 

back  so  badly  that  they  could  be  of  no  service  to 
me.":  The  figures  of  losses  on  the  two  wings 
given  later  on  will  show  that  Bragg  was  right. 

The  forces  to  resist  the  whole  Confederate 
Army  were  but  five  divisions  in  line.  The  rank 
and  file  of  these  divisions  did  not  know  of  the 
condition  on  the  right,  which  was  very  fortunate; 
they  stood  and  fought  therefore  defensively,  and 
with  great  confidence  and  bravery. 

The  Union  line,  as  now  formed,  consisted  of 
Thomas's  original  five  divisions  and  such  troops 
as  Wood's  one  brigade  (Marker's),  a  fraction 
of  another  (Buell's)  and  fractions  of  regiments 
which  had  drifted  in,  together  with  Steedman's 
two  brigades.  It  stood  off  the  Confederate  Army 
until  dark.  An  attack  on  General  Thomas's  left 
—organized  about  three  o'clock — must  be  men 
tioned,  however.  It  is  supposed  that  this  was  made 
in  order  to  prevent  any  of  the  Union  troops  at  that 
point  from  being  sent  to  the  right.  The  attack 
was  a  general  one  and  was  easily  repulsed.  The 
divisions  of  Breckenridge,  Liddell,  Armstrong's 
dismounted  cavalry,  and  Forrest's  artillery  across 

Rebellion  Records,  Serial  No.  51,  p.  289. 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

the  Lafayette  road,  were  active.  Willich  made 
the  fourth  charge  along  the  length  of  Kelly's  field 
against  these  troops  across  the  Lafayette  road.  At 
half  after  five  o'clock  all  was  quiet  on  the  Union 
left,  and  confidence  filled  the  hearts  of  the  troops; 
but  the  attacks  by  Longstreet  on  the  Union  right 
lasted  another  hour. 

Thomas  had  orders  from  Rosecrans  to  draw 
back  to  Rossville ;  Granger  wanted  him  to  ignore 
the  orders  and  hold  the  field ;  but  Thomas  would 
not  accede  to  such  a  request,  and  began  the  move 
ment  at  half  past  five.  His  line  was  solid  and 
confident,  but  had  very  little  ammunition,  and  no 
rations.  He  was  largely  outnumbered  and  out 
flanked  at  both  right  and  left;  by  falling  back  to 
Rossville  he  would  gain  the  fugitive  troops,  whom 
he  had  been  unable  to  induce  to  march  back  to  this 
position ;  he  would  also  gain  a  stronger  defensive 
line,  which  would  better  cover  the  approaches  to 
the  city.  He  intended  to  start  the  movement  so 
early  in  the  evening  that  he  could  get  the  troops 
in  the  proper  roads  and  directions  before  night, 
when  darkness  would  protect  them  from  danger 
of  attack  during  the  march.  Boynton  says:  "It 

[118] 


THOMAS  WITHDRAWS 

was  in  no  sense  a  military  retreat,"  it  was  done  "be 
cause  Chattanooga,  and  not  the  Chickamauga 
woods,  was  the  objective  of  the  campaign."  Still, 
it  may  also  be  said,  that  the  Confederate  Army 
was  the  objective,  and  that  its  destruction  was  of 
more  importance  than  the  occupation  of  the  city, 
It  is  quite  certain  that  General  Thomas  would 
gladly  have  remained  on  the  field,  if  he  had  been 
confident  that  he  could  have  destroyed  Bragg's 
army  the  next  day.  He  did  not  know  at  that  time 
that  it  was  badly  used-up  as  later  events  proved 
and  the  movement  backwards  in  the  face  of  a  very 
vigilant  foe,  who  was  constantly  advancing  in  al 
most  full  force,  would  have  been  dangerous. 

The  dispositions  made  by  General  George  H. 
Thomas  — before  and  after  he  discovered  the 
break  in  the  Union  right  —  were  of  the  highest 
military  character;  his  plan  of  withdrawal  to 
Rossville  was  equally  scientific.  In  his  report  he 
says,  that  after  the  arrival  of  Granger's  forces  and 
their  effective  attack  on  the  enemy's  troops  on  the 
right  of  Brannan,  every  assault  of  the  enemy  until 
nightfall  was  repulsed  in  the  most  gallant  style  by 
the  whole  line.  This  was  the  result  of  his  skill- 

[119] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

ful  placing  of  troops,  his  constant  watchfulness 
with  regard  to  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  and 
the  excellent  counter  movements  by  the  Union 
forces.  But  the  real  cause  of  the  preservation  of 
the  army  was  the  masterful  formation  of  the  five 
divisions  remaining  under  General  Thomas's  com 
mand  on  the  morning  of  the  20th;  they  were 
formed  in  compact,  double  lines,  protected  by  log 
breast-works  and  had  three  or  four  brigades  in  re 
serve;  these  lines  required  no  re-adjustment  and 
were  not  penetrated.  His  watchfulness  of  the 
troops — of  which  many  formed  under  his  own  di 
rection  on  Snodgrass  Hill  after  the  break  on  the 
right — enabled  him  to  point  out  instantly  where 
they  should  go,  when  Granger  and  Steedman  ap 
peared.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  he  was  at  that 
time  unaware  of  the  extent  of  the  disaster  on  the 
right.  In  his  report  he  states,  "General  Garfield, 
chief  of  staff  of  General  Rosecrans,  reached  this 
position  about  4  p.  m.,  in  company  with  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Thruston,  of  McCook's  staff,  and  Cap 
tains  Gaw  and  Barker,  of  my  staff,  who  had  been 
sent  to  the  rear  to  bring  back  the  ammunition,  if  pos 
sible.  General  Garfield  gave  me  the  first  reliable 

[120] 


THOMAS  WITHDRAWS 

information  that  the  right  and  centre  of  our  army 
had  been  driven,  and  of  its  condition  at  that  time.  I 
soon  after  received  a  dispatch  from  General  Rose- 
crans,  directing  me  to  assume  command  of  all  the 
forces,  and,  with  Crittenden  and  McCook,  take  a 
strong  position,  and  assume  a  threatening  attitude 
at  Rossville,  sending  the  unorganized  forces  to 
Chattanooga  for  reorganization,  stating  that  he 
would  examine  the  ground  at  Chattanooga,  and 
then  join  me;  also  that  he  had  sent  out  rations  and 
ammunition  to  me  at  Rossville."' 

General  Thomas,  of  course,  knew  before  Gar- 
field  reached  him  that  disaster  of  some  kind  had 
occurred  on  the  right ;  but  he  did  not  know  its  ex 
tent,  neither  did  he  know  of  the  departure  of  the 
many  troops  and  high  officers  from  the  field. 
When  he  received  this  dispatch  from  General 
Rosecrans  he  determined  to  fall  back  and  imme 
diately  formulated  his  plans.  To  enable  the 
troops  in  line  to  hold  the  positions  they  occupied 
until  the  proper  time  to  fall  back,  he  sent  two  aides 
to  distribute  some  ammunition — ten  rounds  to  the 
man — which  Granger  had  brought  with  him.  As 

27 Id.,  Serial  No.  50,  P.  253. 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

soon  as  this  was  done  he  sent  Captain  Willard,  an 
aide,  to  direct  the  division  commanders  to  be  pre 
pared  to  withdraw  their  commands  as  soon  as  they 
received  orders.  At  5:30  p.  m.  Captain  Barker 
carried  the  order  to  Reynolds  to  commence  the 
movement.  Thomas  does  not  indicate  in  his  re 
port  why  he  wanted  Reynolds  to  commence  the 
movement,  but  it  has  been  shown  that  his  division 
was  the  one  best  located  for  the  work.  A  brigade 
of  Confederate  troops  of  Liddell's  division  occu 
pied  at  that  time  the  woods  on  the  west  of  the  La 
fayette  road,  between  the  Union  right  on  Snod- 
grass  Hill  and  the  left  around  the  Kelly  field. 
It  was  in  the  rear  of  both  Union  wings.  Rey- 
nolds's  position  was  at  the  head  of  these  woods, 
and  his  troops  could  fire  into  the  Confederate 
lines  without  danger  to  the  backs  of  the  Union 
soldiers.  Under  Thomas's  direction,  Turchin's 
brigade  moved  down  the  Lafayette  road,  and 
filed  to  the  left;  when  his  rear  had  cleared  the 
road  and  faced  to  the  right  on  the  march,  he  threw 
his  brigade  upon  the  Confederate  forces  and  drove 
them  in  utter  defeat  entirely  beyond  Baird's  left. 
This  was  the  fifth  charge  made  during  the  day  in 

[  122  1 


THOMAS  WITHDRAWS 

the  same  direction  along  this  road,  in  and  adjacent 
to  the  Kelly  field.  General  Thomas  posted  Rey- 
nolds's  two  brigades,  Turchin's  and  Robinson's — 
formerly  King's — together  with  Johnson's  reserve 
brigade  and  General  Willich's  on  the  ridge  road 
west  of  the  Lafayette  road,  near  the  Mullis  farm, 
in  order  to  cover  McFarland's  Gap.  Thomas's  re 
port  describes  best  what  followed:  "These  dis^ 
positions  being  made,  I  sent  orders  to  Generals 
Wood,  Brannan,  and  Granger  to  withdraw  from 
their  positions.  Johnson's  and  Baird's  division 
were  attacked  at  the  moment  of  retiring,  but,  by  be 
ing  prepared,  retired  without  confusion  or  any  seri 
ous  losses.  General  Palmer  was  attacked  while 
retiring.*  *  *  I  then  proceeded  to  Rossville, 
accompanied  by  Generals  Garfield  and  Gordon 
Granger,  and  immediately  prepared  to  place  the 
troops  in  position  at  that  point."1 

During  Baird's  withdrawal  he  was  heavily  at 
tacked  by  the  enemy,  and  lost  a  great  many  who 
were  taken  prisoners;  some  of  these  remained 
too  long  behind  the  breastworks,  others  took  a 
wrong  direction  in  falling  back.  The  troops  which 

28 Ibid.,  p.  254. 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

had  retreated  to  Rossville  Gap  during  the  day 
were  reorganized  by  their  officers  prior  to  the  fall 
ing  back  of  the  main  army.  Negley's  division 
was  placed  directly  across  the  gap,  and  the  next 
morning  Baird's  was  placed  behind  it;  the  other 
divisions  on  the  right  and  left  (on  the  crest  of 
the  ridge)  were  stationed  with  Minty's  cavalry 
in  front  of  the  gap,  about  one  mile  and  a  half  on 
the  Ringgold  road.  General  R.  B.  Mitchell's 
cavalry  was  on  the  Union  right  covering  McFar- 
land's  Gap,  and  extending  his  right  to  the  Chat 
tanooga  Creek.  McCook's  Corps  was  in  line 
about  a  mile  behind  him. 

On  September  21,  General  N.  B.  Forrest  ad 
vanced  at  Rossville  some  Confederate  cavalry 
close  enough  to  throw  a  shell  or  two  into  a  Union 
wagon  train  and  Minty's  advance  Union  cavalry 
on  the  Ringgold  road  had  a  little  skirmish.  But 
the  Confederate  Army  was  not  advancing;  ap 
parently  it  did  not  intend  to  attack  the  position  at 
this  point.  In  fact,  General  Bragg  did  not  know 
of  the  retirement  of  the  Union  Army  until  the  2 1  st, 
and  he  did  not  order  an  advance.  The  Confed 
erate  Army  lay  still  on  the  field  during  the 

[124] 


THOMAS  WITHDRAWS 

2 1  st,  and  most  of  the  22nd.  Therefore  General 
Thomas  advised  General  Rosecrans  to  concen 
trate  the  troops  at  Chattanooga,  and  this  was  done 
on  the  night  of  September  21 ,  in  a  most  admirable 
manner  under  Thomas's  direction.  Brannan's 
division — in  order  to  cover  and  protect  the  move 
ment — was  posted  half  way  between  Rossville 
and  Chattanooga.  Nearly  all  the  infantry  and 
artillery  were  in  or  around  the  city  by  7  a.  m.  of 
the  22nd.  The  different  organizations  were 
marched  directly  to  positions  previously  assigned 
them. 

Baird's  division  (now  Rousseau's) ,  with  Min- 
ty's  cavalry  still  in  rear  of  it,  brought  up  the 
rear,  and  did  not  arrive  in  the  entrenchments 
around  the  city  until  late  in  the  evening  of  the 
22nd.  General  Rousseau,  who  was  absent  from 
early  in  August,  joined  the  army  again  at  Rossville 
on  September  2 1 ,  and  assumed  command  of  his 
old  division.  General  Baird  was  later  assigned 
to  another  division  at  Chattanooga. 

In  the  forenoon  of  the  22nd,  Cheatham's  Con 
federate  division  marched  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Chickamauga  station,  and  took  a  road  leading 

[125] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

thence  to  the  top  of  Missionary  Ridge;  it  was  fol 
lowed  by  the  rest  of  Folk's  Corps  on  the  23rd.  On 
the  same  day,  Hill's  and  Longstreet's  corps  fol 
lowed  on  different  roads  and  slowly  formed  their 
line  on  top  of  the  ridge.  Longstreet's  and  Hill's 
was  thrown  across  the  valley  to  the  foot  of  Look 
out  ;  their  left  was  on  the  top  of  Lookout  Moun 
tain  and  their  right  on  the  northeast  nose  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  abutting  on  the  Tennessee  River, 
but  the  main  line  did  not  reach  to  the  river.  Their 
camps  were  principally  located  in  the  Chicka- 
mauga  Valley  on  the  east  side  of  the  ridge,  where 
they  were  protected  from  observation  by  the  Union 
forces. 

WISCONSIN  TROOPS  AT  CHICKAMAUGA 

There  were  five  infantry  regiments  from  Wis 
consin  in  the  battle  of  Chickamauga,  viz.: 
the  First,  Tenth,  Fifteenth,  Twenty-first,  and 
Twenty-fourth.  The  First  and  Twenty-first 
were  parts  of  the  Second  Brigade,  commanded  by 
General  John  C.  Starkweather — formerly  Colonel 
of  the  First  Wisconsin  Infantry — of  the  First  Divi 
sion,  commanded  by  General  Absalom  Baird,  of 

[126] 


WISCONSIN  AT  CHICKAMAUGA 

the  Fourteenth  Corps,  commanded  by  General 
George  H.  Thomas.  They  were  actively  en 
gaged  near  the  extreme  left  on  both  days  of  the 
battle.  When  Baird's  division  on  the  morning  of 
the  1 9th  advanced  from  Kelly's  house  on  the  La 
fayette  road,  Starkweather's  brigade  was  in  re 
serve  behind  the  other  two  brigades  of  the  divi 
sion.  His  brigade  was  formed  in  two  lines,  the 
first  composed  of  the  First  Wisconsin  on  the  right 
and  the  Seventy-ninth  Pennsylvania  on  the  left, 
with  the  Fourth  Indiana  Battery  between  the  two 
wings.  The  Twenty-first  Wisconsin  Infantry 
and  Twenty-fourth  Illinois  Infantry  formed  the 
rear  line.  Lieutenant-Colonel  George  B.  Bing- 
ham  commanded  the  First,  and  Lieutenant-Colo 
nel  Harrison  C.  Hobart  the  Twenty-first.  Having 
advanced  about  a  mile  through  the  woods,  driv 
ing  the  enemy's  skirmishers,  Starkweather  moved 
to  Thomas's  left  by  the  order  of  the  General,  in 
order  to  relieve  Croxton's  brigade  of  Brannan's 
division,  reported  to  be  out  of  ammunition.  Gen 
eral  Starkweather  seems  to  have  no  sooner  taken 
position  here  than  the  enemy  attacked  in  such 
overwhelming  numbers  as  to  force  him  back.  He 

[127] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

retreated  to  a  ridge  in  the  rear  of  his  left;  leaving 
his  battery  temporarily  in  the  possession  of  the  en 
emy.  Very  soon  the  enemy  was  struck  on  his 
flank  and  rear  by  General  Johnson's  division  of 
McCook's  Corps  and  forced  back ;  the  battery  was 
then  recovered. 

In  reforming  the  lines  late  in  the  afternoon, 
Starkweather's  brigade  was  placed  on  the  left  of 
Johnson's  division;  it  took  part  in  the  night  attack 
by  the  Confederate  General  Cleburne,  and  was 
under  fire  during  the  whole  of  the  battle  of  the 
1 9th.  On  the  morning  of  the  20th  it  formed  the 
right  of  Baird's  position  in  the  woods  east  of  the 
Kelly  field,  and  was  in  one  of  the  most  exposed 
positions ;  this  brought  it  again  on  the  left  of  John 
son's  division.  The  Fourth  Indiana  Battery  had 
two  guns  in  the  centre  of  the  brigade  and  two 
upon  the  left.  General  Starkweather  in  his  offi 
cial  report  says:  ''This  position  was  held  and 
retained  during  the  whole  day  under  repeated  at 
tacks  from  the  enemy  in  heavy  columns  supported 
with  batteries,  repulsing  and  driving  the  enemy 
back  from  time  to  time;  driving  the  enemy  also 
back  from  the  extreme  left  with  the  artillery. 

[128] 


WISCONSIN  AT  CHICKAMAUGA 

*  *  *  .  While  holding  this  position  the  ammu 
nition  of  my  first  line  was  expended,  and  most  of 
the  second  line,  together  with  all  the  ammunition 
of  the  battery,  except  three  rounds  of  canister."5 
He  retired  with  the  rest  of  Baird's  division  in  the 
evening  of  the  20th  to  Rossville,  thence  to  Chatta 
nooga  on  the  22nd.  In  the  retirement,  Lieutenant 
Colonel  Hobart,  eight  other  commissioned  offi 
cers,  and  67  men  of  the  Twenty-first  Wisconsin 
were  captured  by  the  enemy.  The  loss  of  the 
First  Wisconsin  was  188  killed,  wounded,  and 
missing;  the  latter  being  77.  The  officers  killed 
were  Captains  Abner  O.  Heald,  and  William  S. 
Mitchell;  Lieutenants  James  S.  Richardson,  and 
Charles  A.  Searles.  Of  the  Twenty-first  the 
loss  was  121,  of  these  76  were  missing.  The 
First  seems  to  have  gone  into  the  battle  with  391 , 
and  the  Twenty-first  with  369  men. 

The  Tenth  Wisconsin  Infantry — commanded 
by  Lieutenant-Colonel  John  H.  Ely — was  in 
Scribner's  brigade  of  Baird's  division.  The  his 
tory  of  its  fighting  is  almost  identical  with  that  of 
the  First  and  Twenty-first.  On  the  20th  theTenth 

™  Rebellion  Records,  Serial  No.    50,  p.  301. 

9  [  129  ] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Wisconsin  Infantry  was  immediately  on  the  left 
of  Starkweather.  Colonel  Ely,  Major  McKer- 
cher  and  several  other  officers,  together  with  a 
large  number  of  men  were  captured  in  falling 
back  (by  orders) ,  on  the  evening  of  the  20th. 
They,  by  mistake,  took  the  wrong  direction,  going 
too  far  to  the  right,  as  they  faced  the  rear,  and 
thus  ran  into  the  enemy.  Its  loss  was  a  total 
of  21 1 ,  but  145  of  these  were  missing.  Captain 
J.  W.  Roby,  who  made  the  report  says:  "Mon 
day  morning  September  21st  we  numbered  three 
officers  and  26  men."  Lieutenant-Colonel  Ely's 
name  appears  among  those  killed ;  the  other  offi 
cers  killed  were  Captain  George  M.  West  and 
Lieutenant  Robert  Rennie. 

The  Fifteenth  Wisconsin  Infantry  served  in  the 
Third  brigade,  Davis's  division  of  the  Twentieth 
Corps.  This  brigade  was  commanded  by  Colo 
nel  Hans  C.  Heg  until  he  was  killed  on  the  1 9th; 
and  afterwards  by  Colonel  John  A.  Martin. 
This  regiment  fought  most  gallantly  with  Davis's 
division  on  the  1 9th,  when,  according  to  their  offi 
cial  report,  the  loss  was  7  officers  and  59  enlisted 
men  killed,  wounded,  and  missing.  It  will  be  re- 

[130] 


WISCONSIN  AT  CHICKAMAUGA 

membered  that  on  the  20th  General  Davis's  divis 
ion  was  cut  off  on  the  right  by  the  break  at  Wood's 
division,  and  that  it,  after  some  desultory  fighting, 
retired  to  McFarland's  Gap.  The  total  loss  of 
the  Fifteenth  Wisconsin  Infantry  was  111,  of 
which  55  men  were  captured  or  missing.  The 
officers  killed  were  Colonel  Hans  C.  Heg,  Cap 
tains  Hans  Hanson,  Henry  Hauff,  John  M. 
Johnson,  and  Lieutenant  Oliver  Thompson. 

The  Twenty-fourth  Wisconsin  Infantry  was 
in  General  Lytle's  brigade  of  the  First  Division 
of  the  Twentieth  Corps.  This  regiment,  with 
the  brigade  to  which  it  was  attached,  occupied  the 
entrenchments  at  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill  on  the 
afternoon  of  the  19th,  where  it  relieved  General 
Thomas  J.  Wood's  division ;  it  remained  here  all 
afternoon  under  a  little  artillery  fire  from  the 
enemy,  which  did  no  harm,  however.  At  3  a.  m. 
on  the  20th  it  went  to  a  point  near  General  Rose- 
crans's  headquarters,  near  the  Widow  Glenn's 
house;  at  10:30  a.  m.  it  double  quicked — under  a 
terrific  fire  from  the  enemy — to  the  point  where 
General  Lytle  was  killed ;  it  fought  here  for  thirty 
minutes  driving  the  enemy,  but  was  soon  out- 

[131] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

flanked  by  Hindman's  troops  coming  toward  its 
left  flank  from  the  celebrated  break.  The  offi 
cial  report  of  its  commander  (Major  Carl  Von 
Baumbach),  from  which  the  foregoing  facts  are 
gleaned,  says  further:  "We  retreated  in  some 
disorder;  but  quickly  reformed  on  a  hill  some  400 
yards  to  the  rear.  Our  brave  and  gallant  com 
mander,  Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  S.  West,  being 
among  the  missing,  I  assumed  command."  This 
regiment  bivouaced  for  the  night  at  Rossville;  its 
loss  was  3  officers  and  69  men  killed  and 
wounded,  and  20  missing;  Captain  Gustavus 
Goldsmith  was  killed.  The  Major  in  his  report 
makes  especial  mention  of  Lieutenant  Thomas  E. 
Balding,  acting  adjutant,  for  his  gallant  conduct. 
The  First  Wisconsin  Cavalry — under  com 
mand  of  Colonel  Oscar  H.  LaGrange — was  a 
part  of  the  Second  Brigade,  of  Colonel  Edward 
M.  McCook's  cavalry  division.  During  the  cam 
paign,  preceding  the  battle,  this  regiment  per 
formed  the  usual  duties  of  cavalry  in  reconnoiter- 
ing,  picketing,  leading  in  advance  of  the  marching 
column  of  infantry,  and  generally  acting  with  the 
rest  of  the  cavalry,  as  the  eyes  of  the  army.  On 

[132] 


WISCONSIN  AT  CHICKAMAUGA 

\  9th  it  was  stationed  on  the  right  of  the  army 
to  watch  the  enemy's  cavalry,  which  kept  on  the 
east  side  of  the  Chickamauga  in  the  movement 
back  to  Rossville,  and  thence  into  Chattanooga,  it 
protected  the  trains  and  rear  of  the  army.  Its  loss 
was  2  men  wounded  and  4  missing. 

There  were  three  Wisconsin  light  batteries 
with  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  in  the  battle 
of  Chickamauga:  the  Third,  Fifth,  and  Eighth. 
The  Third  Battery — commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Courtland  Livingston — was  attached  to  Van 
Cleve's  division  of  Crittenden's  Corps.  Captain 
L.  H.  Drury  of  this  battery,  was  chief  of  artillery 
of  the  division ;  he  was  severely  wounded  in  a  skir 
mish  several  days  before  the  battle.  This  battery 
followed  the  fortunes  of  its  division;  but  there 
seems  to  be  no  definite  report  by  its  commanding 
officer.  Its  losses  were  2  killed,  1 2  wounded 
and  1 2  missing,  out  of  an  aggregate  of  1 1 9. 

The  Fifth  Wisconsin  Battery,  commanded  by 
Captain  George  Q.  Gardner  was  attached  to  the 
First  Brigade,  commanded  by  Colonel  P.  Sid 
ney  Post  of  General  Jefferson  C.  Davis's  division 
of  the  Twentieth  Corps.  This  brigade  was 

[133] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

guarding  the  supply  train,  and  was  not  engaged 
in  the  battle,  and  this  battery  had  no  losses.  The 
brigade  commander,  in  his  official  report,  com 
mends  Captain  Gardner  for  great  zeal  and  ability 
in  the  management  of  the  battery. 

The  Eighth  Wisconsin  Battery — commanded 
by  Lieutenant  John  D.  McLean — was  attached 
to  Colonel  Heg's  brigade  of  Davis's  division  of 
McCook's  Twentieth  Corps.  The  chief  of  artil 
lery  of  Davis's  division  reports,  that  the  movement 
of  the  artillery  in  the  Chickamauga  woods  was  not 
deemed  practicable;  therefore,  this  battery  did 
not  become  engaged,  and  had  no  losses. 

The  Chickamauga  campaign  proper  was  now 
ended.  It  formed  the  second  step  in  the  cam 
paign  from  Murfreesboro  to  Chattanooga;  the 
Tullahoma  campaign  being  the  first.  It  is  true, 
the  city  was  now  occupied  by  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  but  its  possession  was  not  secure  as 
long  as  the  Confederate  Army  lay  within  two  or 
three  miles,  and  held  the  city's  most  available  lines 
of  supply  by  the  river  and  the  river  road,  between 
Bridgeport  and  Chattanooga.  Therefore,  an 
other  conflict  was  necessary,  which  would  consti- 

[134] 


THE  CRACKER  LINE 

tute  the  third  step  in  the  great  campaign.  An  ac 
count  of  that  struggle  will  include  the  coming  of 
reinforcements  to  the  Union  Army ;  the  opening  of 
what  the  men  in  the  ranks  called,  "the  cracker 
line;"  the  reorganization  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland ;  and  an  account  of  the  four  battles  of 
Wauhatchie,  Orchard  Knob,  Lookout  Mountain, 
and  Missionary  Ridge.  But  before  that  is  at 
tempted,  it  will  be  necessary  to  make  some  ob 
servations  on  the  late  battle  of  Chickamauga. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland — or  rather  that 
part  of  it  which  now  occupied  the  city — was  re 
duced  by  the  Chickamauga  battle  to  an  estimated 
aggregate  of  35,000.  This  estimate  excluded 
perhaps  the  cavalry.  Its  total  losses,  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners,  in  the  Chickamauga  cam 
paign  reached  13,615.  A  large  number  of  sick, 
besides  the  wounded,  were  in  hospitals.  But  the 
Confederate  losses  were  at  least  5,374  more  than 
those  of  the  Union  Army.  General  Longstreet, 
in  his  book,  From  Manassas  to  Appomatox, 
claims  that  the  Confederate  force  at  Chickamauga 
was  somewhat  less  than  60,000  men.  The  Con 
federate  records  are  so  defective  that  it  is  largely 

[135] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

an  estimate  to  give  their  numbers  or  losses.  Gen 
eral  H.  V.  Boynton  estimates  the  number  at 
very  much  more  than  60,000.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  Bragg  actually  outnumbered  Rosecrans  on  the 
field  by  several  thousand  troops,  perhaps  in  the 
proportion  of  60,000  to  50,000. 

The  Union  Army  captured  2,003  prisoners, 
and  lost  4,774.  Of  the  latter  2,500  were 
wounded  and  left  on  the  field  when  the  army  fell 
back  to  Rossville.  The  terrible  fighting  which 
took  place  is  shown  by  the  number  of  killed  and 
wounded  on  each  side.  Longstreet  says  in  his 
book,  that  Bragg's  killed  and  wounded  amounted 
to  1 6,986,  but  the  official  returns  make  them  about 
1 , 1 00  less,  or  1 5,88 1 .  The  official  returns  of  the 
army  give  the  Union  losses  of  killed  and  wounded 
1 1 ,  338.  The  Confederate  loss  was  greater  in 
killed  and  wounded  than  at  Gettysburg;  and  the 
largest  the  enemy  had  in  a  single  battle.  Atten 
tion  is  called  to  the  fact,  that  the  numbers  engaged 
at  Gettysburg  were  about  80,000  on  each  side; 
and  that  the  battle  lasted  three  days. 

The  killed  and  wounded  in  some  battles  of  the 
war  are  shown  in  the  following  table: 

[136] 


LOSSES  AT  CHICKAMAUGA 

Union  Confederate 

Shiloh,  Tenn.        .  .  .  10,162  9,735 

Second  Bull  Run  .  .  .  10,199  9,108 

Fredericksburg,  Va.  .  .  10,884  4,664 

Chancellorsville,  Va.  .  .  11,368  10,746 

Gettysburg,  Pa.     .  .  .  17,567  15,298 

Chickamauga,  Ga.  .  .  11,409  15,881 

Stone's  River,        .  .  .  9,532  9,239 

Antietam,  Md.       .  .  .  11,657  11,234 

In  every  one  of  these  battles  the  Union  loss  was 
greater  than  the  Confederate,  except  at  Chicka 
mauga;  yet  Shiloh,  Gettysburg,  and  Stone's  River 
are  recorded  as  Union  victories.  The  Confeder 
ate  loss  at  Antietam  was  much  smaller  than  that 
given  above,  which  includes  Harper's  Ferry,  South 
Mountain,  Crampton's  Gap,  and  Shepardstown. 
The  prisoners  captured  are  excluded  from  the 
above  list,  because  only  the  killed  and  wounded 
indicate  the  intensity  of  the  fighting. 

The  Confederate's  large  losses  at  Chickamauga 
show  plainly  the  active  musketry  of  the  Union 
troops,  their  good  marksmanship,  and  the  differ 
ence  (in  the  number  of  casualties)  between  mak 
ing  and  receiving  attacks.  On  the  second  day  the 
Union  troops  remained  in  line  and  received  the  at 
tacks  of  the  Confederates.  At  Gettysburg  the 

[137] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Union  forces  did  the  same  thing  during  the  last 
two  days.  Those  on  the  left  at  Chickamauga 
were  protected  by  breastworks,  and  suffered 
but  little  loss  on  the  20th ;  while  they  inflicted  very 
heavy  punishment  on  the  Confederates;  for  in 
stance,  Hill's  Corps  of  the  Confederate  right  lost 
2,990  out  of  8,894;  Jackson's  brigade  of  Cheat- 
ham's  division  lost  35  per  cent,  of  his  force,  and  the 
losses  in  Govan's  brigade  exceeded  50  per  cent. 
On  the  Union  side  Steedman,  while  attacking  the 
Confederate  troops — which  had  gained  an  enfil 
ading  position  and  were  about  to  attack  the  right 
flank  of  Brannan — lost  in  this  assault  and  in  the 
subsequent  position  which  his  troops  occupied, 
1 ,787  out  of  3,700  in  about  four  hours.  The  loss 
is  fearful,  when  assaults  are  made  on  protected 
lines,  or  on  points  held  with  difficult  approaches. 
On  the  Confederate  left  Benning's  brigade  of 
Hood's  division  lost  56.6  per  cent. ;  Gregg's  brig 
ade  of  B.  R.  Johnson's  lost  44.4  per  cent.  Taking 
Longstreet's  estimate  of  1 6,986  killed  and  wound 
ed,  and  adding  to  it  the  number  of  prisoners  cap 
tured,  namely,  2,003,  the  total  Confederate  loss 
aggregates  18,989.  It  is  officially  established 

[138] 


TIMBER  FORTIFICATIONS 

that  the  Union  loss  was  1 1 ,338  in  killed  and 
wounded;  its  loss  in  prisoners  was  4,774;  but  2,- 
500  of  them  were  wounded  and  were  left  on  the 
battlefield.  It  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  these 
wounded  left  on  the  field  were  reported  as  wound 
ed  by  their  company  officers,  and  are  included  in 
the  official  returns  of  the  1  1 ,338. 

The  historian  will  point  out  sharply  the  im 
mense  benefit  to  the  Union  Army  derived  from 
the  log  works  and  the  compact  lines  of  the  four 
divisions  under  General  Thomas  on  the  20th.  The 
conclusion  is  a  fair  one,  that  the  whole  line  ought 
to  have  been  similarly  fortified ;  there  was  ample 
supply  of  timber  along  the  line  to  provide  for  such 
protection.  Of  the  five  divisions  under  General 
Thomas's  command  on  the  1 9th  and  on  the  20th, 
Brannan's  was  the  only  one  which  fought  both  days 
without  works ;  on  the  1 9th  none  of  them  fought 
behind  any  entrenchments,  yet  they  fought  against 
six  Confederate  divisions,  viz.:  two  of  Walker's 
corps,  two  of  Cheatham's,  Cleburne's,  and  Stew 
art's.  On  the  20th  Brannan  was  on  the  right  and 
did  not  fight  any  of  the  Confederate  troops,  which 
Baird's,  Johnson's,  Palmer's,  Reynolds's,  and  his 

[139] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

own  divisions  had  fought  on  the  1 9th.  Van  Der- 
veer's  brigade  of  Brannan's  division  made  one 
charge,  however,  along  the  Kelly  field,  against 
two  brigades  of  BreckenridgeV,  then  returned  to 
the  right.  But  it  must  be  noticed  that  Brecken- 
ridge  was  not  in  the  fight  of  the  1 9th.  On  the  20th 
Baird,  Johnson,  Palmer,  and  Reynolds  fought  be 
hind  breastworks  all  day  the  same  divisions  they 
had  fought  the  day  before  without  breastworks, 
and  also  Breckenridge's  in  addition.  It  is  true 
they  were  assisted  a  little  by  two  brigades  of  Neg- 
ley's  and  one  of  Van  Cleve's  on  the  left  of  the 
breastworks.  In  addition  to  the  Confederate  in 
fantry  divisions  mentioned,  there  was  also  Forrest's 
cavalry  of  3,500,  which  would  more  than  offset 
any  assistance  these  four  Union  divisions  had  re 
ceived  from  other  troops  on  the  20th.  The  fol 
lowing  table  will  show  the  losses  in  killed  and 
wounded  of  the  divisions  on  both  sides,  with  the 
exception  of  prisoners  captured  during  the  two 
days  of  battle  in  and  around  the  Kelly  field. 


[140] 


LOSSES  AT  CHICKAMAUGA 
The  figures  are  taken  from  the  official  returns: 

Union  Confederate 

Brannan— Three  Brigades  .  1,977  Walker— Five  Brigades   .          .  2,290 

Baird— Three  Brigades    .  .  975  Cheatham— Five  Brigades         .  1,843 

Johnson— Three  Brigades  .  1,088  Cleburne— Three  Brigades       .  1,743 

Palmer— Three  Brigades  .  1,165  Stewart— Three  Brigades         .  1,674 

Reynolds— Two  Brigades  .  778  Breckenridge— Three   Brigades  1,075 

Total     ....  "5,983  Total     ....  ~<M>25 

There  were  1 4  Union  brigades  and  1 9  Confed 
erate.  It  will  be  seen  that  Brannan,  who  was  not 
protected  by  works  on  the  20th,  lost  about  800 
more  than  the  highest  loss  of  any  of  the  Union  di 
visions,  which  were  protected.  That  is  a  practical 
illustration  of  the  value  of  the  precautions  thus 
taken  by  the  protected  troops.  Estimating  Bran- 
nan's  loss  on  the  20th  at  900,  his  loss  on  the  1 9th 
would  be  1,077.  This  would  reduce  the  total 
loss  in  the  Union  column  above  to  5,083.  Con 
sidering  that  the  Confederate  divisions  mentioned 
above  encountered  no  other  Union  troops  during 
the  battle,  except  those  five  divisions  mentioned, 
it  will  be  understood  that  the  five  Union  divisions 
by  incurring  a  loss  of  5,083  killed  and  wounded, 
inflicted  a  loss  on  the  enemy  of  8,625.  Forrest's 
loss  does  not  appear  but  should  be  added  to  the  lat 
ter  ;  let  this  item  be  offset,  however,  by  the  losses  to 

[141] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Beatty's  Stanley's  and  Barnes's  brigades  in  their 
assistance  on  the  left  of  Baird. 

We  will  make  a  similar  comparison  of  the  losses 
on  the  right  of  the  Union,  and  the  left  of  the  Con 
federate  Army: 

Union 

Steedman    .          .          .          .  1,174  —  Two  Brigades 

Sheridan     ....  1,090 

Davis          ....  944  —  Two  Brigades 

Wood         ....  876—  Two  Brigades 

VanCleve.         ...  660 

Negley        ....  496 

Brannan  (estimate)        .         .  900 

Total.  .          .          .         6,140 

Confederate 
Hood       } 


Six  Divisions»  6>881  (estimated) 
Preston    J 

The  estimated  Confederate  loss  given  above  has 
been  made  up  in  the  following  manner.  The  offi 
cial  Confederate  loss  is  given  by  Colonel  W.  F. 
Fox  in  his  Regimental  Losses  in  the  Civil  War 
as  15,881  killed  and  wounded  at  Chickamauga, 
the  Confederate  loss  of  the  troops  opposed  to  the 
above  named  Union  divisions  can  be  found  by 

adding  to  8,625  —  the  Confederate  losses  in  the 

[142] 


CONFEDERATE  LOSSES 

first  table  given  above — the  estimated  loss  of  the 
Confederate  cavalry,  probably  enough  to  bring  the 
figures  to  9,000,  and  deducting  that  from  1 5,881 , 
the  total  Confederate  loss  is  secured.  The  result 
makes  6,  88 1  killed  and  wounded — as  given  in  the 
last  table — by  the  seven  Union  divisions  mentioned 
above,  at  a  cost  to  the  latter  of  6, 1 40  killed  and 
wounded.  Longstreet  gives  in  his  report  his  loss 
at  7,594  killed  and  wounded ;  deducting  Stewart's 
loss  from  this  sum  leaves  5,920  as  the  loss  of  the 
above  mentioned  Confederate  forces.  This 
makes  the  contrast  between  the  two  tables  still 
greater. 

These  figures  emphasize  the  deadly  fighting  in 
that  great  battle,  and  they  are  more  eloquent  of  the 
valor  of  American  soldiers  than  words  of  song  or 
oratory.  They  emphasize  also  the  value  of  de 
fensive  breastworks,  in  comparison  with  fighting 
unprotected. 

The  Union  troops  expended  2,650,000  musket 
cartridges  in  hitting  the  15,881  Confederate  killed 
and  wounded;  some  of  them  were,  however, 
wounded  by  artillery.  It  appears  as  if  it  took 
about  1 50  infantry  cartridges  to  hit  one  man.  The 

[143] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

expenditure  was  650,000  more  cartridges  than  at 
Stone's  River ;  but  then  6,642  more  of  the  Confed 
erates  were  struck  at  Chickamauga,  which  shows 
that  the  firing  was  much  more  destructive. 

General  Rosecrans  states:30  "The  fight  on  the 
left  after  2  p.  m.,  was  that  of  the  army.  Never, 

in  the  history  of  this  war  at  least  have  troops  fought 
with  greater  energy  and  determination.  Bayonet 
charges,  often  heard  of  but  seldom  seen,  were 
repeatedly  made  by  brigades  and  regiments  in  sev 
eral  of  our  divisions." 

At  2  p.  m.  on  September  2 1 ,  C.  A.  Dana,  As 
sistant  Secretary  of  War,  sent  a  dispatch  from 
Chattanooga  to  the  Secretary  of  War.  It  con 
tained  the  following  statements :  "Thomas,  find 
ing  himself  cut  off  from  Rosecrans  and  the  right, 
at  once  brought  his  seven  divisions  into  position  for 
independent  fighting.  Refusing  both  his  right 
and  left,  his  line  assumed  the  form  of  a  horse-shoe 
posted  along  the  slope  and  crest  of  a  partly  wood 
ed  ridge.  He  was  soon  joined  by  Granger  from 
Rossville,  with  the  brigade  of  McCook  and  divi 
sion  of  Steedman,  and  with  these  forces  firmly 

30 Ibid.,  p.  60. 

[M4] 


DANA'S  REPORT 


maintained  the  fight  till  after  dark.  Our  troops 
were  as  immovable  as  the  rocks  they  stood  on.  The 
enemy  hurled  against  them  repeatedly  the  dense 
columns  which  had  routed  Davis  and  Sheridan  in 
the  morning,  but  every  onset  was  repulsed  with 
dreadful  slaughter.  Falling  first  on  one  and  then 
another  point  of  our  lines,  for  hours  the  rebels 
vainly  sought  to  break  them.  Thomas  seemed 
to  have  filled  every  soldier  with  his  own  uncon 
querable  firmness,  and  Granger,  his  hat  torn  by  bul 
lets,  raged  like  a  lion  wherever  the  contest  was  hot 
test  with  the  electrical  courage  of  a  Ney.  *  *  * 
When  night  fell  this  body  of  heroes  stood  on  the 
same  ground  they  had  occupied  in  the  morning 
their  spirit  unbroken,,  but  their  numbers  greatly 
diminished.  *  *  *  The  divisions  of  Wood, 
Johnson,  Brannan,  Palmer,  Reynolds,  and  Baird, 
which  never  broke  at  all,  have  lost  very 
severely."1  He  should  have  added  that  they  in 
flicted  greater  loss  upon  the  enemy  than  any  of  the 
other  divisions.  The  discouraged  spirit  of  the 
Confederate  Army  at  the  close  of  the  battle  was 
sufficiently  apparent  when  the  forces  under 

"Ibid.,  P.  194. 

10  [  145  ] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Thomas's  command  were  able — after  the  arrival 
of  General  Gordon  Granger's  troops — to  stop  the 
enemy's  further  successes.  It  is  evident  that  the 
fighting  spirit  was  gone  from  Bragg's  army  since, 
although  they  discovered  the  falling  back,  they  did 
not  approach  Rossville  Gap  on  the  21st  with  a 
considerable  force,  nor  seriously  interfere  in  the 
backward  movement  to  Chattanooga,  not  even  try 
ing  to  capture  a  wagon,  mule,  or  horse,  although 
its  great  cavalry  leader,  Forrest  and  his  troopers, 
were  in  force  close  to  Rossville  Gap.  It  was 
more  paralyzed  than  the  Union  Army.  Gen 
eral  Daniel  H.  Hill,  who  commanded  a  Confed 
erate  corps  on  the  right  in  the  battle,  states  in  the 
article  referred  to  before:  "There  was  no  more 
splendid  fighting  in  '61,  when  the  flower  of  the 
Southern  youth  was  in  the  field,  than  was  dis 
played  in  those  bloody  days  of  September,  '63. 
But  it  seems  to  me  that  the  elan  of  the  Southern  sol 
dier  was  never  seen  after  Chickamauga — that  bril 
liant  dash  which  had  distinguished  him  was  gone 
forever.  He  was  too  intelligent  not  to  know 
that  the  cutting  in  two  of  Georgia  meant  death  to 
all  his  hopes.  *  *  *  He  fought  stoutly  to  the 

[146] 


A  CRITICISM 

last,  but,  after  Chickamauga,  with  the  sullenness  of 
despair  and  without  the  enthusiasm  of  hope.  That 
'barren'  victory  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Southern 
Confederacy."5 

If  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  accomplished 
so  much  at  Chickamauga  in  spite  of  certain  mis 
takes,  after  having  penetrated  to  the  centre  of  the 
Confederate  territory,  what  might  not  have  been 
done,  if  the  right  of  the  Union  line  had  been  prop 
erly  placed  and  protected  during  the  night  of  the 
1 9th,  and  if  the  disastrous  order  to  Wood  had  not 
been  issued?  The  withdrawal  of  Wood  from 
the  line — just  before  Bushrod  Johnson  advanced 
against  the  centre — cost  the  Union  fighting  line 
10,000  men,  and  caused  the  withdrawal,  some 
hours  later,  of  the  Union  Army  to  Rossville. 
Whether  Wood  interpreted  that  order  correctly, 
the  fact  is  that  the  order  should  never  have  been  is 
sued.  The  movement  of  closing  in  towards  the  left 
and  of  throwing  the  right  further  back,  should  have 
been  done  hours  before.  One  of  Mitchell's  cav 
alry  division  should  have  been  placed  on  the  Union 
left  during  the  night  of  the  19th. 

32  See  Battles  and  Leaders  of  the  Civil  War,  vol.  3,  p.  662. 

[147] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

It  must  be  conceded  that  Brannan's  division  was 
the  most  active  in  the  battle.  It  was  well  man 
aged,  but  its  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  was 
greater  than  that  of  any  other  Union  division. 
Brannan  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  1 ,977, 
with  214  missing.  His  division  fought  bravely 
under  his  skillful  management,  yet  he  was  unpro 
tected  on  both  days.  Negley's  loss  was  496 
killed  and  wounded,  the  smallest  loss  of  all.  The 
following  officers  went  through  the  battle  with 
great  credit,  viz.:  Generals  Thomas,  Granger, 
Steedman,  Brannan,  Baird,  Johnson,  Palmer, 
Reynolds;  and  Brigade-Commanders  Hazen, 
Marker,  Van  Derveer,  Croxton,  Whittaker,  John 
C.  Mitchell,  Willich,  and  Turchin. 

If  a  real  soldier,  like  Longstreet,  had  been  in 
command  of  the  Confederate  right  and  had  found 
upon  advancing  against  the  Union  line,  that  two 
brigades  lengths  extended  beyond  the  Union  left, 
he  would  certainly  have  made  more  out  of  such  a 
condition  than  did  Breckenridge  or  Leonidas  Polk. 

General  D.  H.  Hill,  in  his  report33  discusses  the 
situation  as  follows:  "The  important  results  ef- 


33  Rebellion  Records,  Serial  No.  51,  p.   143. 

[148] 


THOMAS'S  GENIUS 


fected  by  two  brigades  on  the  flank  proved  that, 
had  our  army  been  moved  under  cover  of  the 
woods  a  mile  farther  to  the  right,  the  whole  Yan 
kee  position  would  have  been  turned  and  an  al 
most  bloodless  victory  gained.  A  simple  recon- 
noissance  before  the  battle  would  have  shown  the 
practicability  of  the  movement  and  the  advantage 
to  be  gained  by  it."  Hill  was  in  command  on  that 
flank  and  should  have  acted  in  accordance  with  his 
understanding  of  the  situation,  or  at  least  reported 
the  facts  to  his  superior.  This  was  what  Rose- 
crans  was  anxious  about  when  he  hastened  troops 
from  the  right  to  the  left.  If  Sheridan  could  have 
reached  Thomas  before  Longstreet  cut  him  off  in 
the  act  of  double-quicking  toward  the  left  flank, 
what  would  have  happened  ? 

General  Thomas's  dispositions  to  protect  his  left 
showed  military  genius  of  the  highest  order,  and 
General  Baird  greatly  assisted  him  in  this  matter. 
This  was  only  one  instance,  however,  of  General 
Thomas's  many  equally  meritorious  tactics  in  this 
great  battle.  He  rose  to  the  highest  point  in  the 
estimation  of  both  officers  and  men. 

Both  days'  fighting  illustrates  the  fact  that  when 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

troops  are  outflanked  or  attacked  in  the  rear,  how 
ever  brave  they  may  be  in  other  positions  relative 
to  the  enemy,  they  will  as  a  rule  go  to  pieces.  It 
was  repeatedly  shown  on  both  sides,  especially  on 
the  1 9th,  during  the  battle,  that  the  veteran  troops 
as  well  as  the  new  regiments,  would  become  dis 
heartened  and  confused  in  such  a  position ;  many 
of  the  regiments  on  the  left  during  the  second  day, 
who  did  not  flinch  when  attacked  in  flank  and  rear 
on  the  day  before,  then  went  to  pieces. 

The  protected  troops  on  the  Union  left  fought 
through  the  entire  day  of  the  20th,  entirely  uncon 
scious  that  they  were  frequently  surrounded  not 
only  in  front  and  rear  of  their  own  line,  but  that  the 
«wo  flanks  of  the  army  were  only  about  three- 
fourths  of  a  mile  apart,  although  in  the  morning 
they  were  two  and  a  half  miles  apart.  At  noon 
the  Union  right  was  contracted,  and  thrown  back 
against  the  left.  The  order  to  retreat  late  in 
evening  of  the  20th  came  as  a  surprise  and  shock  to 
these  troops,  who  had  been  repulsing  the  enemy  all 
day  with  comparative  ease.  Thousands  of  mus 
ket  bearers  were  so  stiff  and  sore  from  the  two 
days*  conflict  and  the  marches  over  the  mountains 

[150] 


WEARIED  TROOPS 

during  the  preceding  days,  that  when  a  regiment 
lying  down  on  the  evening  of  the  20th  attempted 
to  rise  there  was  a  distinct  creaking  of  bones  and  an 
accompanying  groan,  slight,  but  perceptible. 
Many  of  them  while  moving  back  to  Rossville  at 
night,  took  the  desperate  chance  of  lying  down  for 
a  nap  in  the  woods  by  the  roadside,  intending 
to  rest  for  an  hour  or  two  and  then  join  their  regi 
ments  again  before  daylight ;  but  hundreds  of  these 
awoke  to  find  it  was  already  daylight  and  many 
were  captured  by  the  enemy's  cavalry. 

The  Confederate  Army  itself  did  not  advance 
from  the  battlefield  until  the  23rd;  only  a  small 
part  leaving  on  the  22nd.  The  fact  is  that  the 
Confederate  Army  was  much  more  used  up  than 
the  Union  Army ;  General  Bragg  said  to  General 
Longstreet  on  the  20th  that  his  troops  upon  his  right 
were  used  up.34  The  same  Confederate  troops 
which  had  penetrated  the  line  and  driven  Davis, 
Sheridan,  and  others  from  the  field,  were  so  rough 
ly  handled  by  Brannan  and  Granger  on  Snod- 
grass  Hill  that  they  could  not  be  brought  for 
ward  for  another  attack.  The  slowness  with 


14 See  General  Longstreet's  report  in  Ibid.,  p.  287. 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

which  the  Confederate  Army  moved  to  their  posi 
tions  around  Chattanooga  proves  that  they  were 
practically  defeated.  At  the  time  the  orders  were 
sent  to  the  divisions  behind  the  log-works  on  the 
left  to  prepare  for  withdrawal,  their  commanders 
sent  word  back  to  General  Thomas  that  there  was 
no  reason  for  them  to  retreat;  they  had  been, 
and  were  at  that  moment  repulsing  easily  every  as 
sault.  They  did  not  know  of  the  disaster  to  the 
right,  caused  by  Wood's  withdrawal,  nor  did 
General  Baird  and  his  brigade  commanders  know 
of  the  movements  of  either  Union  or  Confederate 
forces  until  after  the  retreat.  Many  writers  have 
expressed  the  opinion  that  the  Union  Army  should 
not  have  retreated.  But  to  a  soldier  who  was 
present  on  the  field  and  knew  the  facts — such 
as  the  absence  of  the  commander  of  the  army ;  his 
order  sent  from  the  far  rear  to  fall  back  to  Ross- 
ville;  the  absence  of  ammunition  and  rations;  the 
utterly  exhausted  condition  of  the  rank  and  file  by 
the  superhuman  exertions  of  the  two  days'  fighting 
and  the  preceding  hard  marching;  the  fear  that  if 
the  Union  Army  remained,  the  Confederate  Army 
might  yet  wedge  its  way  between  it  and  Chatta- 


FORREST'S  CAVALRY 

nooga,  the  Union  commander  not  being  aware 
at  that  time  of  the  exhausted  and  discouraged  con 
dition  of  the  Confederate  Army — it  seems  that  the 
falling  back  in  the  way  and  at  the  time  it  did  was 
the  correct  thing.  At  least  it  seems  as  if  Thomas 
had  really  nothing  else  to  do  than  to  fall  back 
when  the  order  from  General  Rosecrans  was  re 
ceived.  Had  General  Thomas  been  the  com 
mander  of  the  army,  it  might  have  been  different. 

The  Union  cavalry  did  not  properly  cooperate 
with  the  other  arms  of  the  Union  forces.  Forrest, 
with  his  large  Confederate  cavalry  force,  was  close 
to  the  right  of  the  Confederate  Army,  and  did 
fine  service;  the  force  was  equal  to  the  infantry 
in  number.  Forrest  should  have  been  opposed  by 
a  division  of  the  Union  cavalry.  Only  one  cav 
alry  brigade  was  needed  at  Crawfish  Springs; 
the  other  cavalry  brigade  together  with  Wilder's 
mounted  infantry  which  closed  up  on  the  right  of 
McCook,  should  have  given  better  service  at  a  time 
when  it  was  most  needed.  This  was  not  the  fault 
of  the  cavalry  commander,  for  he  only  obeyed 
orders  from  his  superiors.  In  a  despatch  to  Gen 
eral  R.  B.  Mitchell,  the  commander  of  the  cav- 

[i53l 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

airy,  at  7 : 1 5  p.  m.  September  20,  General  Rose- 
crans  said,  "Had  you  been  on  our  right  today  you 
could  have  charged  the  enemy's  flank,  and  done 
much  incalculable  mischief."  Why  was  not  his 
cavalry  as  close  to  the  Union  right  flank  as  For 
rest's  was  to  the  Confederate  right  flank  ?  Mitch 
ell's  cavalry  was  too  far  away  to  be  effective, 
when  disaster  overtook  the  wing:  it  was  supposed 
to  be  protecting,  but  it  was  farther  away  from 
Snodgrass  Hill  on  the  right  than  were  the  forces 
of  Gordon  Granger,  at  McAffee's  church  on  the 
left. 


[i54] 


CHAPTER  III 

The  Occupation  and  Battles  of  Chattanooga 

When  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  fell  back 
from  Chickamauga  and  Rossville  to  Chattanooga, 
the  first  and  most  important  thing  to  do  was  to 
quickly  fortify  against  attack.  The  troops  marched 
directly  to  the  places  assigned  them,  and  when  all 
were  in  place,  the  lines  half  encircled  the  city, 
both  flanks  terminating  at  the  river.  McCook  was 
on  the  right,  Thomas  next,  and  Crittenden  on  the 
left.  The  troops  began  at  once  the  work  of  throw 
ing  up  the  ordinary  entrenchments;  these  were  from 
time  to  time  strengthened  until  satisfactory.  Two 
forts  had  been  partially  completed  by  the  enemy; 
these  were  finished  and  occupied  by  both  artil 
lery  and  infantry.  The  army  was  drawn  in  close 
around  the  city;  the  point  of  Lookout  Mountain 
and  its  slopes  beyond  Chattanooga  Creek  were 
left  to  the  enemy.  This  gave  the  Confederate 
Army  command  of  the  river,  the  rail  and  wagon 

[i55] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

roads  (parallel  with  the  river),  between  Chatta 
nooga,  Bridgeport,  and  Stevenson.  The  only 
other  practicable  road  to  the  bases  of  supplies  was 
over  Walden's  Ridge  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river,  a  distance  of  60  miles  by  wagon ;  thus  it  be 
came  very  difficult  to  furnish  more  than  half  or 
three-quarters  rations  to  the  men,  and  only  very  lit 
tle  forage  could  be  furnished  to  the  animals.  The 
road  mentioned  was  so  steep  and  bad  that  a  team 
of  four  or  six  mules  would  consume  almost  the  en 
tire  load  of  feed  in  bringing  the  load  and  in  return 
ing  for  another. 

General  Bragg  deemed  the  occupancy  of  his 
main  line  along  Missionary  Ridge — across  the  val 
ley  to  Lookout  Mountain,  thence  on  the  south  side 
of  the  river  by  small  detachments  at  different 
points — to  Bridgeport  sufficient  to  starve  out  the 
army  in  Chattanooga.  Meanwhile  he  sent 
Wheeler's  cavalry  to  the  north  side,  in  order  to 
raid  the  line  of  supplies.  Wheeler  burned  300 
wagons  in  the  Sequatchie  Valley  and  went  on 
north  doing  what  damage  he  could.  Fearing 
that  Bragg  might  follow  Longstreet's  advice  and 
cross  the  river  east  of  Chattanooga  with  a  large 

[156] 


CHATTANOOGA  IN  SEMI-SIEGE 

part  of  his  army,  Rosecrans  soon  completed  an  in 
side  works  of  circumvallation  by  which  ten  thou 
sand  men  might  be  able  to  hold  the  city,  while  he 
might  be  obliged  to  protect  his  base  of  supplies 
by  marching  the  rest  of  his  army  to  meet  such  a 
situation.  That  Bragg  did  not  undertake  an  enter 
prise  of  this  character  was  further  proof  of  the  used- 
up  condition  of  his  army,  the  result  of  the  late  bat 
tle  of  Chickamauga.  Bragg's  reasoning  regarding 
his  ability  to  starve  the  forces  in  the  city  was  good 
only  on  the  supposition  that  the  Government  at 
Washington  would  fail  to  send  sufficient  reinforce 
ments  to  protect  the  rear,  and  to  raise  "The  Siege 
of  Chattanooga;"  it  was  not  more  than  a  semi- 
siege,  however,  and  has  been  so  called  by  some 
authors.  If  Bragg's  army  had  occupied  both 
sides  of  the  river  and  practically  surrounded  the 
city,  as  the  German  troops  surrounded  Paris  in  the 
Franco-German  War  of  1 87 1 ,  then  it  could  have 
been  called  a  siege.  Of  course  the  situation  of 
the  Union  Army  was  critical,  not  only  here  in 
the  fortified  city,  but  ever  since  it  crossed  the 
Tennessee  River  during  the  campaign  preced 
ing  the  battle  of  Chickamauga.  As  before  men- 

[i57] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

tioned,  General  Rosecrans  estimated  on  Septem 
ber  23,  1863,  that  he  had  about  35,000  troops 
in  the  entrenchments;  the  cavalry  and  Wilder's 
brigade  of  mounted  infantry  were  then  on  the 
north  side  of  the  river  and  guarded  the  cross 
ings  for  a  considerable  distance,  both  above  and 
below.  Union  reinforcements  had  been  ordered 
both  from  the  east  and  from  the  west;  but  Burn- 
side,  who  commanded  in  East  Tennessee,  was 
asking  at  the  same  time  for  help  at  Knoxville, 
instead  of  being  able  to  send  any  succor  to  Rose 
crans.  Before  the  battle  of  Chickamauga  rein 
forcements  had  been  ordered  from  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee — at  that  time  on  or  near  the 
Mississippi  at  Memphis — and  from  Burnside, 
but  none  had  arrived.  After  the  great  battle  and 
the  falling  back  of  Rosecrans,  the  commander  did 
not  need  to  urge  the  President  and  Secretary  of 
War  to  be  convinced,  that  unless  they  really  de 
sired  to  lose  Tennessee  and  all  that  had  so  far  been 
gained  in  the  department  of  the  Cumberland,  other 
troops  must  be  sent  with  the  greatest  celerity. 
Two  corps  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  were 
ordered  to  the  battlefield;  the  Eleventh  com- 

[158] 


CONFEDERATES  ACTIVE 

manded  by  General  O.  O.  Howard,  and  the 
Twelfth  under  General  H.  W.  Slocum;  both  un 
der  the  command  of  General  Joseph  Hooker. 
General  W.  T.  Sherman  was  also  to  reinforce  the 
Union  Army  with  the  Fifteenth  Corps,  and  one 
division  of  the  Seventeenth  from  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee.  In  the  meantime  every  exertion  was 
made  by  the  troops  present  to  hold  the  city  at  all 
hazards.  When  Wheeler  captured  and  burned 
the  300  wagons  near  Anderson's  cross  roads,  in  the 
Sequatchie  Valley,  Colonel  E.  M.  McCook  with 
the  First  Wisconsin  Cavalry,  the  Second  and 
Fourth  Indiana  cavalry  and  a  section  of  artillery 
started  from  Bridgeport  up  the  Sequatchie  Valley. 
Retarded  by  an  incessant  rain,  he  was  in  time  to 
see  the  smoke  only  of  the  burning  wagons ;  he  made 
a  charge  and  drove  a  detachment  of  the  enemy's 
troops  past  the  fire  upon  their  main  body.  He  fol 
lowed  this  Confederate  division — which  was  com 
manded  vigorously  by  Martin  and  Wheeler — out 
of  the  valley,  captured  a  number  of  soldiers  and 
800  mules  and  saved  some  of  the  wagons. 
Wheeler  reached  McMinnville  in  time  to  capture 
the  garrison  and  burn  the  supplies.  He  was  off 

[i59] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

toward  Murfreesboro  before  the  arrival  of  Crook 
and  his  command,  who  had  taken  up  the  pursuit. 
The  Union  cavalry  corps,  commanded  by  R.  B. 
Mitchell,  with  McCook's  division,  joined  Crook 
at  Murfreesboro  and  saved  that  place  from  cap 
ture.  They  followed  Wheeler  so  persistently 
and  fought  him  so  successfully  that  theyj>revented 
the  destruction  of  the  railroad,  but  were  unable  to 
save  the  telegraph  lines.  Wheeler  crossed  back  at 
Rogersville  to  the  south  of  the  Tennessee;  Mitch 
ell  followed  and  captured  at  that  point  a  large 
amount  of  Confederate  cotton  and  destroyed  it. 
Mitchell  prevented  the  Confederate  advance  to 
Winchester  and  Decherd  after  having  heard  at 
Huntsville,  Alabama,  that  Roddey's  Confederate 
cavalry  was  moving  towards  these  cities,  having 
been  forced  to  recross  the  river.  Bragg's  inten- 
ton  was  to  destroy  Rosecrans's  communications 
and  to  force  him  to  abandon  Chattanooga.  The 
maintenance  of  the  railroad  back  to  Nashville 
was  of  vital  importance  to  the  Union  Army. 
Wheeler's  loss  on  this  raid  was  according  to 
the  estimate  of  General  Crook,  2,000  men  and  6 
pieces  of  artillery.  These  fatalities  made  the 

[160] 


PROTECTING  THE  RAILROAD 

Confederate  commander  more  cautions.  Crook's 
loss  was  only  14  killed  and  97  wounded. 
Wheeler's  raid  and  the  Union  pursuit,  are  speci 
mens  of  the  kind  of  warfare  which  cavalry  are 
expected  to  make,  showing  the  terrible  destruction 
of  men  and  horses,  the  untiring  marches,  and 
watchfulness  necessary  in  a  field  so  extensive  and 
difficult  as  that  of  the  department  of  Cumberland. 
It  would  have  been  much  more  economical  and 
effective,  if  the  War  Department  had  previously 
protected  the  railway  with  sufficient  infantry,  as  it 
now  intended  to  do,  than  to  protect  it  by  an  ordi 
nary  force  of  cavalry.  The  Department  did 
adopt  the  plan  of  protecting  the  railway  with  in 
fantry,  when  Hooker  came  with  a  division;  this 
mode  was  most  effectively  used  also  in  1 864. 

Although  the  railroad  from  Nashville  to  Stev 
enson  was  being  maintained  and  supplies  were  ac 
cumulated  at  the  latter  city,  yet  the  necessity  of 
hauling  supplies  by  wagons  over  such  an  extended 
and  precipitious  road  as  the  one  over  Walden's 
Ridge,  and  the  destruction  of  so  many  wagons  by 
Wheeler,  told  heavily  on  the  devoted  troops  in  the 
entrenched  city.  The  rains  were  heavy  and  con- 

11  [  161  ] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

tinuous  during  the  early  part  of  October,  making 
the  roads  almost  impassable  in  some  places.  The 
trips  to  Bridgeport  seemed  gradually  to  lengthen, 
the  mules  became  thinner,  and  so  the  rations  had  to 
be  reduced  from  time  to  time,  until  men,  horses, 
and  mules  were  in  very  sore  straits.  The  artil 
lery  horses  and  all  extra  horses  of  mounted  officers, 
that  had  not  already  died  from  starvation,  were 
sent  back  to  Bridgeport  or  Stevenson  to  be  kept 
there  until  the  strain  could  be  relieved  sometime 
in  the  indefinite  future.  Yet  no  thought  of  retreat 
or  surrender  entered  the  minds  of  the  devoted 
soldiers.  The  fact  that  the  army  in  the  surround 
ing  hills  was  in  a  worse  condition — too  weak  to 
take  any  advantage  of  the  situation  by  aggressive 
movements,  except  those  abortive  cavalry  raids  in 
the  rear — undoubtedly  saved  the  Union  Army 
from  destruction. 

In  the  early  part  of  October,  General  Hooker 
arrived  at  Nashville  with  the  Eleventh  and 
Twelfth  corps.  They  were  stationed  along  the 
railroad  to  Bridgeport.  The  corps  had  come  to 
Nashville  by  railroad,  but  were  without  trans 
portation,  therefore  did  not  supply  all  the  re- 

[162] 


PROTECTING  THE  RAILROAD 

lief  needed  at  Chattanooga.  What  was  abso 
lutely  necessary  was  the  restoration  of  rail  trans 
portation  from  Stevenson  to  Chattanooga,  and  not 
exclusively  the  protection  of  the  railroad  from  the 
north  to  Bridgeport.  Sufficient  reinforcements 
were  also  needed  in  order  to  enable  the  Union 
Army  to  attack  and  destroy  or  drive  back  the 
enemy,  who  was  in  too  close  proximity  for  safety; 
and  therefore  the  first  thing  to  be  considered,  after 
the  Union  troops  were  properly  fortified,  was  to 
plan  means  by  which  the  cooperation  of  these 
eastern  reinforcements  could  be  made  available. 
In  preliminary  preparation  for  this,  a  steajnboat 
which  had  been  captured  at  Chattanooga,  had 
been  repaired  and  another  was  being  built  at 
Bridgeport.  Rosecrans  ordered  Hooker  to  bring 
to  Bridgeport  all  his  command,  with  the  excep 
tion  of  what  was  needed  to  protect  the  railroad 
from  Nashville  to  the  Tennessee  River.  He 
started  also  the  construction  of  pontoons  for  a 
bridge,  at  some  point  over  the  river  below  Chat 
tanooga,  where  his  troops  might  have  to  cross 
in  order  to  meet  Hooker's  forces  coming  from 
Bridgeport,  and  also  in  order  to  shorten  the 

[163] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

road  down  the  river.  General  W.  F.  Smith 
("Baldy  Smith")  had  lately  been  appointed 
chief  engineer  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
General  Rosecrans  ordered  him  to  reconnoiter  the 
river  near  Williams's  Island,  a  few  miles  below  the 
points  of  Lookout  Mountain,  expecting  to  make  of 
that  island  a  steamer  landing  and  supply  depot. 
This  last  order  was  issued  October  1 9,  and  on  that 
same  day  General  Rosecrans  was  relieved  from 
the  command  of  the  Army ;  and  General  George 
H.  Thomas  assumed  command. 

Prior  to  this  date,  on  October  9,  a  complete  re 
organization  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had 
been  made.  Many  of  the  regiments  and  brigades 
had  been  so  reduced  in  numbers  by  the  late  battle 
and  by  sickness,  that  consolidation  of  brigades  be 
came  imperative.  Besides,  in  order  to  maintain 
efficiency  in  the  army  and  proper  discipline,  a 
weeding  out  among  the  general  officers  became  a 
necessity.  Ever  since  the  close  of  fighting  at 
Chickamauga,  there  had  been  an  undercurrent  of 
feeling  among  the  majority  of  the  officers,  that  cer 
tain  ones,  who  had  failed  to  meet  the  emergencies 
which  arose  during  that  battle,  could  not  continue 

[164] 


THE  FOURTH  CORPS 

in  command,  without  decided  detriment  to  the  fu 
ture  operations  of  the  army.  In  compliance  with 
the  President's  order  of  September  28,  the  Twen 
tieth  and  Twenty-First  corps  were  consolidated 
and  called  the  Fourth  Corps.  This  new  corps 
was  placed  under  the  command  of  General  Gor 
don  Granger  who  had  particularly  distinguished 
himself  at  Chickamauga.  The  reserve  corps  was 
made  a  part  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps.  Each  corps 
was  composed  of  three  divisions  and  each  division 
of  three  brigades.  The  following  short  dispatch 
sent  to  the  Secretary  of  War  by  C.  A.  Dana,  gives 
a  very  concise  and  interesting  statement  of  what 
was  done: 

"Fourth  Corps:  First  Division,  Palmer;  First 
Brigade,  Cruft,  nine  regiments,  2,044  men; 
Second  Brigade,  Whittaker,  eight  regiments, 
2,035  men;  Third  Brigade,  Colonel  Grose,  eight 
regiments,  1,968  men.  Second  Division,  Sheri 
dan;  First  Brigade,  F.  T.  Sherman,  ten  regiments, 
2,385  men ;  Second  Brigade,  Wagner,  eight  regi 
ments,  2,188  men;  Third  Brigade,  Marker,  2,026 
men.  Third  Division,  Wood;  First  Brigade, 
Willich,  nine  regiments,  2,069  men;  Second 

[165] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Brigade,  Hazen,  nine  regiments,  2,195  men; 
Third  Brigade,  Samuel  Beatty,  eight  regiments, 
2,222  men. 

"Fourteenth  Corps:  First  Division,  Rousseau; 
First  Brigade,  Carlin,  nine  regiments,  2,072  men; 
Second  Brigade,  King,  four  regiments  of  regulars 
and  four  regiments  of  volunteers,  2,070  men; 
Third  Brigade,  Starkweather,  eight  regiments, 
2,214  men.  Second  Division,  J.  C.  Davis;  First 
Brigade,}.  D.  Morgan,  five  regiments,  2,214 
men  [this  brigade  had  been  in  the  reserve  and 
did  not  take  part  in  the  late  battle]  ;  Second 
Brigade,  John  Beatty,  seven  regiments,  2,460 
men;  Third  Brigade,  Daniel  McCook,  six  regi 
ments,  2,099  men  [this  brigade  had  few  losses 
in  the  late  battle].  Third  Division,  Baird; 
First  Brigade,  Turchin,  seven  regiments,  2,175 
men;  Second  Brigade,  Van  Derveer,  seven  regi 
ments,  2,1  16  men;  Third  Brigade,  Croxton,  seven 
regiments,  2,165  men." 

Those  detachments  of  the  reserve  corps 
which  still  remained  along  the  Nashville  and 
Chattanooga  railroad  beyond  Bridgeport,  were 
not  included.  The  garrison  at  Stevenson, 

[166! 


WISCONSIN  TROOPS 

Bridgeport,  and  Battle  Creek,  under  General  J.  D. 
Morgan,  as  above  stated,  were  however  included. 
The  State  of  Tennessee  was  divided  into  two  dis 
tricts,  the  northern,  commanded  by  General  Rob 
ert  S.  Granger  with  headquarters  at  Nashville,  and 
the  southern  under  General  R.  W.  Johnson  with 
headquarters  at  Stevenson. 

General  L.  H.  Rousseau  superseded  General 
R.  S.  Granger  at  Nashville,  in  November,  prior  to 
the  battles.  General  Starkweather  relieved 
Johnson  at  Stevenson  after  the  battle,  the  latter 
having  been  assigned  in  Rousseau's  place,  as  com 
mander  of  the  First  Division  of  the  Fourteenth 
Corps. 

In  the  reorganization  of  the  army  the  Wiscon 
sin  troops  were  distributed  as  follows:  The  First 
and  Twenty-First  Infantry  remained  in  Stark 
weather's  Third  Brigade  of  the  First  Division  of 
the  Fourteenth  Corps;  the  Tenth  Infantry  in  the 
First  Brigade  of  the  same  division  which  was 
commanded  by  General  W.  P.  Carlin.  The 
Twenty-fourth  Infantry  was  in  the  First  Brigade 
of  Sheridan's  Division,  commanded  by  Colonel 
F.  T.  Sherman ;  the  Fifteenth  Infantry  in  Wil- 

[167] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

lich's  Brigade  of  Wood's  Division,  of  the  Fourth 
Corps.  The  Fifth  Battery  was  attached  to 
Davis's  Division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps;  the 
Third,  Eighth  and  Tenth,  and  Company  A  of  the 
First  Wisconsin  Heavy  Artillery  were  assigned 
to  the  Second  Division  of  the  Artillery  Reserve. 
The  Eleventh  and  Twelfth  corps  were  not  re 
organized  prior  to  the  battles;  the  Third  and 
Twenty-sixth  Wisconsin  Infantry  remained  in  the 
same  organization  in  which  they  were  in  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac — viz.:  the  Third  in  Ruger's 
Third  Brigade  of  the  First  Division  ( Williams's) 
of  the  Twelfth  Corps;  the  Twenty-sixth  in  the 
Second  Brigade  of  the  Third  Division  of  the 
Eleventh  Corps. 

When  General  Thomas  became  commander  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  General  John  M. 
Palmer  was  made  commander  in  his  place  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps,  and  General  Charles  Cruft 
was  assigned  to  the  command  of  the  First  Division 
of  the  Fourth  Corps,  in  place  of  Palmer. 

General  James  A.  Garfield,  chief  of  staff,  had 
been  elected  member  of  Congress  from  his  district 
in  Ohio;  he  left  in  order  to  assume  his  duties  and 

Fi681 


GRANT  TAKES  COMMAND 

General  J.  J.  Reynolds  had  been  appointed  chief 
of  staff  in  his  place.  General  John  M.  Brannan 
was  made  chief  of  artillery.  These,  with  Gen 
eral  W.  F.  Smith  as  chief  engineer,  greatly  added 
to  the  strength  of  the  headquarters  staff. 

This  order  of  the  President — which  affected 
these  local  changes  in  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land — was  followed  by  a  much  greater  consolida 
tion  on  a  very  much  broader  scale.  The  Army  of 
the  Tennessee — then  in  western  Tennessee  and 
northern  Mississippi — was  placed  under  command 
of  General  W.  T.  Sherman,  who  was  on  his  way 
with  a  portion  of  it  to  Chattanooga  in  order  to 
reinforce  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  The 
Army  of  the  Ohio,  under  General  A.  E. 
Burnside,  was  at  Knoxville.  These  three  ar 
mies  had  not  before  had  a  commander  in 
common  under  whose  orders  they  could  be  made 
to  co-operate.  A  commander-in-chief  at  Wash 
ington  had  so  far  been  unable  to  accomplish 
this  very  necessary  co-operation.  The  Tennessee 
River  ran  through  the  fields  of  operations  of  all  the 
three  armies — less  directly  in  the  field  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee — and  the  preceding  lack  of  unity 

[169] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

in  movements  jeopardized  the  ultimate  object  of 
all  their  campaigns,  namely :  the  re-establishment 
of  the  former  relation  between  the  states  in  rebel 
lion  and  the  general  government.  On  this  ac 
count  the  President  established  the  Military  Divi 
sion  of  the  Mississippi,  with  Lieutenant-General 
U.  S.  Grant  in  command.  This  was  a  virtual 
consolidation  of  the  three  armies;  their  co-opera 
tion  in  that  wide  field  was  henceforth  perfect. 
Subsequent  events  showed  the  wisdom  of  this  or 
der.  The  Confederates  never  won  another  battle 
in  this  department;  and  in  fourteen  months  after 
the  organization  of  one  command  there  existed  no 
organized  Confederate  force  in  this  field,  worthy 
of  notice.  There  were  only  detachments  here 
and  there,  like  Forrest's  rangers  in  the  early  spring 
of  1 865,  until  General  James  H.  Wilson's  cavalry 
raid  put  an  end  to  all  resistance. 

After  its  reorganization,  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  was  composed  of  the  Fourth, 
Eleventh,  Twelfth,  and  Fourteenth  corps,  and 
three  divisions  of  cavalry.  Had  General  Sheri 
dan  been  placed  in  command  of  the  combined 
cavalry,  his  subsequent  career  shows  that  its  effi- 

[170] 


ARRIVAL  OF  GRANT 

ciency  would  have  been  greatly  improved; 
but  all  the  changes,  that  might  have  been  benefi 
cial,  could  not  be  thought  of  at  once.  The 
pending  events  in  this  department  developed  some 
pre-eminent  officers,  who  were  indeed  very  much 
needed;  they  became  masterful  factors  in  the 
early  downfall  of  the  rebellion,  both  in  the  east 
and  in  the  west ;  Sheridan  was  one  of  these ;  others 
were  Grant,  Thomas,  and  Sherman. 

Grant  reached  his  new  command  by  way  of 
Louisville,  Kentucky,  where  he  met  the  Secretary 
of  War,  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  who  brought  with 
him  the  order  of  October  1 8,  as  well  as  General 
Grant's  commission.  Grant  sent  from  Louisville 
the  following  telegram  to  Thomas,  "Hold  Chat 
tanooga  at  all  hazards.  I  will  be  there  as  soon  as 
possible.  Please  inform  me  how  long  your 
present  supplies  will  last,  and  the  prospect  for 
keeping  them  up."  General  Thomas  answered: 
'Two  hundred  and  four  thousand  four  hundred 
and  sixty-two  rations  in  storehouses ;  ninety  thous 
and  to  arrive  tomorrow,  and  all  the  trains  were 
loaded  which  had  arrived  at  Bridgeport  up  to  the 

[171] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

16th — probably  three  hundred  wagons.  /  will 
hold  the  town  till  We  starve.9' 

On  October  19,  Thomas  ordered  General 
Hooker  to  carry  out  the  former  orders  of  General 
Rosecrans,  namely  to  concentrate  his  forces  at 
Bridgeport,  in  order  to  move  them  to  Chatta 
nooga. 

General  Grant  arrived  at  Chattanooga  on  the 
evening  of  October  23,  one  month  after  the  Union 
troops  had  taken  possession  of  the  city.  On  the 
24th  he  went  to  Brown's  Ferry  in  company  with 
Thomas  and  W.  F.  Smith,  the  chief  engineer; 
at  once  he  recognized  the  necessity  and  possibility 
of  the  scheme,  initiated  by  General  Roscrans,  but 
conceived  and  planned  by  W.  F.  Smith,  of  plac 
ing  a  pontoon  bridge  there  and  of  obtaining  a  hold 
on  the  south  side  of  the  river  at  that  point,  and  he 
ordered  its  execution;  much  had  already  been 
done  toward  preparing  for  it.  General  Smith 
was  given  full  power  to  complete  the  plan.  The 
river  at  Chattanooga  runs  almost  directly  west  op 
posite  the  city,  but  soon  it  curves  to  the  north  and 
then  it  turns  to  the  south  with  quite  a  sharp  bend 
at  the  foot  of  Lookout  Mountain,  from  where  the 

[172] 


MOCCASIN  POINT 

river  runs  directly  north,  forming  a  narrow  and 
perfect  peninsula  directly  opposite  or  west  of  the 
city.  This  peninsula  widens  slightly  at  its  south 
ern  end  and  forms  a  perfect  shape  of  a  human 
foot;  hence  it  is  called  "Moccasin  Point." 
Brown's  Ferry  is  directly  west  of  the  city,  on  the 
western  point  of  the  neck  of  this  peninsula,  some 
miles  below  Lookout.  It  is  only  about  a  mile  in 
direct  line  to  Brown's  Ferry  from  the  northern  end 
of  the  bridge,  at  the  foot  of  Cameron  Hill  in  the 
western  outskirts  of  the  city.  From  Brown's 
Ferry  the  river  continues  north,  and  passes  Wil 
liams  Island;  five  or  more  miles  from  the  ferry, 
it  makes  another  sharp  turn  to  the  south  at  the  foot 
of  Walden's  Ridge;  in  the  course  of  six  or  seven 
miles  from  this  northern  bend  it  flows  tortuously 
past  Kelly's  Ferry.  The  peninsula  thus  formed, 
is  the  northern  nose  of  Raccoon  Mountain.  From 
Brown's  to  Kelly's  Ferry  is  about  five  miles  in  di 
rect  line  somewhat  to  the  southwest,  and,  as  said 
before,  it  is  one  mile  across  to  Chattanooga.  It  is 
about  five  miles  from  Cameron  Hill  bridge  to 
Brown's  Ferry,  but  from  where  the  boats  for  the 
Brown's  Ferry  bridge  subsequently  started,  it  is 

[i73] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

about  nine  miles,  and  to  Kelly's  Ferry  more  than 
fifteen,  perhaps  twenty  miles.  These  figures 
show  the  value  to  the  transportation,  of  obtaining 
unobstructed  access  to  Kelly's  Ferry  as  a  landing 
for  steamboats  bringing  supplies  from  Bridgeport 
across  Brown's  Ferry,  when  it  should  come  into 
possession  of  the  Union  Army  by  the  advance  of 
Hooker,  until  the  railroad  could  be  repaired  or 
put  into  working  order  from  Bridgeport  to  Chatta 
nooga.  The  movement  of  troops  which  accom 
plished  this,  also,  gave  the  army  a  lodgment  on 
the  south  side  of  the  river,  to  meet,  and  assist, 
Hooker's  forces  coming  from  Bridgeport,  thus 
breaking  the  Confederate  hold  upon  the  river  road 
to  Bridgeport.  Under  General  Smith's  orders 
and  supervision,  the  plans  were  successfully  car 
ried  out.  Two  flatboats  and  fifty  pontoons,  with 
cars,  were  prepared.  In  these,  1 ,500  men  under 
Hazen  passed  down  the  river  nine  miles,  and  close 
to  the  Confederate  pickets.  They  were  to  land 
at  different  points  in  sections,  the  places  having 
been  pointed  out  previously  to  the  officers  in  com 
mand.  On  account  of  the  darkness  fires  were 
kept  burning  opposite  these  places,  so  that  the  dif- 

[i74] 


CROSSING  THE  RIVER 

ferent  sections  could  land  at  the  proper  points. 
The  remainder  of  Turchin's  and  Hazen's 
brigades — from  which  the  men  in  the  boats  were 
taken — and  their  batteries,  were  marched  across 
the  peninsula,  and  posted  out  of  sight  in  the 
woods,  near  Brown's  Ferry  on  the  north  side  of 
the  river. 

The  infantry  troops  were  to  cross  in  the  boats, 
as  soon  as  the  men  under  Hazen  landed  on  the 
south  side,  and  recross  to  the  north  side.  The  ar 
tillery  was  to  move  into  position  as  soon  as  the 
boats  landed,  in  order  to  cover  a  retreat  in  case  of 
disaster.  The  equipment  for  the  pontoon  bridge 
was  also  in  place  and  ready  for  use.  The  boats 
commenced  to  float  at  3  a.  m.  October  27,  and 
they  were  not  discovered  by  the  enemy  until  5 
a.  m.,  when  the  first  section  had  landed;  a  portion 
of  the  second  section,  which  did  not  land  in  the 
proper  place,  was  fired  on  by  the  enemy's  picket, 
calling  forth  an  attack  by  the  picket-reserve  of  the 
enemy.  But  the  Union  troops  on  the  north  side 
of  the  ferry  crossed  rapidly  in  the  boats,  pushed 
forward  to  the  top  of  the  ridge,  and  in  two  hours 
they  protected  themselves  sufficiently  with  timber 

[175] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

and  abatis  to  hold  the  tele  de  pont.  On  the  27th 
the  bridge  was  completed  at  4:30  p.  m.;  the  work 
was  done  under  some  shelling  from  Lookout 
Point.  Captain  P.  V.  Fox  of  the  First  Michi 
gan  Engineers  was  the  skillful  superintendent  of 
the  bridge  building.  Twenty  beeves,  six  pon 
toons,  a  barge  and  about  2,000  bushels  of  corn  fell 
into  the  hands  of  the  Union  troops.  The  Union 
loss  was  6  killed,  23  wounded,  and  9  missing. 
Six  prisoners  were  taken  from  the  Confederates 
and  6  were  killed;  how  many  were  wounded  is 
not  known.  While  the  bridge  was  being  laid, 
General  Hooker  crossed  the  river  at  Bridgeport  on 
a  pontoon  bridge,  and  was  marching  up  towards 
Chattanooga.  At  3  p.  m.  on  the  28th,  his  head 
of  column  reached  Wauhatchie,  in  Lookout  Val 
ley,  at  the  junction  of  the  railroad  from  Bridge 
port,  with  the  branch  from  Trenton  up  the  val 
ley.  The  wagon  road  from  here  to  Brown's 
Ferry  runs  about  four  miles,  along  the  western 
base  of  a  ridge,  which  here  and  there  has  deep 
depressions;  through  one  of  these  the  railroad 
continued  to  Chattanooga,  around  the  nose  of 
Lookout,  close  to  the  river;  through  another  the 

[176] 


WISCONSIN  REGIMENTS 

wagon  road  runs.  General  Hooker  had  with  him 
Howard's  Eleventh  Corps,  and  Geary's  division 
of  the  Twelfth,  with  the  exception  of  one  regi 
ment  left  at  the  bridge  at  Bridgeport,  one  at  White- 
side's  and  one  at  Shellmound;  the  latter  two 
places  being  on  the  railroad  between  Bridgeport 
and  Chattanooga. 

The  First  Division  of  the  Twelfth  Corps, 
(Williams),  had  been  left  to  guard  the  railroad 
from  Murfreesboro  to  Bridgeport.  In  Ruger's 
brigade  of  this  division  was  the  Third  Wisconsin 
Infantry,  commanded  by  Colonel  William  Haw- 
ley.  This  regiment  had  been  mustered  into  the 
service  on  June  29,  1861,  and  had  been  serving 
with  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  since  that  date 
until  now,  when  it  became  a  part  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland.  In  the  Second  Brigade  of  the 
Third  Division,  (Schurz)  of  the  Eleventh  Corps 
was  the  Twenty-sixth  Wisconsin  Infantry,  com 
manded  by  Captain  Frederick  C.  Winkler,  who 
was  appointed  Major  November  17,  1863.  It 
was  exclusively  a  German  regiment,  and  was 
mustered  in  at  Milwaukee  on  August  17,  1862. 
On  the  following  October  6,  it  left  Wisconsin  for 

12  [177] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  in  which  it  served  until 
it  became  a  part  of  the  Eleventh  Corps  under 
Howard  and  Hooker  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land. 

Hooker's  advance  troops,  under  General  How 
ard,  camped  that  night  within  a  mile  or  so  of 
Brown's  Ferry,  where  they  opened  communication 
with  the  troops  there.  Geary's  division  was 
in  the  rear  and  camped  near  Wauhatchie,  three 
miles  from  Howard's  troops;  thus  the  road 
from  Wauhatchie  to  Kelly's  Ferry — three  miles 
to  the  northwest  of  Wauhatchie — was  con 
trolled.  About  1  a.  m.  on  the  29th,  Geary  was 
heavily  attacked  by  a  part  of  Longstreet's  troops, 
but  not  before  he  had  his  division  in  line  for  de 
fense.  Howard  was  ordered  to  double  quick  his 
nearest  division,  under  command  of  General  Carl 
Schurz,  to  Geary's  relief.  Before  proceeding  far, 
it  was  fired  upon  from  the  near  hills  on  the  divi 
sion's  left,  but  at  long  range.  The  firing  pro 
duced  no  great  injury  to  Schurz's  troops.  How 
ard  detached  one  brigade  to  deploy  on  these  hills, 
and  pushed  on  with  the  other;  in  the  meantime 
Steinwehr's  division,  also  of  Howard's,  came  up. 

[178] 


LOOKOUT  VALLEY  SECURED 

Then  it  was  discovered  that  another  hill,  in  the 
rear  of  Schurz  was  also  occupied  by  the  enemy. 
Smith's  brigade  charged  it  and  carried  it  with  the 
bayonet  against  three  times  its  number, 

Hooker  says,  "No  troops  ever  rendered  more 
brilliant  service.  The  name  of  their  valiant  com 
mander  is  Colonel  Orlando  Smith  of  the  Seventy- 
third  Ohio  Infantry.  *  *  *  For  almost 
three  hours,  without  assistance  Geary  repelled  the 
repeated  attacks  of  vastly  superior  numbers,  and  in 
the  end  drove  them  ingloriously  from  the  field." 
Thus  the  Lookout  Valley  was  secured,  and 
new  communications  were  opened.  The  loss  to 
General  Hooker's  command  was  416.  Long- 
street  practically  conceded  that  the  Union  com 
mander  had  succeeded  in  opening  this  new  line  of 
communication,  but  spoke  lightly  of  it.  Whit- 
taker's  and  John  G.  Mitchell's  brigades  were  sub 
sequently  moved  over  to  this  region.  The  steam 
boat  at  Chattanooga  passed  down  on  the  night  of 
the  28th ;  thereafter  two  steamboats  (one  had  been 
built  at  Bridgeport) ,  made  regular  trips  with  sup 
plies  from  Bridgeport  to  Kelly's  Ferry.  Good 
roads  were  made  from  Chattanooga  via  Brown's 

[179] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

to  Kelly's  Ferry  and  the  railroad  from  Bridgeport 
towards  the  east  was  being  repaired.  There  was 
no  shortage  of  rations  or  forage  after  these  rapid 
preparations  were  commenced  to  attack  the  enemy 
in  his  strong  positions  around  the  city.  Hope  and 
confidence  had  always  inspired  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland;  the  rank  and  file  had  never 
despaired ;  now,  they  took  the  lead  in  anticipating 
that  the  end  was  in  sight ;  success  in  battle  depends 
very  much  on  the  condition  of  the  human  body  and 
the  enthusiasm  of  the  spirit. 

The  feeble  and  ineffectual  efforts  of  Long- 
street  to  prevent  the  opening  of  the  river,  and  the 
advance  of  Hooker's  troops,  opened  the  eyes  of 
all  the  general  officers  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  to  the  weakness  of  the  Confederate  Army, 
both  in  the  ranks  and  among  the  officers.  Gen 
eral  Longstreet,  in  his  official  report  of  the  battle 
of  Wauhatchie,  attributes  his  defeat  to  the  jeal 
ousy  of  brigade  officers.35  The  Confederate 
troops,  making  the  attack  on  General  Geary,  were 
withdrawn  from  the  east  side  of  Lookout,  but 
they  returned  immediately  before  daylight  on  the 


*  Rebellion  Records,  Serial  No.   51,  p.  287. 

[180] 


LONGSTREET  WITHDRAWS 

night  of  the  attack.  General  Longstreet  gave 
reasons  for  this  action ;  he  showed  that  it  was  not 
good  military  tactics  to  keep  a  large  force  on  that 
side  of  the  mountain,  where  its  only  line  of  retreat 
was  around  the  slope  of  Lookout;  if  it  were  de 
feated,  it  would  be  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
Union  troops  at  and  opposite  Chattanooga. 
These  reasons  were  sound  and  foreshadowed  the 
ease  with  which  Hooker's  forces,  on  November 
24,  drove  the  enemy  so  easily  and  captured  Look 
out  Mountain.  It  was  after  this  defeat,  that 
Bragg  (for  reasons  unknown),  sent  Longstreet's 
Corps  toward  Knoxville  to  assist  in  defeating 
Burnside.  Bragg  hoped  that  it  could  be  returned 
in  time  to  assist  in  the  battle,  that  he  knew  must  be 
fought  at  Chattanooga.  Longstreet  took  with 
him  the  two  divisions  of  McLaws  and  Hood,  and 
Alexander's  cavalry.  Wheeler's  cavalry  passed 
him  on  the  road ;  it  was  supposed  to  do  certain 
things  that  it  failed  to  do.  Longstreet  recom 
mended  that  Bragg's  army  should  be  drawn  back 
in  a  strong  position  behind  the  Chickamauga,  after 
the  departure  of  Longstreet's  troops  in  November; 
his  reason  for  this  recommendation  was,  that  in  its 

[181] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

present  position  it  could  be  reached  in  twenty  min 
utes  by  the  Union  Army.  Bragg  seemed  to  be 
blind,  however,  to  the  events  so  rapidly  transpiring 
in  Chattanooga;  he  did  not  seem  to  realize  that 
the  troops  Longstreet  had  fought  at  Wauhatchie, 
were  reinforcements  from  the  East  to  the  Union 
Army. 

In  the  meantime  the  Confederate  batteries  on 
Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary  Ridge  sent  an 
occasional  artillery  shot  into  the  Union  lines. 
The  pickets  of  the  two  armies  held  their  lines 
close  to  each  other  in  the  valley  and  watched  each 
other's  movements,  firing  whenever  a  soldier  on 
his  beat  became  visible.  There  being  no  good 
reason  for  this  desultory  and  ineffectual  warfare, 
an  agreement  was  finally  reached,  that  the  pickets 
should  fire  only  when  advances  of  troops  became 
apparent;  henceforth,  an  officer  could  with  im 
punity  ride  along  the  picket  line  in  plain  view  of 
the  opposite  pickets. 

As  soon  as  Grant  became  aware  of  Longstreet's 
departure  for  East  Tennessee,  he  prepared  for  an 
attack  on  Bragg's  army  in  order  to  keep  him  from 
detaching  more  troops  against  Burnside  and  to 

[182] 


AGGRESSIVE  OPERATIONS 

compel  him  to  return  those  already  sent.  He  or 
dered  General  Thomas  to  assault  the  north  end  of 
Missionary  Ridge;  the  order  was  given  Novem 
ber  7 ;  but  on  account  of  the  utter  lack  of  animals 
—caused  not  only  by  the  great  loss  in  the  recent 
battles,  but  also  by  the  death  of  a  large  number 
from  starvation  since  the  occupation  of  the  city — 
it  was  finally  decided  by  Grant,  Thomas,  and 
Smith,  that  nothing  but  a  defensive  attitude  would 
be  feasible  until  General  Sherman's  forces  could 
arrive.  The  necessity  for  aggressive  operations, 
on  account  of  Bragg's  boldness  in  taking  such  a 
desperate  chance  as  to  send  a  large  force  com 
manded  by  his  ablest  general  away  from  his  weak 
little  army,  increased  the  activity  of  the  Union 
Army  in  its  preparation  for  battle,  and  thus  was 
opened  a  way  for  the  relief  of  Burnside;  the 
hope  was  that  he  could  hold  out  until  help  ar 
rived. 

It  is  to  be  presumed,  that  Bragg  had  implicit 
confidence  that  the  Union  Army  would  not  dare 
to  attack  such  a  strong  position  as  Bragg's  army 
then  held.  General  Grant  at  once  wrote  the 
facts  of  the  situation  to  Burnside  and  urged  him 

[183] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

to  maintain  his  attitude  at  Knoxville,  until  a 
battle  could  be  fought  at  Chattanooga  and  a  de 
tachment  sent  to  his  assistance.  Not  waiting  for 
Sherman,  he  formulated  his  plans;  and  thus  knew 
before  the  latter's  arrival,  just  where  he  should 
place  Sherman,  what  his  part  of  the  attack  should 
be,  and  that  he  should  march  immediately  on  his 
approach  directly  to  the  north  end  of  Missionary 
Ridge.  Grant  planned  furthermore  that  Hooker 
should  attack  Lookout  Mountain  from  his  position 
in  Lookout  Valley ;  the  one  should  attack  the  right 
of  the  Confederate  Army  and  the  other  the  left. 
Sherman  arrived  at  Bridgeport,  with  his  leading 
division,  on  November  1 5,  Arriving  at  Chatta 
nooga  ahead  of  his  troops,  he  with  Grant,  Thomas, 
and  Smith,  looked  over  the  entire  situation  and 
learned  how,  and  by  what  route,  he  could  reach  his 
point  of  attack.  It  had  become  apparent  to  the 
Union  commanders,  that  Bragg's  line  did  not  reach 
the  immediate  river  hills,  at  the  north  end  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  but  was  deflected  to  the  east,  along 
the  third  hill  to  the  south  of  the  river,  with  a  deep 
depression  between  it  and  the  next  hill  to  the 
north.  This  made  necessary  a  much  stronger 

[184] 


SHERMAN  S  MOVEMENTS 

position  than  the  supposed  location  at  Bragg's  right 
flank,  and  stronger  forces  and  dispositions  were 
needed.  Grant  announced  his  plan  to  his  gener 
als  on  the  1 8th  and  expected  the  attacks  could  be 
made  on  the  2 1  st ;  a  rain  storm  delayed,  however, 
the  arrival  of  Sherman's  troops.  When  they  did 
arrive  at  Brown's  Ferry  the  high  water  had  broken 
the  bridge,  which  delayed  the  crossing.  When  the 
bridge  was  repaired,  Sherman  crossed  it  in  plain 
view  of  the  enemy's  signal  station  on  the  point  of 
Lookout  Mountain;  he  marched  into  the  woods 
behind  a  series  of  hills  on  the  north  side  of  the 
river;  these  hills  concealed  his  march  all  the 
way  to  the  mouth  of  Chickamauga  Creek,  where 
Davis's  division  of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  had  been 
placed  to  cover  his  movement,  and  to  protect  the 
bridge  there,  after  Sherman's  troops  had  again 
crossed  to  the  south  side.  The  crossing  at  the 
Chickamauga  was  also  protected  by  artillery, 
placed  on  the  heights  north  of  the  river.  After 
crossing  at  the  mouth  of  the  Chickamauga,  Sher 
man  was  to  follow  Missionary  Ridge  as  far  as  the 
railroad  tunnel.  This  seemed  to  be  the  principal 
point  of  attack;  the  plan  further  contemplated 

[185]  . 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

that  all  the  forces  available  should  be  converged 
toward  General  Sherman's  position.  Therefore 
Howard's  Eleventh  Corps  was  taken  from  Hook 
er's  position  and  replaced  by  Whittaker's  and 
Grose's  brigades  of  the  Fourth  Corps;  the  Elev 
enth  Corps  was  placed  on  the  left  of  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  south  of  the  river,  looking  to 
wards  Sherman's  position  perhaps  four  miles  fur 
ther  east.  Thomas  was  to  co-operate  by  moving 
his  troops  to  his  left,  so  that  he  could  join 
with  Sherman's  right,  when  the  latter  should  push 
the  Confederate  forces  back  to  the  tunnel.  The 
combined  forces  should  then  advance  against  the 
enemy,  with  the  object  in  view  of  sweeping  the 
Confederate  Army  into  the  south  Chickamauga 
Creek,  which  runs  on  the  opposite  side  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge.  General  Hooker  was  to  hold 
Lookout  Valley  with  Geary's  division  and  the  two 
brigades  of  Whittaker  and  Grose,  and  Howard's 
corps  was  to  be  in  readiness  to  act  with  either  Sher 
man  or  Thomas,  as  circumstances  should  dictate. 
The  plan  was  a  fine  one,  because,  if  that  flank 
could  be  defeated,  the  Confederate  line  of  retreat 
could  be  easily  cut  off. 

[186] 


SHERMAN'S  MOVEMENTS    . 

Colonel  Long  with  his  brigade  of  cavalry 
moved  to  Sherman's  left.  When  Sherman  should 
sweep  the  ridge,  he  was  ordered  to  cross  the  Chick- 
amauga  and  raid  the  rear  of  the  Confederate 
Army.  This  attack  was  to  begin  on  the  22nd,  but 
was  postponed  on  account  of  the  fact  that  two  of 
Sherman's  divisions  had  not  been  able  to  cross 
Brown's  Ferry  bridge,  on  account  of  a  break.  To 
avoid  any  further  delay,  Thomas  suggested  that 
Howard's  Corps  be  sent  to  General  Sherman  in 
place  of  the  two  delayed  divisions,  and  that  the 
latter  be  ordered  to  report  to  General  Hooker, 
whose  combined  forces  should  immediately  attack 
Lookout  Mountain  in  order  to  divert  the  attention 
of  the  enemy  from  Sherman's  contemplated  at 
tack  ;  this  suggestion  was  in  part  approved  by  Gen 
eral  Grant. 

A  singular  thing  happened  on  November  22. 
General  Ewing's  division  of  Sherman's  troops  had 
come  into  Lookout  Valley  at  Trenton  from 
Bridgeport;  Bragg's  rear  was  thus  threatened. 
The  movement  of  some  of  Bragg's  troops  to 
avert  this  calamity  together  with  the  former  with 
drawal  of  Longstreet's  Corps  for  Knoxville,  pro- 

[187] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

duced  the  impression  in  the  Confederate  Army, 
that  the  whole  was  going  to  fall  back.  De 
serters  who  came  into  the  Union  line  reported 
this  impression.  Bragg  also  notified  the  Union 
commander  to  remove  all  non-combatants  from 
the  city;  this  was  on  the  20th.  General  Grant 
ordered  Thomas  to  make  a  reconnoisance  in 
front  of  Chattanooga  in  order  to  test  the  truth 
of  this  report,  and  to  find  out  whether  Bragg 
was  really  falling  back,  and  if  so,  Thomas 
should  prevent  him  from  doing  it  undisturbed. 
The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  nearest  to 
the  enemy  and  in  readiness  to  do  this  with  the 
most  celerity.  It  seems  that  General  Bragg  had 
such  confidence  in  the  strength  of  his  position 
on  the  top  of  Missionary  Ridge,  about  500  feet 
high,  that  he  was  willing  not  only  to  send 
away  Longstreet,  but  actually  started  other  forces 
to  follow  him.  The  latter  he  recalled,  however, 
in  time  to  take  part  in  the  battle.  He  supposed, 
and  with  good  reason,  that  Missionary  Ridge 
could  not  be  taken  by  assault ;  and  even  if  Look 
out  should  become  untenable  on  account  of  the 
capture  of  the  valley  of  Chattanooga,  he  would 


BRAGG'S  MISTAKES 


be  safe  in  his  entrenchments  on  Missionary  Ridge. 
This  must  have  been  his  conclusion,  and  he  must 
have  known  that  the  Army  of  the  Cumber 
land  was  receiving  considerable  reinforcements. 
Bragg's  lines  were  altogether  too  long.  When 
the  object  of  holding  Lookout  Mountain  no 
longer  existed,  after  the  reopening  of  the  river  and 
railroad  route  to  Bridgeport,  he  should  have  with 
drawn  from  there  and  from  Chattanooga  Valley; 
he  should  either  have  concentrated  on  Missionary 
Ridge  or  taken  Longstreet's  advice  and  fallen 
back  to  Dalton,  behind  the  second  ridge,  southeast 
of  Chattanooga,  where  he  was  finally  driven. 

Fortunately  for  the  success  of  the  Union  move 
ments,  Bragg  did  not  do  the  things  that  an  abler 
general  would  have  done.  He  stood  stolidly  in 
his  original  line  along  its  whole  length  until  the  op 
ening  of  the  battle  of  Missionary  Ridge.  It  has 
been  stated,  that  Bragg  expected  Grant  when 
he  discovered  the  departure  of  Longstreet  for  East 
Tennessee,  would  send  forces  to  support  Bumside. 

In  pursuance  of  the  order  to  make  a  reconnois- 
ance,  Thomas  ordered  Granger,  who  commanded 
the  Fourth  Corps,  to  advance  a  division  of  his 

[189] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

corps  towards  Orchard  Knob  November  23,  about 
noon.  This  elevation  of  land  is  located  about 
half  way  between  the  city  and  Missionary  Ridge, 
at  the  left  of  Thomas's  line.  Between  the  Union 
line  and  this  knob  was  a  growth  of  trees  and 
bushes.  These  concealed  the  formation  of  the 
troops  for  a  while  only  from  the  enemy.  Wood's 
division  was  deployed  in  front  of  Fort  Wood. 
Sheridan's  division  formed  next  on  the  right  and 
rear  of  Wood.  Howard's  Corps  was  massed  in  the 
rear  of  these  two  divisions.  General  Baird's  divi 
sion  fell,  in  echelon,  at  the  right  of  Sheridan. 
General  Johnson's  division  (formerly  Rousseau's) 
of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  stood  with  arms  in  the 
entrenchments,  ready  to  move  in  any  direction. 
This  really  placed  the  latter  in  echelon  with  Baird. 
It  is  said  the  enemy  looked  upon  these  movements 
as  a  parade  for  display  or  to  obtain  wood  for  fires, 
when  seeing  them  from  the  top  of  Missionary 
Ridge.  The  Confederates  had  a  line  of  rifle-pits 
along  the  base  of  Orchard  Knob,  following  Citico 
Creek  for  a  mile  or  more. 

With  Willich's  and  Hazen's  brigades  in  front 
and  Beatty's  in  reserve,  General  Wood  moved 

[190] 


TAKING  OF  ORCHARD  KNOB 

forward  about  2  p.  m.  His  troops  pushed  back 
easily  whatever  was  in  their  front.  Willich  struck 
Orchard  Knob  squarely  on  his  front,  and  soon  cap 
tured  it,  clearing  it  of  the  enemy's  lines.  Hazen 
met  more  resistance  from  the  Confederates  who 
were  perhaps  more  numerous  or  better  fighters,  al 
though  the  hill  he  attacked  was  not  so  high  as  Or 
chard  Knob.  He  carried  the  hill,  however,  and 
captured  the  Twenty-eighth  Alabama  Regiment 
and  its  flag.  This  advanced  line  gave  a  good 
position  for  further  advances,  and  was  held; 
the  rest  of  the  troops  on  the  right  moving  up 
to  and  extending  the  line  far  to  the  right.  General 
Wood  fortified  his  line  over  Orchard  Knob,  and 
General  Howard  formed  his  corps  on  its  left. 
The  summit  of  this  Knob  gave  a  splendid  outlook 
over  the  field  between  it  and  Missionary  Ridge, 
and  gave  a  fine  view  of  the  ridge  itself.  It  af 
forded  an  opportunity  for  Grant  and  Thomas  to 
view  later  on  the  whole  subsequent  movements 
against  the  enemy.  General  Wood  lost  1 25  men 
killed  and  wounded  in  this  battle  of  Orchard 
Knob.  The  Fifteenth  Wisconsin  of  Willich's 
brigade  took  part  in  this  engagement;  its  losses 

[191] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

were  not  reported  until  after  the  battle  of  the  25th, 
when  its  commander  reported  6  men  slightly 
wounded  in  both  engagements.  Wood  occupied 
this  position  until  3 : 1 5  p.  m.  on  the  25th,  when  he 
moved  forward  with  the  rest  of  the  army  to  the 
assault  on  Missionary  Ridge.  Bridge's  Illinois 
Battery  occupied  an  epaulment  in  Wood's  line  on 
Orchard  Knob. 

The  taking  of  Orchard  Knob  had  a  most  im 
portant  bearing  on  the  attack  that  General  Hooker 
made  on  Lookout  Mountain  the  next  day.  It 
caused  Bragg  to  withdraw  Walker's  division  from 
that  point  to  strengthen  his  right,  which  Bragg 
thought  to  be  menaced  by  this  advance  to  Orchard 
Knob.  These  troops  prolonged  Bragg's  line  to 
wards  Sherman's  front  but  did  not  reach  it.  The 
Confederate  general,  Stevenson,  signalled  from 
the  top  of  Lookout  to  Bragg  that  night  that  if  an  at 
tack  was  intended  by  Grant,  it  would  be  delivered 
on  Lookout  Mountain.  This  is  what  actually  oc 
curred.  Another  of  Sherman's  divisions  crossed 
Brown's  Ferry  on  the  23rd;  the  bridge  was  again 
broken,  however,  leaving  Osterhaus's  division  still 
on  the  left  bank.  This  gave  General  Sherman 

[192] 


SAGACITY  OF  THOMAS 

only  three  divisions  besides  General  Davis's  of  the 
Fourteenth  Corps,  with  which  to  operate  at  the 
designated  place  on  Missionary  Ridge.  General 
Thomas  informed  General  Hooker  of  the  proxim 
ity  of  Osterhaus's  troops  and  directed,  that  if  they 
did  not  get  over  to  Sherman,  he  should  have  them 
join  him  and  "take  the  point  of  Lookout  Moun 
tain."  This  division  was  at  that  time  in  command 
of  General  Charles  R.  Woods,  one  of  its  brigade 
commanders.  How  sagacious  was  General 
Thomas  in  seeing  immediately  the  advantage  that 
should  be  taken  of  a  mere  accident,  like  the 
breaking  of  a  pontoon  bridge!  It  looks  as  though 
Thomas  had  made  this  suggestion  to  Hooker, 
without  having  beforehand  a  distinct  under 
standing  with  General  Grant;  for  he  told  General 
Hooker  later,  that  Grant  still  hoped  Woods's  (Os 
terhaus's)  division  could  cross  in  time  to  partici 
pate  in  Sherman's  movement,  but  if  it  could  not 
the  mountain  should  be  taken  if  practicable. 
Hooker,  finding  that  there  was  little  possibility  of 
the  bridge  being  quickly  repaired,  made  prepara 
tions  for  the  advance  against  the  mountain.  It  will 
be  observed  further  on,  that  this  accident  resulted 

13  [  193  ] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

in  modifying  the  original  plans  very  materially,  as 
the  taking  of  Orchard  Knob  had  already  done. 
The  left  of  Bragg's  line  was  turned,  but  not  his 
right ;  this  movement  was  a  result  of  the  accidents 
to  the  Brown's  Ferry  pontoon-bridge.  General 
Grant  showed  his  broad  mind  in  this  affair  as  well 
as  in  other  changes  he  made  in  his  original  plan, 
at  a  later  date. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN 

At  4  p.  m.  on  November  24,  1863,  one  of  the 
most  spectacular  battles  of  the  war  commenced. 
General  Hooker's  force  consisted  of  the  follow 
ing:  Osterhaus's  division  of  the  Fifteenth  Corps, 
Cruft's  (formerly  Palmer's)  of  the  Fourth; 
Geary's  of  the  Twelfth — with  the  exception 
of  such  regiments  from  the  last  two  divisions 
as  were  required  to  protect  the  communications 
with  Bridgeport  and  Kelly's  Ferry ;  battery  K  of 
the  First  Ohio,  and  battery  I  of  the  First  New 
York  of  the  Eleventh  Corps,  having  sufficient 
horses  for  but  one  battery;  a  part  of  the  Second 
Kentucky  Cavalry,  and  Company  K  of  the  Fif 
teenth  Illinois  Cavalry.  The  aggregate  number 

[194] 


P        0 


BATTLE  OF  LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN 

of  this  force  was  9,68 1 .  The  foregoing  statement 
of  the  forces  is  taken  from  General  Hooker's  offi 
cial  report36,  which  is  remarkably  well  written, 
clear  in  statement  and  full  of  essential  facts.  "At 
this  time  the  enemy's  pickets  formed  a  continuous 
line  along  the  right  bank  of  Lookout  Creek,  with 
the  reserves  in  the  valley,  while  his  main  force  was 
encamped  in  a  hollow  half  way  up  the  slope  of 
the  mountain.  The  summit  itself  was  held  by 
three  brigades  of  Stevenson's  division,  and  those 
were  comparatively  safe,  as  the  only  means  of  ac 
cess  from  the  next  [that  is,  from  the  valley  in 
which  Hooker's  troops  were  located]  for  a  dis 
tance  of  20  miles  up  the  valley  was  by  two  or 
three  trails,  admitting  to  the  passage  of  but  1 
man  at  a  time ;  and  even  these  trails  were  held  at 
the  top  by  rebel  pickets." 

The  top  of  Lookout  Mountain  at  this  point  con 
sists  of  a  perpendicular  crest,  or  palisade  of  rocks 
which  rises  out  of  the  main  body  of  the  mountain 
about  a  hundred  feet.  From  the  foot  of  this  crest 
the  mountain  slopes  by  a  gradual  descent  but  with 
a  very  broken  surface  on  all  sides  to  the  valleys  on 

36 Id.,  Serial  No.  55,  p.  315. 

[195] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

the  east,  west,  and  to  the  river  on  the  north.  An 
army  could  operate  on  this  slope  only  below 
the  crest,  from  the  west  to  the  east,  or  on  the  side 
of  Chattanooga,  around  the  northern  slope,  under 
the  crest.  Hooker's  army  did  not  cross  the  top  of 
the  crest;  but  by  taking  the  slope,  the  Confederate 
troops  occupying  the  top,  were  forced  to  retreat 
by  the  only  wagon  road  reaching  to  the  top  on  the 
Chattanooga  side.  The  slope  on  that  side 
is  less  precipitous  than  on  the  west  side  where 
Hooker  was.  At  the  foot  of  the  slope  on 
the  Chattanooga  side  flows  the  Chattanooga  Creek 
and  on  the  west  side  Lookout  Creek,  both  flowing 
north,  practically  parallel  with  the  trend  of  the 
mountain,  and  emptying  into  the  Tennessee  River, 
which  runs  west  at  the  foot  of  the  northern  slope. 
Hooker  continues  his  report  as  follows:  "On  the 
northern  slope  midway  between  the  summit  and 
the  Tennessee,  a  plateau  or  belt  of  arable  land, 
encircles  the  crest.  There,  a  continuous  line  of 
earth-works  had  been  thrown  up,  while  redoubts, 
redans,  and  pits  appeared  lower  down  the  slope 
to  repel  an  assault  from  the  direction  of  the  river." 
Geary  commenced  his  movements  as  instructed, 
[196] 


BATTLE  OF  LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN 

crossed  the  creek  at  8  o'clock  a.  m.,  "captured  the 
entire  picket  of  42  men  posted  to  defend  it,  march 
ed  directly  up  the  mountain  until  his  right  rested 
on  the  palisades,  and  headed  down  the  valley." 
The  Confederate  Walthall  was  in  command  of 
the  troops  immediately  opposed  to  Geary,  and 
Moore's  brigade  near  the  Craven  house  on  the  east 
ern,  or  northeastern  slope.  General  Stevenson  was 
there  in  command  of  all  the  Confederate  troops  on 
the  mountain.  He  placed  sharpshooters  along 
the  western  edge  of  the  crest,  and  wherever  there 
was  depression  enough,  the  artillery  by  raising  the 
trails  of  the  gun  carriages  did  some  execution 
until  Geary's  troops  reached  the  foot  of  the 
palisades.  The  Confederate  troops  located  on 
the  western  slope,  moved  into  position,  facing 
Lookout  Creek,  in  order  to  prevent  the  Union 
troops  crossing  at  the  bridge;  but  this  disposition 
subjected  them  to  a  flank  enfilading  fire  from 
Geary's  troops.  The  other  Union  troops  moved 
up  the  Creek,  crossed  behind  Geary's  line,  and 
joined  on  his  left.  The  batteries  had  been 
placed  on  elevated  points,  so  as  to  enfilade  the 
route  by  which  the  enemy  had  to  march  down 

[i97] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

the  slope,  and  on  other  points,  by  which  the  Con 
federates  had  to  retreat  if  they  were  driven  back. 
The  Union  line  advanced,  the  artillery  opened. 
The  rout  of  the  enemy  was  complete,  many  pris 
oners  were  taken,  and  many  were  killed  and 
wounded.  At  noon  when  Geary's  advance 
rounded  the  northern  slope,  his  flags  were  plainly 
visible  from  Chattanooga.  There  had  been  a  fog 
all  morning,  which  greatly  favored  Hooker's 
movements,  preventing  the  Confederates  on  top  of 
the  crest  from  directing  their  shots  satisfactorily. 
As  the  Union  flags  appeared  on  the  sky  line  of  the 
northern  slope,  and  were  visible  at  Chattanooga, 
this  fog  settled  down  upon  the  lower  stretches 
of  the  slope  and  revealed  the  Confederate  lines 
badly  broken  and  in  flight  with  the  compact 
ranks  of  the  Union  soldiers  triumphantly  ad 
vancing  with  flags  flying  and  muskets  glistening 
in  the  sun.  It  was  a  glorious  sight  to  the  Union 
troops,  then  in  line  in  front  of  the  works  at  Chat 
tanooga.  The  picture  presented  was  a  "battle 
above  the  clouds,"  for  the  fog  obscured  all  thai 
part  of  the  mountain  which  was  below  the  con 
quering  lines  of  Hooker.  General  Stevenson  says 

[198] 


BATTLE  OF  LOOKOUT  MOUNTAIN 

in  his  report,  with  regard  to  this  affair:  "Finding 
that  the  fog  was  becoming  so  dense  that  the  troops 
on  the  northern  part  of  the  mountain  [meaning 
Pettus's  brigade  on  the  crest]  could  not  see  the 
enemy  moving  upon  Walthall,  I  gave  orders  for 
Pettus  with  my  only  disposable  force  to  move 
down  and  report  to  Brigadier-General  Jackson. 
He  started  at  12:30  o'clock  and  reached  the 
scene  of  action  a  little  past  1  o'clock.  *  *  * 
This  position  was  held  by  Moore,  Walthall,  and 
Pettus  until  about  8  p.  m."5 

Stevenson  had  six  brigades  in  his  command; 
four  of  these  took  part  in  the  fight  on  the  mountain, 
the  other  two  were  placed  between  Chattanooga 
Creek  and  the  road  up  the  slope,  in  order  to  guard 
the  line  of  retreat  on  the  east  side  of  the  mountain 
against  any  advance  from  Chattanooga.  Steven 
son  reports,  that  he  lost  only  380  in  his  three 
brigades;  he  dees  not  state  the  number  of  troops 
he  had  on  the  mountain.  Hooker  rested  at 
2  o'clock  p.  m.  after  passing  the  point.  The 
settling  down  of  the  fog  shut  off  his  view  of  the 
Chattanooga  Valley  and  prevented  his  seeing 

91  Ibid.,  P.  720. 

[i99] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

sufficiently  the  topography  to  justify  him  in  ad 
vancing  down  into  the  valley  that  same  evening. 
He  formed  his  lines  on  the  eastern  slope;  his  right 
was  at  the  palisades,  and  his  left  was  near  the 
mouth  of  Chattanooga  Creek.  This  line  he 
fortified,  and  reported  the  fact  to  the  department 
commander.  In  this  position  he  enfiladed  the 
enemy's  line  in  the  Chattanooga  Valley,  and  also 
had  communication  across  the  mouth  of  the  creek 
with  the  Union  forces  in  the  city.  At  5 : 1 5  p.  m. 
General  Carlin's  brigade  of  Johnson's  division  of 
the  Fourteenth  Corps,  reported  to  General  Hooker 
after  having  crossed  the  mouth  of  the  creek  by 
ferry;  he  was  placed  on  the  right  of  the  line  re- 
Jieving  Geary's  troops,  which  were  almost  ex 
hausted  with  fatigue.  During  the  night  the 
enemy  withdrew  entirely,  leaving  behind  20,000 
rations,  and  the  camp  and  garrison  equipage  of 
three  brigades.  General  Thomas  reported,  that 
Hooker  captured  500  or  600  prisoners.  The 
Eighth  Kentucky  Infantry  scaled  the  crest  about 
daylight  on  the  25th  and  hoisted  the  United  States 
flag  amid  wild  and  prolonged  cheers  from  the 
whole  army. 

[200] 


ADVANCE  ON  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

At  ten  o'clock  a.  m.  on  the  25th,  leaving  two 
regiments  to  hold  the  mountain,  Hooker  started 
towards  Rossville,  across  Chattanooga  Creek  and 
the  valley,  with  Osterhaus's  division  of  the  Fif 
teenth  Corps  in  the  lead.  Thus  the  left  of  the 
Confederate  Army  was  completely  turned,  while 
the  right  still  held  its  own.  Hooker  was  too  far 
from  the  Confederate  line  of  retreat  to  menace  it. 
To  have  turned  the  right  first  would  have  been 
better.  Hooker  was  delayed  four  hours  by  a  de 
stroyed  bridge  in  crossing  Chattanooga  Creek. 
The  Tenth  Wisconsin  Infantry  of  Carlin's 
brigade  of  Johnson's  division  of  the  Fourteenth 
Corps  participated  in  this  engagement;  it  was 
detached  from  the  brigade,  and  held  a  fort  south 
of  the  Crutchfield  house  on  the  east  side  of  the 
mountain ;  its  losses  were  not  reported. 

While  these  operations  were  occurring  on  Look 
out  Mountain  under  the  command  of  Hooker, 
Sherman  advanced  across  the  Tennessee  River 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Chickamauga  with  three 
divisions  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and 
one  division  (Davis's)  of  the  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland,  on  the  morning  of  the  24th,  against  the 

[201] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

other  or  extreme  right  wing  of  the  Confederate 
line  on  Missionary  Ridge.  He  advanced  and 
formed  his  lines  on  the  north  end  of  the  ridge;  a 
brigade  of  Howard's  Corps  moved  to  the  left  at  9 
a.  m.  on  the  same  day  and  communicated  with 
Sherman  about  noon.  Later  Howard  joined 
Sherman  with  his  two  divisions  and  formed  on  his 
right.  Carlin's  brigade  rejoined  his  division  on 
the  25th,  which  was  then  in  the  valley  half  way  to 
Missionary  Ridge  and  on  the  right  of  Thomas's 
line.  Palmer's  and  Granger's  corps  were  held  in 
readiness  by  Thomas  to  advance  to  the  foot  of  the 
ridge,  as  soon  as  Hooker  should  get  into  position 
at  Rossville.  It  was  after  2  p.  m.  that  General 
Hooker  effected  a  crossing  of  Chattanooga  Creek 
and  advanced  as  above  stated.  At  noon  General 
Sherman  was  heavily  engaged  with  the  enemy  in 
his  position,  and  finding  it  to  be  very  strong  was 
not  making  any  headway  against  it.  General 
Baird  was,  therefore,  ordered  to  march  his  division 
within  supporting  distance  of  Sherman,  and  to 
move  promptly. 

He  reported  to  Sherman,  but    the    latter   told 
him  he  could  not  find  room  for  him  and  could  not 

[202] 


BATTLE  OF  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

make  use  of  his  troops.  General  Baird  marched 
back  a  distance  of  about  two  miles,  and  arrived 
at  the  left  of  General  Thomas's  line  at  2:30  p.  m. ; 
he  was  ordered  to  fall  in  on  the  left  of  Wood,  the 
left  division  of  Granger's  Fourth  Corps. 

It  will  be  well  at  this  time  to  take  a  rapid  view 
of  the  entire  lines  of  the  Union  and  the  Confeder 
ate  armies,  as  they  stood  facing  each  other,  arms 
in  hand,  at  3  o'clock  p.  m.  on  November  25,  1 863, 
just  before  they  grappled  in  a  struggle  for 
life  and  death,  and  for  the  permanent  possession 
of  the  stronghold  of  the  Middle  West.  So  many 
changes  having  occurred  in  the  previous  three  or 
four  days  in  the  Union  Army,  and  equally  as 
many  and  more  important  changes  occurring  on  the 
Confederate  side,  makes  it  necessary  to  pause,  just 
before  describing  the  great  spectacular  battle  of 
Missionary  Ridge,  and  try  to  get  at  least  a  bird's- 
eye  view  of  the  position  of  the  numerous  divisions 
and  corps. 

General  Gsterhaus  had  again  taken  command 
of  his  own  division,  relieving  General  Charles  R. 
Woods;  General  Cruft,  and  General  Geary 

were  near  enough  with  their  troops  to  the  ridge  at 

[203] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Rossville  to  form  the  extreme  right  of  the  Union 
line.  There  was  an  interval  between  Geary's  left 
and  Johnson's  right,  where  Carlin  stood  after 
coming  from  Lookout.  Johnson  had  only  two 
brigades,  Carlin  on  the  right,  and  Stoughton 
(John  H.  King's  successor)  on  the  left;  Stark 
weather  had  been  left  in  the  works  around  the 
city.  Hooker's  and  Thomas's  troops  were  without 
reserves.  Sheridan's  three  brigades,  F.  T.  Sher 
man's,  Harkers's  and  Wagner's  were  next  to  the 
left  of  Johnson ;  then  Wood's  three  brigades,  Ha- 
zen's,  Willich's,  and  Beatty's;  the  latter  ap 
peared  in  two  lines,  being  the  last  in  Thomas's 
section,  and  forming  the  left  flank  of  the  line;  and 
then  Baird's  three  brigades,  Turchin's,  Van  Der- 
veer's  and  Phelps's. 

A  mile  and  a  half  to  the  left  of  General 
Thomas's  line  lay  Sherman's  right  flank,  with  no 
troops  in  the  interval.  The  latter's  line  was  com 
posed  from  right  to  left  of  the  following  brigades, 
viz.:  Buschbeck's,  Ewing's  Matthies's,  Corse's 
and  A.  Smith's;  Raum,  was  behind  Matthies, 
and  two  brigades  of  J.  E.  Smith's  were  in  reserve 
behind  the  centre.  Behind  this  line,  a  half  mile 

[  204] 


BATTLE  OF  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

in  the  fortified  line  lay  from  left  to  right  the 
brigades  of  Loomis,  Cockerell,  Alexander,  and 
Lightburn,  and  Schurz's  division.  Sherman  thus 
had  six  divisions.  The  Confederate  line  from 
its  right,  which  faced  Sherman,  was  as  follows 
by  divisions:  Cleburne,  Stevenson,  Gist,  Cheat- 
ham,  Anderson,  Bate,  and  Stewart.  Stewart 
held  the  left  of  Bragg's  line,  and  his  troops  were 
the  first  to  encounter  those  of  Hooker  on  their  way 
to  Rossville  from  Lookout  Mountain.  General 
Hardee  commanded  the  right  wing,  consisting  of 
the  following  four  divisions:  Cheatham,  Cle 
burne,  Stevenson,  and  Walker;  General  Brecken- 
ridge  was  in  charge  of  the  left  wing,  which 
was  composed  of  Bate,  Stewart,  and  Ander 
son.  Cheatham's  division  faced  Baird,  Ander 
son's  Wood;  Bate's  Sheridan,  and  Stewart's 
Johnson.  Cleburne's  division  reached  the  front 
of  Sherman's  line  on  the  afternoon  of  the  24th 
while  marching  from  the  Confederates'  left 
Before  the  fight  of  the  25th  occurred,  Cheatham's, 
Stevenson's,  and  Walker's  divisions  had  pro 
longed  Bragg's  line  to  within  three-quarters  of  a 
mile  of  the  tunnel;  Smith's  brigade  of  Cle- 

[205] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

burne's  division  held  Tunnel  Hill  on  the  25th 
against  Sherman ;  the  rest  of  the  division  was  not 
heavily  engaged,  but  it  had  the  assistance  of 
Brown's  and  Cumming's  brigades  of  Stevenson's 
division,  and  Maney's  of  Walker's.  Tunnel 
Hill  was  not  captured  by  Sherman's  troops  until 
after  the  retreat  of  these  Confederate  forces  on  the 
evening  of  the  25th,  the  result  of  the  successful  as 
sault  in  the  centre  by  Thomas. 

The  whole  Confederate  line  on  the  left  across 
the  Chattanooga  Valley  was  abandoned;  Stew 
art  withdrew  to  the  top  of  the  ridge  before 
Hooker  reached  Rossville.  It  must  be  noticed, 
that  General  Thomas's  line  in  the  centre,  con 
tained  only  four  divisions  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  namely  two  of  the  Fourth  Corps, 
and  two  of  the  Fourteenth ;  one  division  (Davis's) 
of  the  Fourteenth  Corps  was  with  Sherman  on 
the  left,  and  one  (Cruft's)  was  with  Hooker  on 
the  right.  Hooker  had  three  divisions  and  Sher 
man  six. 

Starkweather's  brigade  of  Johnson's  division 
was  left  to  hold  the  original  works  around  Chatta 
nooga  ;  and  did  so  during  the  assault  of  the  rest  of 
the  troops  upon  Missionary  Ridge. 

[206] 


BATTLE  OF  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

At  1  p.  m.  on  the  1 2th,  C.  A.  Dana,  Assistant 
Secretary  of  War,  who  was  in  Chattanooga,  sent 
this  dispatch  to  the  Secretary  of  War  at  Wash 
ington,  "In  our  front  here  [meaning  Thomas's 
front],  Confederate  rifle  pits  are  fully  manned, 
preventing  Thomas  gaining  ridge."  At  4:30 
p.  m.  he  sent  another  dispatch  showing  how  mis 
leading  the  former  dispatch  was:  "Glory  to 
God.  The  day  is  decisively  ours.  Missionary 
Ridge  has  just  been  carried  by  a  magnificent 
charge  of  Thomas's  troops,  and  rebels  routed." 
The  reader  must  not  lay  much  stress  on  the  time 
given,  at  which  the  various  movements  were  made; 
this  is  a  mere  guess  in  most  instances.  Seldom 
did  an  officer  think  of  looking  at  his  watch,  at  the 
moment  any  orders  were  given  to  make  an  impor 
tant  movement.  The  original  Army  of  the  Cum 
berland,  referred  to  by  Dana,  were  the  troops 
General  Grant  thought  would  not  fight,  because 
they  had  been  so  roughly  handled  at  Chicka- 
mauga.38  It  was  quite  a  natural  conclusion. 
The  entire  Union  Army  was  in  line  at  about 


^Memoirs  of  General  William  T.  Sherman,  by   himself 
(N.  Y..  1875),  vol.  KP.  362. 

[207] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

3:30  p.  m.,  ready  for  any  commands  which 
might  be  given  by  Grant,  Thomas,  Sherman  and 
Hooker.  The  array  of  soldiers  in  the  Union 
ranks  from  the  three  armies,  those  of  the  Potomac, 
the  Cumberland,  and  the  Tennessee,  was  for 
midable,  commanded  by  such  heroes  as  Grant, 
Thomas,  Sherman,  Hooker,  Sheridan,  and  How 
ard.  Thomas's  four  divisions  had  about  1 8,000 
in  rank  and  file,  Hooker's  about  9,000,  and  Sher 
man's  about  24,000. 

It  is  not  likely  that  Bragg  had  more  than 
30,000;  but  his  position  was  sufficiently  strong  to 
almost  equal  Grant's  advantage  in  numbers.  The 
Confederate  Army  was  concentrated  on  a  500  feet 
ridge,  which  had  a  very  steep  and  rough  sur- 
fact,  sloping  towards  the  Union  lines  at  an  angle  of 
about  forty-five  degrees.  This  ridge  had  a 
fortified  line  on  the  top,  manned  by  veteran  in 
fantry  and  artillery,  and  a  thinner  line  of  infan 
try  at  its  foot  in  a  series  of  deep  rifle-pits;  in 
front  of  the  latter  was  a  swarm  of  skirmishers. 
The  army  was  still  in  command  of  Braxton 
Bragg,  a  commander  of  great  experience ;  and  of 

two  wing  commanders,  Hardee  a  veteran  of  the 

[208] 


BATTLE  OF  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

old  regular  army,  and  Breckenridge  a  former  vice- 
president  of  the  United  States.  Its  division- 
commanders  were,  as  a  rule,  soldiers  of  the  old 
regular  United  States  Army,  and  were  very 
capable  officers.  That  army  had  two  months  be 
fore  (or  thought  it  had)  won  the  battle  of  Chick- 
amauga,  and  it  was  now  fighting — at  least  in  the 
centre  where  Thomas's  troops  faced  them — the 
same  troops  they  claimed  to  have  defeated  a  short 
time  ago.  It  had  every  advantage  of  position 
at  this  time,  and  it  had  success  in  the  past  to  fire  the 
hearts  of  its  soldiers,  and  arouse  in  them  confi 
dence  in  their  ability  to  hurl  back  their  old  foe, 
who  had  the  audacity  to  assault  so  formidable  a 
stronghold. 

Standing  on  any  of  the  Union  forts  at  Chatta 
nooga,  especially  on  Fort  Negley  or  Fort  Wood, 
or  better  still  on  Orchard  Knob,  where  Grant  and 
Thomas  remained  during  the  25th,  one  would 
have  not  only  a  rear  view  of  the  Union  Army  as  it 
stood,  but  also  a  front  view  of  most  of  the  Con 
federate  force.  From  the  top  of  Missionary 
Ridge,  where  Bragg  had  his  headquarters,  the 
whole  panorama  was  magnificent.  The  lines  of 

14  [  209  ] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

blue,  and  their  array  of  glittering  muskets,  could 
be  seen  from  there  in  front.  The  backs  of  the 
troops  were  turned  on  Chattanooga.  'Their 
faces  were  to  the  foe."  Bragg  had  a  view  of 
them  which  Grant  and  Thomas  missed,  and  if 
he  could  have  had  an  hour  undisturbed  by 
the  conflicting  emotions  aroused  in  him  by  the 
pending  conflict,  if  he  could  have  watched 
through  his  field-glass  the  valorous  mein,  the 
confident  air,  and  the  evident  determination  of 
these  veteran  soldiers,  to  "feed  fat  the  ancient 
grudge"  against  the  old  foes  they  had  met  at 
Mill  Springs,  Perryville,  Stone's  River,  and 
Chickamauga,  he  would  surely  have  read  in  these 
characteristics  the  doom  of  the  defeat  which 
an  hour  later  overwhelmed  him  and  his  little  army, 
and  from  which  it  never  sufficiently  recovered  to 
win  another  battle.  Had  he  been  half  as  much  of 
a  philosopher,  as  he  was  a  soldier,  he  would  have 
foreseen,  what  afterwards  was  expressed  by  one  of 
his  ablest  generals  (D.  H.  Hill),  that  the  holding 
of  Chattanooga  "sealed  the  fate  of  the  confeder- 

»» 

acy. 

The  living,  moving  lines  of  soldiers,  presented 

[2IOJ 


BATTLE  OF  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

to  the  view  of  the  two  opposing  commanders,  sta 
tioned  at  vantage  points  above  the  valley  in  which 
the  Union  Army  was  then  formed,  although  a 
most  interesting  picture,  was  more  impressive  be 
cause  of  its  background  of  magnificent  mountains, 
rivers,  and  hills.  On  the  west  rose  great  Lookout 
Mountain,  1 ,500  feet  above  the  level  of  the  val 
ley;  while  across  the  valley,  east  of  Lookout, 
Missionary  Ridge  stretched  from  the  north  to  the 
South,  rising  500  feet  and  crowned  by  the  lines 
of  grey  soldiers,  every  movement  of  whom  could 
be  seen  from  Orchard  Knob. 

General  Grant's  most  excellent  plan  on  the  24th 
was  that  Thomas's  troops  should  bear  to  the  left, 
join  with  the  right  of  Sherman  after  his  forces 
had  advanced  to  the  tunnel,  through  which  the 
railroad  from  Chattanooga  to  East  Tennessee 
ran,  and  together  they  should  make  an  assault  with 
the  whole  union  line.  Thomas's  troops  were  in 
line  until  3:30  p.  m.  on  the  25th,  waiting  for 
Sherman  to  capture  the  hill  over  the  tunneL 
General  Sherman  had  begun  the  fight  early  in  the 
morning  of  the  25th  by  advancing  Corse's  brigade; 
the  latter  moved  down  the  southern  slope  of  the 

[211] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

second  hill  which  had  been  gained  the  day  before, 
and  under  a  galling  fire  advanced  against  Cle- 
burne's  fortified  position.  This  position  was  very 
strong,  however,  and  Corse  could  not  drive  the 
enemy  from  the  hill.  Then  other  brigades  were 
brought  up,  but  they  did  not  succeed  in  loosening 
Cleburne's  firm  hold.  General  Grant  observing 
this  from  Orchard  Knob  sent  the  rest  of  Howard's 
Corps  to  Sherman's  aid  at  10  a.  m.  How 
ard  had  two  divisions,  Steinwehr's  and  Schurz's. 
It  was  evident,  that  Bragg  endeavored  most 
vigorously  to  keep  Sherman  from  turning  his  right. 
Had  Sherman  succeeded  in  his  effort,  he 
would  have  been  in  Bragg's  rear  and  able  to 
menace  his  line  of  retreat  at  Chickamauga  sta 
tion,  which  was  immediately  in  the  rear  of  the 
right  flank.  There  was  no  evidence,  however, 
that  Bragg  was  weakening  his  lines  in  front 
of  Thomas;  although  he  had  already  sent 
the  forces,  which  Hooker  had  defeated  the  day 
before  on  Lookout,  to  his  right  wing;  and  these 
proved  to  be  amply  able  to  hold  so  strong  a  na 
tural  fortress  without  any  further  reinforcements. 
When  General  Sherman  received  Howard's  two 

[212] 


BATTLE  OF  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

divisions,  he  renewed  his  efforts  to  take  Tun 
nel  Hill ;  he  made  a  charge  and  received  one  in 
return,  which  broke  some  of  John  E.  Smith's 
brigades. 

It  appears  that  Grant  did  not  contemplate  any 
attack  by  Thomas  on  the  centre,  when  he  at  noon 
ordered  Baird  to  report  to  Sherman;  for  with 
Baird's  he  had  already  detached  nearly  half  of 
Thomas's  troops  to  Sherman  and  Hooker.  With 
Baird  gone,  Thomas  had  only  eight  brigades  to 
Sherman's  seven  divisions;  General  Hooker  had 
seven  brigades  as  far  from  General  Thomas's 
right,  as  General  Sherman's  were  from  the  latter's 
left. 

General  Grant  and  General  Thomas  were  to 
gether  when  these  orders  were  given  on  the  25th; 
they  were  in  accordance  with  Grant's  original 
plan,  that  Bragg's  defeat  should  be  accomplished 
by  Sherman's  turning  the  enemy's  right.  Grant 
must  therefore  have  consulted  with  Thomas  con 
cerning  this  maneuver.  Whether  General  Thomas 
expressed  his  opinion  on  the  25th  with  re 
gard  to  making  the  attack  in  some  other 
place  than  at  Sherman's  line,  is  not  known; 

[213] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

but  it  will  be  seen,  that  the  success  of  the  day 
pivoted  around  Thomas,  because  of  the  invincible 
position  of  the  enemy  at  Tunnel  Hill,  and  the 
valor  of  the  old  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  This 
is  no  disparagement  to  General  Grant's  original 
idea ;  his  plans  were  generally  correct  and  success 
ful,  and  this  one  was  fine  in  conception,  but  it 
shows  definitely,  that  the  "best  laid  schemes, 
o'mice  and  men,  gang  aft  a'gley." 

General  Grant  boldly  made  his  third  deviation 
from  his  original  outline  planned  for  the  battle. 
Seeing  the  improbability  of  Sherman  advancing 
his  present  line  to  join  with  Thomas's  left,  as  con 
templated,  he  ordered  an  independent  assault  by 
Thomas's  troops  alone ;  this  order  was  given  at  3 
p.  m.  This  section  of  the  Union  line  was  covered 
by  two  lines  of  skirmishers ;  and  was  confronted  by 
something  less  than  four  divisions  of  the  enemy, 
namely,  a  part  of  Stewart's  on  the  Confederate 
left,  which  was  facing  Hooker's  line  under  Gen 
eral  Breckenridge's  personal  direction.  The  signal 
for  the  advance  was  to  be  six  shots  from  a  battery 
(perhaps  Bridge's) ,  on  Orchard  Knob.  General 
Grant's  report  will  best  tell  what  occurred,  viz.: 

[214] 


BATTLE  OF  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

"Thomas  was  accordingly  directed  to  move  for 
ward  his  troops,  constituting  our  center,  * 
with  a  double  line  of  skirmishers  thrown  out,  fol 
lowed  in  easy  supporting  distance  by  the  whole 
force,  and  carry  the  rifle-pits  at  the  foot  of  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  and  when  carried  to  reform  his 
lines,  on  the  rifle-pits  with  a  view  to  carry  the  top 
of  the  ridge.  These  troops  moved  forward, 
drove  the  enemy  from  the  rifle-pits  at  the  base  of 
the  ridge  like  bees  from  a  hive — stopped  but  a 
moment  until  the  whole  were  in  line — and  com 
menced  the  ascent  of  the  mountain  from  right  to 
left  almost  simultaneously,  following  closely  the 
retreating  enemy,  without  further  orders.  They 
encountered  a  fearful  volley  of  grape  and  canister 
from  near  thirty  pieces  of  artillery  and  musketry 
from  still  well-filled  rifle-pits  on  the  summit  of  the 
ridge.  Not  a  waver,  however,  was  seen  in  all 
that  long  line  of  brave  men.  Their  progress  was 
steadily  onward  until  the  summit  was  in  their  pos- 


"39 

session. 


When  the  summit  was  reached  by  the  Union 
troops,  the  scene  of  confusion  and  flight  of  the 

^Rebellion  Record*,  Serial  No.  55,  p.  34. 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

Confederate  forces,  down  the  eastern  slope  of  the 
ridge,  was  wonderful  to  behold. 

General  Thomas  in  his  report,40  says:  "Our 
troops  advancing  steadily  in  a  continuous  line,  the 
enemy,  seized  with  panic,  abandoned  the  works 
at  the  foot  of  the  hill  and  retreated  precipitately  to 
the  crest,  where  they  were  closely  followed  by  our 
troops,  who,  apparently  inspired  by  the  impulse  of 
victory,  carried  the  hill  simultaneously  at  six  dif 
ferent  points,  and  so  closely  upon  the  heels  of 
the  enemy,  that  many  of  them  were  taken  prisoners 
in  the  trenches.  We  captured  all  their  cannon 
and  ammunition  before  they  could  be  removed  or 
destroyed." 

In  the  meantime  Hooker  was  advancing  to 
ward  Thomas's  right  with  his  line  stretched  across 
the  ridge,  at  right  angles  to  it.  Stewart's  troops, 
seeing  their  left  threatened  by  Hooker,  tried  to  es 
cape  down  the  eastern  slope  toward  Ringgold,  but 
encountering  there  Osterhaus's  troops,  moved 
northward  along  the  base ;  here  they  ran  into  John 
son's  division,  and  more  than  a  thousand  were  cap 
tured.  After  General  Baird's  division  had  gained 


"Ibid.,  p.  96. 

[216 


BATTLE  OF  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

the  summit,  Stewart  wheeled  his  division  to  the 
left,  across  the  crest,  and  advanced  toward  the 
troops,  resisting  General  Sherman.  He  had  not  ad 
vanced  far  before  he  met  Cheatham's  forces  in  line 
across  the  crest ;  the  contest  here  lasted  until  after 
dark.  During  the  night  all  the  Confederate 
forces  retreated  across  the  Chickamauga,  burned 
the  bridges,  and  continued  their  flight  to  Taylor's 
Ridge,  near  Ringgold,  the  nearest  heights  across 
the  Chickamauga  Valley,  sixteen  miles  in  a 
straight  line  southeast.  General  Sheridan,  after 
halting  a  few  moments  on  top  of  the  ridge  to  re 
form  his  troops,  pushed  on  to  Chickamauga  Creek ; 
he  captured  300  prisoners,  1 3  cannon,  and  a  train 
of  1 2  wagons. 

Mr.  C.  A.  Dana  sent  a  dispatch  to  the  Secre 
tary  of  War  at  1 0  a.  m.  November  26,  which  con 
tained  the  following  paragraph:  ''The  storming 
of  the  ridge  by  our  troops  was  one  of  the  greatest 
miracles  in  military  history.  No  man  who  climbs 
the  ascent  by  any  of  the  roads  that  wind  along  its 
front  can  believe  that  1 8,000  men  were  moved  up 
its  broken  and  crumbling  face  unless  it  was  his 
fortune  to  witness  the  deed.  It  seems  as  awful  as  a 

[217] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

visible  interposition  of  God.  Neither  Grant,  nor 
Thomas  intended  it.  Their  orders  were  to  carry 
the  rifle-pits  along  the  base  of  the  ridge,  and  cap 
ture  their  occupants;  but  when  this  was  accom 
plished,  the  unaccountable  spirit  of  the  troops  bore 
them  bodily  up  those  impracticable  steeps,  over  the 
bristling  rifle-pits  on  the  crest,  and  the  thirty  can 
non  enfilading  every  gully." 

General  Grant  says  in  his  report  that  he  in 
tended  the  lines  should  be  readjusted  and  ascend 
the  ridge  if  they  were  successful  at  the  base.  The 
reports  of  the  corps  and  division  commanders  indi 
cate  that  some  of  them  misunderstood  the  orders. 
The  men  advanced  without  special  orders,  how 
ever,  when  they  found  the  position  at  the  foot  of 
the  ridge  too  much  exposed  to  the  plunging  fire  of 
the  enemy.  In  some  instances  they  were  even 
called  back  to  the  foot  after  proceeding  part  way 
up  the  hill.  The  assault  was  made,  however,  and 
was  so  successful,  that  no  one  was  court-martialed ; 
no  one  was  bold  enough  to  repudiate  the  respon 
sibility  for  its  initiation.  General  Grant  did  not 
hesitate  to  modify  his  original  plans  from  time  to 
time,  when  inevitable  circumstances  showed  him 

[218] 


BATTLE  OF  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

that  some  other  movement  than  the  one  laid  down 
was  essential  to  success.  This  characteristic 
is  the  quality  of  a  great  general. 

The  artillery  also  under  command  of  General 
Brannan  did  fine  service  during  the  assault.  The 
large  guns  in  Forts  Wood,  Sherman,  Cheatham, 
and  battery  Rosseau  directed  their  fire  first  upon 
the  Confederate  line  at  the  foot  of  the  ridge,  as 
did  four  light  batteries  in  front  of  Chattanooga. 
When  the  Union  line  was  ascending  the  ridge, 
this  artillery  turned  their  shots  to  the  entrenched 
Confederate  line  on  top.  The  enemy's  artillery 
and  musketry  seemed  largely  to  have  over-shot 
the  Union  lines;  the  records  do  not  show  that 
the  Union  troops  suffered  as  heavy  losses  during 
the  time  they  were  under  fire,  as  the  enemy's  ap 
parently  advantageous  position  would  warrant. 
It  is  also  probable  that  the  audacity  of  the  blue 
coats  in  assaulting  the  top  of  the  ridge  surprised  the 
Confederates  and  induced  nervousness,  wild 
shooting,  terror,  confusion,  and  flight. 

The  Union  troops  did  not  advance  up  the  ridge 
as  if  on  parade;  but  conformed  more  or  less  to  the 
contour  of  the  ground ;  the  line  appeared  to  an  on- 

[219] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

looker  as  a  zigzag  one ;  but  the  standards  were  al 
ways  where  they  ought  to  be,  and  there  were  no 
stragglers.  They  did  not  fire  their  muskets  to  any 
extent  while  advancing,  although  they  received 
a  constant  wild  fire  from  the  enemy.  It  was  an 
assault  by  the  musket  bearers,  and  it  is  not  likely 
they  received  many  orders  from  their  officers.  As 
soon  as  the  Union  troops  gained  the  crest  at  one 
point,  although  it  appeared  as  if  the  six  different 
points  were  gained  simultaneously,  it  greatly 
assisted  the  rest  of  the  troops,  who  were  so  near  the 
crest.  The  Confederates  began  to  fall  back  as  soon 
as  the  first  Union  troops  gained  the  top.  General 
Bragg  tried  to  send  his  troops  from  a  less  threat 
ened  point  to  one  more  in  danger,  but  his  attempt 
failed,  because  his  men  saw  better  than  he  seemed 
to  do  that  all  was  lost  when  one  point  was  carried. 
This  observation  applies  only  of  course  to  the  iso 
lated  line  on  the  right  and  left  of  Bragg's 
headquarters,  which  was  attacked  by  General 
Thomas's  troops.  His  troops  further  to  the  right, 
beyond  an  unoccupied  space — such  as  Cheatham's 
division — were  not  affected  that  way,  because 

[220] 


BATTLE  OF  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

they  turned  on  left  wheel,  and  attacked  Baird's 
division  on  the  crest. 

The  Union  troops,  which  were  called  back  to 
the  foot  of  the  ridge  by  those  officers  who  thought 
their  orders  carried  them  only  thus  far,  caused 
Bragg  to  believe  that  they  had  been  repulsed 
by  the  fire  of  his  troops;  he  rode  along  his 
line  congratulating  them,  when  he  was  in 
formed  that  his  line  was  broken  further  to  the 
right,  and  the  Union  forces  had  crowned  the 
ridge.  The  victory  was  gained  too  late  in  the 
evening  to  ensure  an  effective  pursuit.  The  enemy 
had  all  night,  after  crossing  the  Chickamauga,  in 
which  to  move  undisturbed  his  troops  and  wagon 
trains;  he  made  the  distance  between  himself  and 
the  pursuing  force  as  great  as  possible  before  morn 
ing.  General  Grant  was  apparently  justified  in 
waiting  for  Hooker  to  arrive  at  Rossville  before 
he  ordered  Thomas's  advance,  but  he  was  not  jus 
tified  in  waiting  so  long  as  he  did  for  Sherman's 
expected  capture  of  Tunnel  Hill.  Yet  who 
could  hope  or  believe  that  Thomas's  troops  could 
successfully  assault  so  formidable  a  position  as 
they  did?  Hooker  was  delayed  four  hours  in 

[221] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

crossing  Chattanooga  Creek.  If  Grant  had  sent 
Howard's  Corps  at  1 0  a.  m.  on  the  25th  to  Ross- 
ville  in  Hooker's  place,  instead  of  sending  it  to 
Sherman,  and  as  soon  as  it  was  in  position,  ordered 
Thomas,  Howard,  and  Sherman  to  advance  in 
unison,  the  same  result  would  have  occurred  at 
one  or  two  o'clock  as  was  secured  much  later, 
and  then  the  four  and  a  half  or  five  hours 
of  daylight  would  have  been  sufficient  to  in 
jure  the  Confederate  Army  very  greatly  before  it 
could  have  crossed  the  Chickamauga.  But  it  is 
very  easy  to  look  back  and  criticise.  On  the  bat 
tlefield  there  may  be  reasons,  apparent  to  a  com 
mander,  why  these  supposable  movements  could 
not  be  made  that  are  not  so  palpable  to  a  historian, 
who  may  lose  sight  of  all  the  complex  situations, 
the  inside  knowledge  of  the  commander,  and  his 
fearful  responsibility  to  the  country. 

The  pursuit  was  taken  up  on  the  morning  of  the 
26th  by  General  Hooker's  troops  and  Palmers 
Fourteenth  Corps.  Hooker  attacked  the  enemy 
in  a  strong  position  at  Ringgold  Gap  on  Taylor's 
Ridge;  he  lost  heavily  without  inflicting  corres 
ponding  injury  on  the  enemy.  The  Fourth  Corps 

-[222] 


PURSUING  THE  ENEMY 

was  marched  back  to  the  city  on  the  morning  of 
the  26th  to  make  preparations  for  the  relief  of 
Burnside  at  Knoxville. 

On  the  27th,  the  pursuit  was  abandoned  at 
Ringgold,  twenty-three  miles  by  rail  south  of 
Chattanooga.  General  Grant  telegraphed  from 
that  place  at  2  p.  m.  to  General  Halleck  at  Wash 
ington,  D.  C.:  "I  am  not  prepared  to  continue 
pursuit  further."  The  official  reports  neither 
give  the  strength  of  the  Union  Army  nor  of  the 
Confederate  Army.  At  the  time  of  the  attack 
on  Missionary  Ridge  the  Union  Army  outnum 
bered  largely  the  Confederate  Army.  A  large 
part  of  this  disparity  in  numbers  was  offset  by 
the  extraordinarily  strong  position  of  the  Con 
federate  forces,  and  the  fact  that  the  Union 
Army  was  the  aggressor.  Could  Bragg  have 
commanded  the  resources  that  Grant  did,  he 
would  have  gladly  availed  himself  of  them  in 
order  to  outnumber  the  Union  Army;  no  false 
notions  of  chivalry  prevented  either  army  from 
availing  itself  of  any  great  advantage  in  battle, 
which  is  habitually  taken  where  war  is  waged. 
The  Confederate  boast  at  the  beginning  of  the 

[223] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

war  that  one  Confederate  could  out-fight  five 
Yankees — as  all  northern  troops  were  called  by 
the  Confederates — was  rather  incompatible  with 
their  complaint  after  the  war,  that  they  were 
crushed  only  by  weight  of  numbers. 

Military  skill  will  sometimes  win  battles  against 
numbers;  this  was  not  the  case  in  the  battles 
around  Chattanooga,  however.  Bragg  does  not 
give  his  losses  in  his  official  report;  but  he  lost  to 
the  Union  Army  in  prisoners  6,142  men,  42 
pieces  of  artillery,  69  gun  carriages,  and  7,000 
stands  of  small  arms.  He  destroyed  much  other 
material  before  and  during  his  flight. 

The  Union  less  was  5,286  killed  and  wounded, 
and  330  missing.  These  losses  seem  small  com 
pared  with  other  battles  of  less  importance — 
Chickamauga  for  instance;  but  it  must  be  re 
membered  that  the  sacrifice  for  the  continued  pos 
session  of  Chattanooga  by  the  Union  Army  in 
cludes  also  all  the  losses  of  the  conflicts  of  the  Tul- 
lahoma  campaign,  of  Chickamauga,  Wauhatchie, 
Lookout  Mountain,  Orchard  Knob,  and  Mission 
ary  Ridge.  When  it  is  considered  how  much 
these  battles  meant,  in  their  causal  effect  on  the 

[224] 


WISCONSIN  AT  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

final  suppression  of  the  rebellion  itself,  their  value 
becomes  apparent. 

WISCONSIN  TROOPS  IN  THE  BATTLE  OF  MISSION 
ARY  RIDGE 

Wisconsin's  part  in  the  battle  of  Missionary 
Ridge  was  important  and  honorable.  The  First 
and  Twenty-first  Infantry  were  in  Starkweather's 
brigade  of  Johnson's  division.  This  brigade  had 
lost  heavily  at  Chickamauga;  it  was  assigned  to 
remain  in  Chattanooga  in  order  to  hold  the  works, 
while  the  army  was  assaulting  the  ridge.  This 
duty  was  cheerfully  and  thoroughly  done,  al 
though  it  deprived  the  brigade  of  the  glory  of 
charging  up  the  ridge. 

The  Tenth  Infantry  remained  on  detached  duty 
holding  a  fort  south  of  the  Crutchfield  house,  on 
the  side  of  Lookout  Mountain,  and  did  not  ascend 
the  ridge. 

The  Fifteenth  Infantry  was  attached  to  Wil- 
lich's  brigade  of  Wood's  division  of  Granger's 
fourth  corps ;  it  was  commanded  by  Captain  John 
A.  Gordon.  In  the  ascent  of  the  ridge  it  was  in 
the  reserve  line  of  the  brigade,  therefore  its  loss 

15  [  225  ] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

was  nominal ;  the  entire  loss  during  the  battles  was 
6  men  wounded.  General  Willich  speaks  of 
the  regiment  in  high  terms  in  his  report.  It  con 
sisted  only  of  1 30  men. 

Before  coming  to  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland 
the  Fifteenth  Infantry  had  distinguished  itself. 
On  October  19,  1862,  Major  Quincy  McNeill 
of  the  Second  Illinois  Cavalry  wrote  to  the  Gov 
ernor  of  Wisconsin,  from  Island  Number  Ten,  that 
there  was  no  braver  man  in  the  service  than  Cap 
tain  John  A.  Gordon. 

The  Eighteenth  Infantry  came  with  Sherman's 
troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee;  it  was  com 
manded  by  Colonel  Gabriel  Bouck  and  attached 
to  the  First  Brigade  (Alexander's) ,  of  the  Second 
Division  (General  John  E.  Smith's) ,  of  the  Sev 
enteenth  Corps.  This  infantry  regiment  was  en 
gaged  with  Sherman's  troops  on  the  extreme  left; 
its  losses  are  not  reported.  It  was  organized  at 
Milwaukee  in  February,  1862,  and  was  mus 
tered  in  March.  It  proceeded  to  Pittsburg  Land 
ing,  Tennessee,  and  became  a  part  of  the  Army 
of  the  Tennessee  on  April  5,  1 862.  This  regiment 
was  heavily  engaged  in  the  battle  at  that  place  on 

[226] 


WISCONSIN  AT  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

April  6;  also  in  the  battle  of  Corinth  and  other 
engagements  prior  to  its  coming  to  Chattanooga. 
The  Eighteenth  Infantry  was  noted  for  the  size  of 
its  men ;  it  was  said  that  Company  G  of  this  regi 
ment  averaged  by  actual  weight  1 60  pounds  to  the 
man.  At  the  battle  of  Pittsburg  Landing  on 
April  6,  1862,  this  regiment  was  in  the  left  bri 
gade  of  General  Prentiss's  division;  it  was  then 
commanded  by  its  first  colonel,  J.  S.  Alban.  It 
formed  for  battle  only  thirty  rods  from  its 
tents,  and  fifteen  minutes  later  the  Confederate  line 
was  upon  it.  The  enemy  outflanked  and  overpow 
ered  it;  Alban  was  wounded,  and  carried  from 
the  field,  dying  soon  afterwards;  the  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  was  also  wounded  and  Major  Crane  was 
killed.  All  this  occurred  one  week  after  the  regi 
ment  left  its  camp  of  organization  in  Wisconsin. 
Captain  Gabriel  Bouck,  Company  E,  Second 
Wisconsin  Infantry  was  made  Colonel  of  the 
Eighteenth  on  April  22,  1 862. 

The  Twenty-fourth  Infantry  was  attached  to 
Francis  T.  Sherman's  Brigade  of  Sheridan's  divi 
sion  of  the  Fourth  Corps,  and  was  commanded 
by  Major  Carl  Von  Baumbach.  His  official  re- 

[227] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

port  is  a  vivid  account  of  how  the  top  of  the  ridge 
was  gained,  "My  regiment  advanced  in  admirable 
line  of  battle  up  to  the  first  pits  of  the  enemy.  Up 
on  reaching  the  first  line,  the  men  were  pretty  much 
exhausted,  and  unable  to  move  for  some  time.  In 
about  five  minutes,  however,  we  moved  over  the 
first  pits  of  the  enemy,  but  after  advancing  beyond 
the  first  line,  the  line  of  battle  was  not  regular. 
The  men  took  advantage  of  all  obstacles,  in  the 
way,  for  shelter,  and  thus  advanced  toward  the 
top  of  the  ridge.  The  fighting  was  fierce  and  se 
vere,  but  owing  to  the  formation  of  the  ground 
my  men  were  able  to  screen  themselves  partially, 
from  the  deadly  volleys,  that  were  being  hurled 
at  us,  at  every  step  of  our  advance.  In  the  course 
of  the  ascent  my  men  had  to  rest  several  times  on 
account  of  exhaustion.  But  at  length  we  succeed 
ed  in  gaining  the  crest  of  the  ridge,  after  two  hours 
steady  fighting  *  *  *  I  would  most  respect 
fully  mention  Adjutant  Arthur  Me  Arthur,  Jr., 
for  his  bravery.  When  the  color  sergeant  was 
exhausted  he  carried  the  flag  in  front  of  the  regi 
ment,  cheering  the  men  to  follow  him  up  the 
ridge." 

[228] 


WISCONSIN  AT  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

The  loss  of  the  Twenty- fourth  is  given  as  31 
killed  and  wounded.  Captain  Howard  Greene 
and  Lieutenant  Robert  J.  Chivas  were  killed. 
Captain  Richard  H.  Austin  and  Lieutenant 
Thomas  E.  Balding  were  wounded.  Major  Von 
Baumbach  commended  especially  the  bravery  of 
the  latter  two. 

The  Twenty-sixth  Infantry,  still  in  the  second 
brigade  of  Schurz's  division  of  the  Eleventh 
Corps,  was  commanded  by  Major  F.  C.  Wink- 
ler;  this  regiment  followed  the  movements  of  its 
brigade  and  on  November  25,  was  with  Sherman 
on  the  extreme  left.  Its  losses  are  not  reported. 

The  Third,  Eighth,  and  Tenth  light  batteries 
were  in  the  First  Brigade  of  the  Second  Division 
of  the  artillery  reserve.  Company  C  of  the  first 
heavy  artillery  was  in  the  Second  Brigade  of  the 
same  division. 

The  Eighth  Battery  did  excellent  service  on  the 
evening  of  the  24th,  when  Carlin's  brigade  crossed 
Chattanooga  Creek  at  its  mouth  and  joined 
Hooker.  Lieutenant  O.  German,  commanding 
the  battery,  placed  two  sections  near  the  mouth  of 
the  creek  on  its  right  bank,  and  shelled  the  Con- 

[229] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

federate  position  and  the  road  up  the  east  of  the 
mountain.  On  the  25th,  after  the  infantry  had 
taken  Missionary  Ridge  it  ascended  to  the  crest. 
Losses,  none. 

The  Fifth  Battery  was  part  of  the  artillery 
which  was  so  placed  as  to  cover  the  pontoon 
bridge  at  the  mouth  of  the  Chickamauga,  where 
Sherman's  troops  crossed  on  the  24th. 

The  Twelfth  Battery  was  placed  on  a  hill  near 
the  location  of  the  Fifth  Battery. 

The  Sixth  and  Twelfth  batteries  were  attached 
officially  to  the  Second  Division  of  the  Seven 
teenth  Corps;  therefore  they  were  on  the  left  with 
Sherman  during  the  25th.  Their  losses  are  not 
reported. 

There  is  no  report  from  the  Tenth  Battery, 
which  was  stationed  at  Harrison's  Landing,  about 
twelve  miles  up  the  river,  east  of  Chattanooga;  a 
section  of  this  battery  reported  to  Colonel  Eli 
Long  (of  the  cavalry)  at  Calhoun,  Tennessee. 

Battery  C  of  the  First  Regiment  of  Wisconsin 
Heavy  Artillery  was  mustered  in  October  1, 
1863;  it  was  sent  directly  to  Chattanooga  and  as 
signed  to  Fort  Wood. 

[230] 


WISCONSIN  AT  MISSIONARY  RIDGE 

The  Sixth  Wisconsin  Battery  was  mustered 
into  service  at  Racine,  Wisconsin,  October  2, 

1 86 1 .  It  did  not  leave  the  State  until  March  1 5, 

1 862,  when  it  went  to  St.  Louis.     It  took  part  in 
the  siege  of  Island  Number  Ten,  the  siege  and  bat 
tle  of  Corinth,  and  the  siege  of  Vicksburg.     This 
battery  came  to  Chattanooga  with  the  Fifteenth 
Corps  under  Sherman. 

The  Tenth  Wisconsin  Light  Battery  was  mus 
tered  into  the  service  at  Milwaukee  on  February 
1 0,  1 862,  with  Captain  Yates  V.  Beebe  as  com 
mander.  It  left  the  State  March  1 8  and  went  to 
St.  Louis.  From  there  it  joined  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  and  took  part  in  the  battle  of  Corinth. 
On  September  1 4,  1 862,  it  arrived  at  Nashville, 
and  took  part  in  the  battle  of  Stone's  River.  It 
did  active  duty  in  various  locations  until  the  date 
of  the  battles  around  Chattanooga. 

The  Twelfth  Wisconsin  Battery  was  organized 
and  equipped  at  Jefferson  Barracks,  Missouri.  It 
did  service  in  both  Tennessee  and  Mississippi  un 
til  coming  to  Chattanooga  with  General  Sherman. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland — as  reorganized 

prior  to  the  battles  around  Chattanooga — with 

[231] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

General  Thomas  in  command,  was  now  in  perma 
nent  possession  of  Chattanooga.  The  Confeder 
ate  Army  took  up  its  winter  quarters  at  Dalton, 
Georgia,  on  the  railway  twenty-eight  miles  south 
east  of  Chattanooga,  across  two  mountain  ranges. 
The  assignment  of  General  Grant  as  commander 
of  the  Division  of  the  Mississippi — giving  him 
command  of  all  the  forces,  operating  in  the  States 
of  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Georgia,  Alabama,  and 
Mississippi — which  so  greatly  contributed  to  the 
victories  in  the  battles  around  Chattanooga,  in 
sured  also  the  permanent  holding  of  that  city. 

Whatever  was  accomplished  by  Rosecrans 
during  the  four  months  of  the  campaign,  begin 
ning  on  June  23  at  Murfreesboro,  and  ending  on 
October  19,  1863  at  Chattanooga,  was  done  by 
him  and  his  Army  of  the  Cumberland  alone.  He 
could  not  get  any  cooperation  from  the  East  or 
West.  The  President  and  General  Halleck  at 
Washington,  seemed  to  be  in  earnest  by  the  word 
ing  of  their  dispatches,  as  published  in  the  Re 
bellion  Record,  in  urging  and  commanding  Burn- 
side  in  east  Tennessee  and  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  on  the  Mississippi  to  join  with  Rosecrans 

[232] 


CONCLUSIONS 

prior  to  the  battle  of  Chickamauga;  for  reasons 
not  apparent  to  the  reader  of  present  history,  no 
reinforcements  came.  It  is  pathetic  to  read  the 
official  record  of  those  days,  which  gives  an  ac 
count  of  the  struggles,  the  marches,  the  battles,  the 
sacrifices,  the  patient  endurance  by  the  musket 
bearers  of  extreme  fatigue,  and  the  cheerful 
ness  with  which  the  soldiers  endured  all.  They 
faced  death  without  a  thought  of  their  real 
heroism.  To  one  who  went  through  the  cam 
paign  and  came  out  alive  and  unwounded  it  is  in 
comprehensible,  that  all  did  not  die. 

It  is  true  other  armies,  such  as  those  of  the  Poto 
mac,  the  Tennessee,  and  the  one  in  Missouri  had 
campaigns  at  the  same  time  and  were  equally 
exposed  to  the  hazards  of  war;  but  none  of 
them  marched  over  a  territory  so  mountainous 
and  so  difficult;  none  of  them  fought  battles 
in  so  perilous  a  region  or  with  more  deadly 
effect,  than  the  soldiers  in  the  battle  of  Chicka 
mauga.  Had  the  Union  Army  been  really  de 
feated  and  had  it  lost  Chattanooga,  the  army 
could  hardly  have  recovered  from  the  disaster, 
without  the  quick  aid  of  large  reinforcements, 

[233] 


CHATTANOOGA  CAMPAIGN 

which  were  too  far  away  at  that  time  to  be 
available  in  an  emergency.  Burnside  was  be 
sieged  at  Knoxville,  and  the  Army  of  the  Ten 
nessee  so  far  away,  that  it  took  weeks  to  get  it 
to  Chattanooga.  It  will  be  of  great  interest  to 
the  future  student  of  the  military  history  of  the 
War  between  the  States  to  follow  the  subsequent 
campaigns  of  the  Western  armies  after  Grant  be 
came  commander-in-chief ,  and  Sherman  was  as 
signed  to  the  command  in  the  West,  with  head 
quarters  at  Chattanooga.  He  will  apprehend  how 
all  the  armies  worked  together,  and  how  soon  the 
rebellion  itself  was  crushed,  although  its  soldiers 
fought  to  the  bitter  end. 


1*34] 


INDEX 


[Armies,  Battles,  Corps,  Creeks,  Forts,  Gaps,  Islands,  Losses, 
Mountains,  Rivers,  and  Wars  are  grouped  under  those  respective 
heads;  Regiments  are  grouped  under  the  caption  of  their  respec 
tive  States.] 


ADAMS,  Gen.  Daniel  W.,  at  Chickamauga,  99,  100,  104. 
Alabama,  8-10;  troops  in,  33,  232;  28th  Infantry,  191. 
Alexander,  Col.  E.  Porter,  at  Knoxville,  181. 
Alexander,  Col.  Jesse  I. ,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  205,  226. 
Alexander's  Bridge,  near  Chickamauga,  69,  72,  77. 
Alpine  (Ga.),  61,  63,  72-75. 

Anderson,  Gen.  Patton,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  205. 
Anderson,  Gen.  Robert,  in  Kentucky,  15. 
Anderson's  Cross  Roads  (Tenn.),  159. 
ARMIES — 

Cumberland,  1,  3,  5,  8,  13,  15,  164,   177,   178,  201,   206-208, 
226,  232;  organization,  12,  19,  20,  24,  25,  28;  commander,  16 ire- 
organized,    164,    169,  170,  231;  reinforced,   135,    189;    retreats, 
155;  at  Murfreesboro,  4,  5,  11;  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  52- 
154;  at  Chattanooga,  186;  courage  of,  22,  180,  214;   personnel^ 
25-27,  33. 
Mississippi,  12. 
Ohio,  15,  169. 

Potomac,  4,  158,  177, 178,  208,  233. 

Tennessee  (Confederate),    1,  33;  organized,  33-39;  in  Chicka 
mauga  campaign,  52-154;  on  Missionary  Ridge,  202-222. 

Tennessee  (Union),  4,  5,  158,  159,   169,  201,  208,  226,    231-233. 
Armstrong,  Gen.  Frank  C.,  at  Chickamauga,  117. 
Atlanta  (Ga.),  capture,  3,  5,  10. 
Austin,  Capt.  Richard  H.,  wounded,  229. 

[235] 


INDEX 

BAIRD,   Gen.  Absalom,    of  regular  army,  23;  commands  division, 
19,  21,  166;  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  60,  65,  66,  68;  at  battle 

of  Chickamautfa,  79,  81-103,  107,  108,  111,  112,  115,  122,  126- 

129,  139-142,  145,  152;  withdraws,  123,  125,  129;  at  Rossville, 
124;  Orchard  Knob,  190;  Missionary  Ridge,  202-205,  213,  216, 

221;  commended,  148,  149. 
Balding,  Lieut.  Thomas  E.,  132;  wounded,  229. 
Barker,  Capt.  John  D.,  aide  to  Thomas,  120,    122. 
Barnes,  Gen.  Sidney  M.,  at  Chickamauga,  104,  107,  109,  113,  142. 
Bate,  Gen.  William  B.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  205. 
Battle'Creek  (Term.),  60,  167. 
BATTLES — 

Antietam,  137. 

Bull  Run,  15,  137. 

Oarnifex    Ferry,    12. 

Chancellorsville,  4,  137. 

Chickamauga,  mentioned,  14,  17,  19-21,  30,  34,37,  81,  126,  157, 
207,  224,  233;  not  a  failure,  52;  described,  67-124;  criticized, 
13,  135-150. 

Corinth,  12,  32,  227,  231. 

Crampton's  Gap,  137. 

Dug   Gap,  65-69. 

Fredericksburg,  137. 

Gettysburg,  4,  136-138. 

Guy's  Gap,    44,  46. 

Harper's  Ferry,  137. 

Hoover's  Gap,  2,  43,  44. 

Island  Number  Ten,    29,    32. 

luka,  12. 

Leet's  Tanyard,    65. 

Liberty  Gap,  2,  42,  43. 

Lookout  Mountain,  mentioned,  135,  181,  212,  224;    described, 
192-201. 
'Middle   Creek,  14. 

Mill   Springs,  15,  16,  210. 

Missionary  Ridge,  mentioned,  2,  135,  189,  192,  193;  described, 
201-222. 

Orchard  Knob,  mentioned,  135,  224;  described,  189-194. 

Perryville,  3,    16,  20,  22,  28-35,  210. 
[236] 


INDEX 

BATTLES — Continued. 

Pittsburg  Landing,  226,  227. 
Rich  Mountain,  12. 
Ringgold  Gap,  222,  223. 
Shepardstown,   137. 
Shiloh,  31,  34,  35,  50,  137. 
South  Mountain,   137. 

Stone's    River,   1,    2,  11,  13,  16,  22,  28-37,  137,  144,  210,  231. 
Vicksburg,  5. 

Tunnel  Hill,  185,  186,  206,  211-214,  221. 
Wauhatchie,  mentioned,  135,  224;  described,  176-182. 
Baumbach.     See  Von  Baumbach. 
Beatty,  Gen,  John,  at  Chickamauga,  93,  99,104,113,142:  atChat- 

tanooga,  166. 
Beatty,  Gen.  Samuel,    at   Chattanooga,    166;    at   Orchard  Knob, 

190;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  204. 
Beebe,  Capt.  Yates  V.,  commands  battery,  231. 
Bellefont  (Ala.),  57. 

Benning,  Gen.  Henry  L.,  at  Chickamauga,  97,  138. 
Benton  Barracks  (Mo.),  30. 

Bingham,  Col.  George  B.,  in  Tullahoma  campaign,  28;  at  Chick 
amauga,  127. 

Bloody  Pond,  at  Chickamauga,  80. 
Bouck,  Col.  Gabriel,  commands  regiment,  226,  227. 
Bowling  Green  (Ky.),  2,  3,  6,  11,  16. 
Boynton,  Gen.  H.  V.,  cited,  85,  108,  109,  118,  136. 
Brady ville  (Term.),  41,  43. 

Braarg,  Gen.  Braxton,  Confederate  commander,  2,  33,  34;  at  Tul. 
lahoma,  39,  40;  at  Chattanooga,  54,  55;  plans,  57,  183,  189: 
evacuates  Chattanooga,  63,  64,  67;  at  Lafayette,  65,  66,  68: 
reinforced,  66,  67,  76,  98;  at  Chickamauga,  58,  62,  69-80,  85, 
87,  99,  116,  117,  119;  size  of  army,  136;  after  Chickamauga, 
124,  146,  151,  156-161;  line  near  Chattanooga,  181-194;  at 
Missionary  Ridge,  205-213,  220-224;  reports,  49,  67. 
Brannan,  Gen.  John  M.,  of  regular  army,  23;  commands  division, 
17,  24,  66;  in  Tullahoma  campaign,  41;  at  Chickamauga,  82- 
96,  103-115,  119,  127,  138-142,  151;  withdraws,  123,  125;  chief 
of  artillery,  169;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  219;  commended,  148; 
reports,  85,  86. 

[237] 


INDEX 

Breckenridge,  Gen.  John  C.,  at  Chickamauga,  82,  90,  96-100,  104, 
110,  117,  140,  141,  148;  Missionary  Ridge,  205,  209,  214;  char 
acterized,  34,  35. 

Bridge,  Lyman,  commands  Illinois  battery,  193,  214. 

Bridgeport  (Ala.),  railway  junction,  6,  7,  28,  52-54,  56,  59,  60, 
159,  162,  163,  166,  171-174,  176,  177,  180,  184,  187,  189,  194; 
supply  station,  134;  road  to,  156;  steamboat  at,  179;  Bragg  at, 
19,  49;  Gordon,  83;  garrisoned,  167;  troops  cross  at,  176. 

Broomtown  Valley  (Ala.),  63. 

Brotherton,  ,  house  near  Chickamauga,  80,  81,  91,  92,  116. 

Brown,  Gen.  John  C.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  206. 

Brown's  Ferry  (Tenn.),  fortified,  172-176;  captured,  178;  bridge 
at,  179,  185,  187,  192,  194. 

Buckner,  Gen.  Simon  B.,  in  East  Tennessee,  59;  reinforces 
Bragg,  60,  67,  70;  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  66,  68;  at 
Chickamauga,  97,  98,  142;  characterized,  35. 

Buel,  C.  C.,  and  Johnson,  Robert  U.,  Battles  and  Leaders  of  Civil 
War,  74,  116,  147. 

Buell,  Gen.  D.  C.,  Confederate  officer,  2,  3,  11,  16,  28,  31,  32;  at 
Chattanooga,  50. 

Buell,  Gen.  George  P.,  at  Chickamauga,  106,  113,  117. 

Burnside,  Gen.  Ambrose  E.,  in  East  Tennessee,  59,  66,  67,  158, 
232,  234;  at  Knoxville,  169,  181-184,  189,  223. 

Buschbeck,  Col.  Adolphus,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  204. 

OALHOUN  (Tenn.),  230. 

Cameron  Hill,  at  Chattanooga,  173. 

Camp  Dick  Robinson  (Ky.),  15. 

Caperton's  Ferry  (Ala.),  location,  57,  59;  crossed,  60,  61. 

Carlin,  Gen.  William  P.,  commands  brigade,  43,  201;  at  Chicka 
mauga,  108;  Chattanooga,  166,  167;  Lookout  Mountain,  200; 
Missionary  Ridge,  202,  204. 

Carpenter,  Capt.  Stephen  J.t  commands  battery,  32. 

Century  Magazine,  cited,  74. 

Chapin,  Col.  Alfred  R.,  commands  regiment,  28. 

Chattanooga  (Tenn.),  location,  55;  importance  of,  3,  7-9,  39,51, 
71,  119,  134;  railway  terminus,  6,  177;  in  1862,  50;  held  by 
Confederates,  49,  52-54,  58,  63;  evacuated,  63;  Union  army 

[238] 


INDEX 

Chattanooga  (Term.) — Continued. 

enters,  64;  Union  troops  at,  72,  76,  77,  109,  112,  135,  181,  188, 
200,  210,  219,  225,  227,  230,  231,  234;  troops  withdraw  to,  125, 
129,  133,  146,  152;  siege  of,  156-163;  steamboat  built,  179;  Union 
forts  at,  209;  battles  near,  2,  5,  31,  155-234;  permanently  occu 
pied,  232:  Rosecrans  retires  to,  121;  reports  from,  144,  210. 

Chattanooga  Valley,  54,  188,  189,  199-201,  206. 

Cheatham,  Gen.  Benjamin  F.,  at  Chickamauga,  86,  89,  96,  97, 
138,  139,  141;  advances  125;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  205,  217, 
220. 

Chickamauga  campaign,  51-154.    See  also  Battles:  Chickamauga. 

Chickamauga  Station,  125,  212. 

Chickamauga  Valley,  topography,  11,  126,  217.  See  also  Creeks: 
Chickamauga. 

Chivas.  Lieut.  Robert  J.,  killed,  229. 

Christiana  (Tenn.),  41. 

Cincinnati  Gazette,  cited,  52. 

Clarksville  (Tenn.),  20. 

Cleburne,  Gen.  Patrick  R.,  commands  division,  43;  in  Chick 
amauga  campaign,  58,  66,  68:  at  battle  of  Chickamauga,  82, 
89,  90,  96,  97,  100-102,  128,  139,  141;  at  Missionary  Ridge, 
205,  212:  report,  101;  characterized,  100. 

Cockerill,  Col.  Joseph  R.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  205. 

Columbus  (Ky.),  32. 

Connell,  Col.  JohnM.,  at  Chickamauga,  106,  113. 

Colquitt,  Gen.  Peyton  H.,  killed,  102. 

CORPS — 

4th,  formation,  165,  170;  officers,  168:  at  Missionary  Ridge, 
186,  203,  206;  Orchard  Knob,  189,  190;  Lookout  Mountain,  194; 
Chattanooga,  222;  Wisconsin  troops  in,  168,  225,  227. 

llth,  comes  to  Chattanooga,  159,  170;  at  Nashville,  162; 
Wauhatchie,  177,  178:  Orchard  Knob,  190,  191;  Missionary 
Ridge,  186,  187:  Wisconsin  troops  in,  168,  177,  178,  229. 

12th,  reinforces  Chattanooga,  159,  170;  at  Nashville,  162; 
Wauhatchie,  177,  178;  Lookout  Mountain,  194;  Wisconsin 
troops  in,  168,  177. 

14th,  formation,  12,  17,  19;  commanders,  12,  168;  officers  of, 
21,  24;  medical  director,  110;  in  Tullahoma  campaign,  43-47; 

[239] 


INDEX 

CORPS  (14th) — Continued. 

at  Decherd,  53;  advances,  56,  57,  60,  65,  76;  at  Chickamauga, 
76-79,  86,  88;  reorganized,  165,  166,  170;  at  Orchard  Knob,  190, 
191;  Lookout  Mountain,  200;  Missionary  Ridge,  185,  193,  206; 
pursues  enemy,  222;  Wisconsin  troops  in,  28,  30,  127,  167,  168, 
201. 

15th,  reinforces  Chattanooga.  159;  at  Lookout  Mountain,  194, 
201;  Wisconsin  troops  in,  231. 

17th,  portion  sent  to  Chattanooga,  159;  Wisconsin  troops  in, 
226,  230. 

20th,  formation,  12,  18;  commander,  17,  23;  medical  director, 
110;  in  Tullahoma  campaign,  46,  47;  at  Winchester,  53;  Alpine, 
74,  75;  advances,  56-61,  76;  at  Chickamauga,  73,  76-79,  86-88; 
Wisconsin  troops  in,  29,  30,  32,  33,  59,  130,  131,  133,  134;  merged 
in  4th  Corps,  165. 

21st,  formation,  12,  18;  commander,    17;    in  Tullahoma  cam 
paign,    43,    45,    46;    at  McMinnville,   53;    advances,    56-64;    at 
Chickamauga,  70,  73,  74,  78,  86-88;    Wisconsin   troops   in,    31, 
133;  merged  in  4th  Corps,  165. 
Cavalry,  18,  31. 
Reserve,  19,  83,  165. 

For  Confederate  Corps,  see  names  of  commanders. 
Corse,  Col.  John  M.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  204,  211,  212. 
Cowan  (Tenn.),  47. 
Orane,  Maj.  Josiah  W.,  killed,  227. 

Craven,  ,  house  on  Lookout  Mountain,  197. 

Crawfish  Springs  (Ga.),  71,  78-80,  82,  87,  93,  99,  153. 
GREEKS — 

Big  Crow,  53, 

Chattanooga,  124,  155,  196,  199-202,  222,  229. 
Chickamauga,  60,  64,  66,  69,  70,  73,  76,  81,  82,  119,  133,  181, 
185,  201;  described,  71;    crossed,  72,  78,  79,  85,  99,  187,  230;  re 
treat  across,  217,  221,  222. 
Citico,  190. 
Island,  261. 
Lookout,  195-197. 
McBride's,  44. 
South  Chickamauga,  186. 

[240] 


INDEX 

Crittenden,  Senator  John,  son  of,  17. 

Crittenden,  Gen.  Thomas  L.,  commands  division,  12;  at  Hoover's 
Gap,  43;  in  Tullahoma  campaign,  45;  Chickamauga  cam 
paign,  63,  64,  68,  69;  at  battle  of  Chickamauga,  70,  72,  73,  76, 
78,  82,  84,  86,  87,  91,  94,  95,  109,  121,  133;  at  Chatta 
nooga,  155;  characterized,  17. 

Crook,  Gen.  George,  cavalry  raid,  160,  161. 

Croxton,  Gen.  John  T.,  at  Chickamauga,  84,  85,  113,  114,  127;  at 
Chattanooga,  166;  commended,  148. 

Cruft,   Gen.  Charles,   at  Chattanooga,  165,    168;  Lookout  Moun 
tain,  194;  Missionary  Ridge,  201,  203,  206. 

Crutchfield,  ,  house  on  Lookout  Mountain,  201,  225. 

Gumming,  Gen.  Alfred,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  206. 


D ALTON  (Ga.),  Confederates  at,  189,  232. 

Dana,  C.  A.,  assistant  secretary  of  war,  reports,  144,  145,  165, 
207,  217. 

Daniels,  Col.  Edward,  cavalry  officer,  30. 

Danville  (Ky.),  15. 

Davis,  Gen.  Jefferson  C.,  of  regular  army,  23;  commands  divi 
sion,  18;  in  Tullahoma  campaign,  43,  47;  Chickamauga  cam 
paign,  59;  battle  of  Chickamauga,  86,  87,  93,  95,  96,  106,  107, 
109,  111,  130-134,  142,  145,  151;  at  Chattanooga,  166,  168; 
Missionary  Ridge,  185,  193,  201,  206;  characterized,  108. 

Davis's  Cross  Roads  (Ga.),  65,  68. 

Decherd  (Tenn.),  52,  53,  160. 

Deshler,  Gen.  James,  killed,  102. 

Dick,  Gen.  George  F.,  at  Chickamauga,  113. 

Drury,  Capt  Lucius  H.,  chief  of  artillery,  20,  31;  wounded,  133. 

Dyer,  ,  house  near  Chickamauga,  81. 


EAGLESVILLE  (Tenn.),  41. 

Ector,  Gen.  Matthew  D.,  at  Chickamauga,  85. 

Ely,  Col.  John  H.,  at  Chickamauga,  129;  captured,  130. 

Ewing,  Gen.  Hugh,  at  Trenton,  187;  Missionary  Ridge,  204. 

16 


INDEX 

FAIRFIELD  (Term.),  44. 

Forrest,  Gen.  Nathan  B.,  cavalry  commander,  33;  raiding,  69, 
146,  170;  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  69;  at  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  73,  82-85,  89,  95,  117,  140,  141,  153,  154;  Rossville, 
124;  characterized,  35,  36. 

FORTS:  Cheatham,  219;  Donelson,  16,  20,  35;  Henry,  16;  Leaven- 
worth,  32;  Negley,  209;  Riley,  32;  Rosecrans,  6;  Sherman, 
219;  Sumter,  15;  Wood,  190,  209,  219,  230. 

Fox,  Oapt.  P.  V.,  builds  bridge,  176. 

Fox,  Col.  W.  F.,  Regimental  Losses  in  Civil  War,  142. 

Frankfort  (Ky.),  2. 

Franklin  (Term.),  6. 

Furay,  W.  S.,  war  correspondent,  51,  52. 

GALLATIN  (Term.),  20. 
GAPS: 

Bellbuckle,  40. 

Cooper's,  60,  63,  68,  75. 

Crampton's,  137. 

Dug,  65,  66,  68,  72.    See  also  Battles:  Dug  Gap. 

Prick's,  63. 

Guy's,  40,  44,  46. 

Hoover's,  2,  40,  42,  43. 

Liberty,  2,  40,  42,  46. 

McFarland's,  71,  93,  109,  110,  123,  124,  131. 

Rossville,  19,  76,  81,  83,  109,  114,   124,  146. 

Ringgold,  222. 

Stevens's,  60,  63-65,  68,  71-74. 

Winston's,  61,  75. 
Gardner,  Capt.  George  Q.,  commands  Wisconsin  battery,  32,  133, 

134. 
Garfield,  Gen.  James  A.,   at  Chickamauga,   110,   112,   115,    120, 

123;  leaves  army,    168,   169;  commended,   48;  characterized, 

13,  14. 

Gaw,  Capt.  W.  B.,  at  Chickamauga,  120. 
Geary,  Gen.   John  W.,   at  Wauhatchie,   177,    178,   ISO;  Lookout 

Mountain,    186,    194,    196-198,  200;     Missionary  Ridge,  201- 

204. 

[242] 


INDEX 

Oeorgia,  boundary,  9;  soldiers  from,  10;  Union  troops  in,  146, 
232. 

German,  Lieut.  Obadiah,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  229. 

Gist,  Gen.  .State  Rights,  at  Chickamauga,  98;  Missionary  Ridge, 
205. 

Glass's  Mill  (Ga.),  70. 

Glenn,  Widow ,  house  near  Chickamauga,  78-81,  131. 

Goldsmith,  Capt.  Gustavus,  killed,  132. 

Gordon.     See  Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill. 

Gordon,  Capt.  John  A.,  225,  226. 

Govan,  Gen.  Daniel  C.,  at  Chickamauga,  98,  102,  138. 

Granger,  Gen.  Gordon,  commands  reserve,  19;  in  Tullahoma 
campaign,  41,  44,  46;  at  Chickamauga,  83,  114,  115,  118,  119, 
121,  144,  151,  154;  withdraws,  123;  commended,  145,  148; 
commands  corps,  165:  at  Orchard  Knob,  189,  190;  Mission 
ary  Ridge,  202,  203,  225;  characterized,  21,  22. 

Granger,  Gen.  Robert  S.,  commands  brigade,  19;  at  Nashville,  167. 

Grant,  Gen.  Ulysses  S.,  at  Vicksburg,  4,  5;  Shiloh,  31,  50;  captures 
Fort  Donelson,  16,  35;  takes  command  at  Chattanooga,  170- 
172,  207,  232;plans,  182,  183,  185-189,  193,  194,  211-214,  218, 
221,  222;  watches  battle,  191;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  208-212; 
reports,  215,  223;  commander-in-chief,  234;  genius  of,  219. 

Greene,  Capt.  Howard,  killed,  229. 

Gregg,  Gen.  David  M.,  at  Chickamauga,  138. 

Grose,  Col.  William,  at  Chickamauga,  93,  104,  111:  Chattanooga, 
165;  Lookout  Mountain.  186. 

Gross,  Surgeon  Ferdinand  H.,  at  Chickamauga,  110. 


HALLKCK,  Gen.  H.  W.,  commander-in-chief,  66,  67,  223,  232. 

Hanson,  Capt.  Hans,  killed,   131. 

Hardee,  Gen.  William  J.,  before  the  war,    15;  commands  corps, 

34,  40;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  205,  208;  characterized,  35. 
Barker,  Gen.  Charles  G.,   at    Chickamauga,   94,    113,    116,    117; 

Chattanooga,  165;  Missionary  Ridge,  204;  commended,  148. 
Harrison's  Landing  (Tenn.),  230. 
Hauff,  Capt.  Henry,  killed,  131. 
Hawley,  Col.  William,  of  Third  Wisconsin,  177- 

[243] 


INDEX 

Hazen,  Gen.  William  B.,  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  58,  60,  61, 
62,  64;  at  battle  of  Chickamauga,  104,  107;  at  Chattanooga, 
166;  Brown's  Ferry,  174,  175;  Orchard  Knob,  190,191;  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  204;  commended,  148. 

Heald,  Capt.  Abner  O.,  killed,  129. 

Heg,  Col.  Hans  C.,  brigade  commander,  29;  at  Chickamauga, 
59,  134;  killed,  87,  108,  130,  131. 

Helm,  Gen.  Ben  Hardin,  at  Chickamauga,  99;  killed,  100. 

Hill,  Gen.  Daniel  H.,  at  Chickamauga,  70,  79,  89,  97,  102,  110. 
116,  126,  138;  cited,  73,  74,  146-149,  210. 

Hindman,  Gen.  Thomas  C.,  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  66,  68;  at 
Chickamauga  battle,  82,  96,  97,  113,  115,  132,  142:  report,  115, 
116. 

Hiram  College  (Ohio),  instructor,  14. 

Hobart,  Col.  Harrison  C.,  commands  regiment,  30;  at  Chicka 
mauga,  127;  captured,  129. 

Hood,  Gen.  John  B.,  Confederate  officer,  6;  at  Chickamauga,  S2T 
96-98,  116,  138,  142;  wounded,  116;  at  Knoxville,  181. 

Hooker,  Gen.  Joseph,  at  Chancellorsville,  4;  reinforces  Chatta 
nooga,  159,  161-163;  brings  troops,  172,  174,  176;  at  Wauhat- 
chie,  177-180;  Lookout  Mountain,  181,  184,  186,  187,  192-200, 
212;  pursues  Confederates,  201-208,  222;  at  Missionary  Ridge, 
213,  214;  report,  186,  187, 

Howard,  Gen.  O.  O.,  reinforces  Chattanooga,  159;  at  Wauhatchie, 
177,  178;  Orchard  Knob,  190,  191;  Missionary  Ridge,  186,  187, 
202,  208,  212,  222. 

Humphreys,  Gen.  Benjamin,  at  Chickamauga,  97. 

Huntsville  (Ala.),  28,  160. 


ILLINOIS,  troops  from,  25;  24th  Infantry,  127;  2nd  Cavalry,  226; 
15th  Cavalry,  194. 

Indiana,  troops  from,  25;  29th  Infantry,  42;  39th  Infantry,  42;  44th 
Infantry,  114;  2nd  Cavalry,  159;  4th  Cavalry,  159;  4th  Bat 
tery,  127,  128. 

ISLANDS:  Number  Ten,  29,  32,  226,  231;  Williams,  164,  173. 

Iuka(Miss.),  32. 

[244] 


INDEX 

JACKSON,  Gen.  John  K.,  at  Chickamauga,  89,  138;  lookout 
Mountain,  199. 

Jay's  Mill  (Ga.),  73,  82,  83. 

Jefferson  Barracks  (Mo.),  231. 

Johnson,  Gen.  Bushrod  R.,  Confederate  officer,  69,  70;  at  Chick 
amauga,  96,  97,  105,  106,  138,  147. 

Johnson,  Capt.  John  M.,  killed,  131. 

Johnson,  Gen.  Richard  W.,  commands  division,  18,  43,  59,  201, 
206,  225;  of  regular  army,  23;  at  Chickamauga,  86,  89,  91,  92, 
100,  111,  128,  139-141,  145;  withdraws,  123;  at  Stevenson,  167: 
Orchard  Knob,  190;  Lookout  Mountain,  200;  Missionary  Ridge, 
204,  205;  commended,  148;  report,  42. 

Johnson,  Robert  U.     See  Buel  and  Johnson. 

Johnston,  Gen.  Albert  S.,  Confederate  officer,  15. 

Johnston,  Gen.  Joseph  E.,  reinforces  Bragg,  66. 


KANSAS,  forts  in,  32;  troops  from,  25. 

Kelly's  farm,  at   Chickamauga,   71,  74,  78,  80-82,  85,  91,  92,  100, 

103,  105,  106,  114,  118,  122,  127,  128,  140;  charges  at,  93,  122, 

123. 

Kelly's  Ferry  (Tenn.),  173,  174,  178-180,  194. 
Kenosha,  troops  from,  30. 
Kentucky,  troops  in,  15,   232;    troops    from,    3,  25;  8th  Infantry, 

200;  9th  Infantry,  113;  17th  Infantry,  113;  2nd    cavalry,   194; 

senator,  34;  railroad  through,  6;  Confederates  evacuate,  16. 
Kershaw,  Gen.  Joseph  B.,  at  Chickamauga,  96,  97,  105. 
King,  Gen.  John  H.,  brigade  commander,  24;  at  Chickamauga, 

92,  100,  123;   Chattanooga,  166;  successor,  204. 
Knoxville  (Term.),  operations   at,    158,    169,    184,    187,    189,    234; 

Burnside  at,  223. 

LAFAYETTE  (Ga.),  63;  Bragg  retreats  to,  64-67,  71-74,  77;  road 
from,  72,  76,  78,  79,  82,  88,  91-95,  99,  103,  110,  118,  122,  123, 
127. 

LaGrange,  Col.  Oscar  H.,  commands  cavalry,  20,  31;  at  Chicka 
mauga,  132. 

Law,  Gen.  Evander  M.,  at  Chickamauga,  96,  97,  105,  116. 

[245] 


INDEX 

Lee,  Gen.  Robert    E.,    4;  before   the    war,    15;    in   Virginia,  67; 
surrenders,  10,  52. 

Lee  and  Gordon's  Mill,  at  Chickamauga,  64,  65,  68-79,  82,  87, 
92,  131. 

Leet's  Tanyard  (Tenn.),  skirmish  at,  65. 

Lexington  (Ky.),  15. 

Liddell,  Gen.  St.  John  R.,  at  Chickamauga,  86,  98,  117,  122. 

Lightburn,  Gen.  Joseph  A.  J.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  205. 

Lilly,  Capt.  Eli,  artillery  officer,  58. 

Lincoln,  President    Abraham,    call  for  troops,    27;  orders,   165, 

169,  170,  232;  persistence,  38. 

Livingston,  Lieut.  Courtland,  commands  battery,  31 ;  at  Chicka 
mauga,  133. 

Long,  Col.  Eli,  cavalry  officer,  187,  230. 
Longstreet,  Gen.  James,  reinforces  Bragg,  66,  70,    80;  advances, 

126;  at  Chickamagua,  95-98,  104,  106,  112,  113,  116,  118,  143, 

148,     149;    Wauhatchie,     178-182;    advises   Bragg,    156,  189; 

goes  to  Knoxville,    181,    182,  187,  189;    estimates  losses,    138; 

reports,  116,  151,    180,   181 :     From   Manassas  to  Appomatox, 

135,  136. 
Lookout  Valley,  Union  army  in,  54,  60-62,    75,   176:    opened,  179, 

184,  186,  187;  Confederates  in,  195. 
Loomis,  Col.  John  M.,  at,  Missionary  Ridge,  205. 
LOSSES:  in  Tullahoma  campaign,  48,49;  at  Chickamauga,  135-137, 

141-144,  148;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  224. 
Louisville  (Ky.),  Union  troops  at,  2, 3,  6, 8, 16, 27-29,  31, 50;    Grant 

at,  171. 

Louisville  and  Chattanooga  Railroad,  20. 
Lumley's  Stand  (Tenn.),  42. 

Lyon,  Col.  William  P.,  commands  regiment,  20. 
Lytle,  Gen.  William  H.,    at   Chickamauga,    87;  killed,    80,  109, 

131. 

MCAPFEE'S  Church,  at  Chickamauga,  83,  114,  154. 

Me  Arthur,  Adj.  Arthur  Jr.,  commended,  228. 

McCook,  Gen.  Alexander  U.,  commands  division,  12,45,63,72, 
74;  in  Tullahoma  campaign,  42;  at  Chickamauga,  73-75,  78, 
86,  87,  91-95,  109,110. 121,128,153;  Rossville,  124;  Chatta 
nooga,  155;  staff-officer  of,  120;  characterized,  17,  23. 

[246] 


INDEX 

McCook,  Gen.  Daniel,  at  Chickamauga,  83,84,144;   Chattanooga, 

144. 
McCook,  Col.  Edward  M.,  at  Chickamauga,    132;     cavalry   raid, 

159,  160. 

McDonald, ,  house  near  Chickamauga,  81. 

McKercher,  Maj.  Duncan,  captured,  130. 

McLaws,  Gen.  Lafayette,  at  Chickamauga,  97;  Knoxvilie,  181. 
McLean,  Lieut.  John  D.,  artillery  officer,  33;  at  Chickamauga,  134. 
McLemore's  Cove,  near  Chickamauga,  60,  63-65,  68,  70-75,  78. 
McMinnville  (Tenn.),  railroad  junction,  39,  53,  56,  60;  captured, 

159. 

McNeill,  Maj.  Quincy,  at  Island   Number  Ten,  226. 
Manchester  (Tenn.),  pikeroad  to,  39;  operations  near,  42-46. 
Maney,  Gen.  George,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  206. 
Marshall,  Gen.  Humphrey,  Confederate  officer,  14. 
Martin,  Gen.  John  A.,  replaces  Heg,  108,  130. 
Martin,  Gen.  William  T.,  cavalry  officer,  159. 
Maryland,  Confederates  invade,  4. 
Matthies,  Gen.  Charles  L.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  204. 
Meade,  Gen.  George  C.,  at  Gettysburg,  4. 
Memphis  (Tenn.),  troops  from,  158. 
Michigan,  troops  from,  25;  1st  Engineers,  176. 
Mill  Springs  (Ky.),  15,  16. 

Miller,  Col.  J.  McClelland,  at  Liberty  Gap,  42. 
Millersburg  (Tenn.),  42. 

Milwaukee,  troops  muster  at,  27,  28,  30,  177,  231,  226. 
Minnesota,  troops  from,  25. 
Minty,  Gen.  Robert  EL  G.,  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  57,  61,  62; 

at  battle  of  Chickamauga,  72,  77;  withdraws,  125;  at  Ross- 

ville,  124. 
Mississippi,  troops   from,  66,  70,  98;  troops    in,   169,  231;  Union 

troops,  232. 
Missouri,  troops  from,  25;  Wisconsin  troops  in,  30;  Union  army, 

233. 
Mitchell,  Gen.  John  G.,  at  Chickamauga,  114;  Wauhatchie,  179 ^ 

commended,  148. 
Mitchell,  Gen.  O.  M.,  in  Alabama,  28. 

[247] 


INDEX 

Mitchell,  Gen.   Robert    B.,  cavalry  officer,  18,  41,  42;  at    Chick 
amauga,   83,   99,  112,  147,  153,  154;    Rossville,   124;   raiding, 

160. 

Mitchell,  Capt.  William  S.,  killed,  129. 
Moccasin  Point,  fortified,  173. 

Moore,  Gen.  John  C.,  at  Lookout  Mountain,  197,  199. 
Morgan,  Gen.  James  D.,  commands  division,  19;  at  Chickamauga, 

83;  Chattanooga,  1G6,  167. 
MOUNTAINS — 

Cumberland,  7-9,  47-49,  52-55. 

Horse,  40. 

Horseshoe  Ridge,  107,  111. 

Lookout,  51-55,  60,  62,  76,  155,  156,  172,  173,  176,  204,  205, 
211,  225;  crossed,  63,  64,  68;  Confederates  on,  63,  126,  180-185, 
187-189,  192-194;  described,  195,  196.  See  also  Battles:  Look 
out  Mountain. 

Missionary  Ridge,  55,  56,  63,  81,  93,  109,  115,  126,  156,  182- 
186,  190,  209,  211,  230:  Confederates  on,  188-191.  See  also 
Battles:  Missionary  Ridge. 

Pigeon,  55,  65,  69,  71. 

Raccoon,  173. 

Sand,  53-55,  59,  62. 

Taylor's  Ridge,  217,  222. 

Walden's  Ridge,  54,  55,  58,  156,  161,  173. 

Mullis,  ,  farm  near  Chickamauga,  123. 

Murfreesboro  (Tenn.),  Union  troops  at,  1,  2,  4-8,  11,  14,  28-30,  39, 

44,  232;  advance  from,  46-48,  134;  railroad  centre,  6,  52,  160. 


NASHVILLB  (Tenn.),  troops  at,  20,  30-32,  231;  railroad  terminus, 
3,  6,  9,  160-163. 

Nashville  and  Chattanooga  railroad,  3,  9,  166. 

Negley,  Gen.  James  S.,  takes  command,  17;  in  Tullahoma  cam 
paign,  47:  Chickamauga,  60,  65,  66,  68;  at  battle  of  Chicka 
mauga,  78,  79,  82,  87,  93,  94,  100,  105,  107,  108,  113,  114.  140, 
142,  148;  Rossville,  124;  report,  110. 

New  Madrid  (Mo.),  31. 

New  York,  1st  Infantry,  194. 

1 248  ] 


INDEX 

Nickles,  Lieut.  Robert  J.,  killed,  (59. 
North  Carolina,  invaded,  10. 
Northwest  Territory,  troops  from,  25. 

OHIO,  troops  from,  14,  25;  1st  Infantry,  194;  13th  Infantry,  113; 
15th  Infantry,  42;  21st  Infantry,  113;  73d  Infantry,  179;  repre 
sentative  in  Congress,  168. 

Orchard  Knob,  captured  190,  192,  194;  vantage  point,  209,  211, 
212;  battery  on,  214.  See  also  Battles:  Orchard  Knob. 

Oshkosh,  troops  from,  29. 

Osterhaus,  Gen.  Peter  J.,  crosses  the  Tennessee,  192,  193;  at 
Lookout  Mountain,  194;  Missionary  Ridge,  203,  216;  pur 
sues  enemy,  201. 

PADUCAH  (Ky.),  16. 

"Paint  Rock,"  steamboat,  58. 

Palmer,  Gen.  John  M.,  commands  division,  18,  58,  194;  in  Tulla- 
homa  campaign,  41;  at  Chickamauga,  78,  86,  91,  92,  96,  102, 
104,  107,  111,  139-141,  145;  withdraws,  123;  commended,  148; 
promoted,  168;  at  Chattanooga,  165;  Missionary  Ridge,  202; 
pursues  enemy,  222;  characterized,  21. 

Patterson,  Gen.  Robert,  15.         » 

Pegram,  Gen.  John,  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  69. 

Pelham  (Term.),  57. 

Pennsylvania,  Confederates  invade,  4;  troops  from,  25;  77th  In 
fantry,  42;  79th  Infantry,  44,  127. 

Perkins,  Surgeon  Jabez,  at  Chickamauga,  110. 

Pettus,  Gen.  Edmund  W.,  at  Lookout  Mountain,  199. 

Phelps,  Col.  Edward  H.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  204. 

Pikeville  (Tenn.),  55. 

Pinney,  Capt.  Oscar  F.,  31. 

Pittsburg  Landing,  226. 

Poe, ,  house  near  Chickamauga,  81,  92. 

Polk,  Gen.  Leonidas,  commands  corps,  33,  40,  68,  69;  at  Chicka 
mauga,  70,  72,  95,  97-100,  148;  advances,  126;  characterized, 
35. 

Pond  Spring  (Ga.),  78. 

[249J 


INDEX 

Pope,  Gen.  John,  at  Island  Number  Ten,  32. 

Post,  Col.  Philip  Sidney,  in  Tullahoma  campaign,  43;  at  Chioka- 

mauga,  133. 

Prentiss,  Gen.  B.  M.,  227. 
Preston,  Gen.  William,  at  Chickamauga,  96,  97,  112,  142. 


RACINE,  troops  from,  31,  231. 

Raum,  Col.  Green  B.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  204. 

Rebellion  Records,  cited,  42,  48,  49,  67,  75,  84,  85,  90,  101, 115,  117, 

121,  123,  129,  144,  145,  148,  151,  180,  195,  215,  216,  232. 
Reed's  Bridge,  near  Chickamauga,  69,  72,  73,  76,  82-85. 
Rennie,  Lieut.  Robert,  killed,  130. 

Reynolds,  Gen.  Joseph  J.,  commands  division,  17,  44;  in  Tulla 
homa  campaign,  44;  Chickamauga  campaign,  58,  66;  at  battle 

of  Chickamauga,  82,  86,   91-96,  103-107,   111,  139-141,    145; 

withdraws,  122,   123;  made  chief  of  staff,  166;  commended, 

148. 

Richardson,  Lieut.  James  S.,  killed,  129. 
Richmond  (Va.),  4,  10,  49,  52,  67. 
Ringgold  (Ga.),  64,  69,  70,  74,  77,  114,  216,   217,  223;  road  from, 

124. 
RIVERS — 

Cumberland,  7,  15. 

Duck,  7,  39,  40. 

Elk,  7,  40,  47. 

Hiawassie,  56,  59. 

Little,  75. 

Mississippi,  4,  31,  158,  232. 

Ohio,  25. 

Sequatchie,  54,  55. 

Tennessee,  7-9,  52-54,  71,    126,  196;  described, 54;  valley  of, 
58;  bends,  172;  bridged,  163;  crossed,  19,  59-62,  157,    160,   176,, 
201;  Confederates  command,  155,  156:  armies  on,  169. 
Robertson,  Gen.  Jerome  B.,  at  Chickamauga,  97. 
Robinson,  Col.  Milton  S.,  at  Chickamauga,  123. 
Roby,  Capt.  J.  W.,  at  Chickamauga,  130. 
Roddey,  Gen.  Philip  D.,  cavalry  leader,  160. 

[250] 


INDEX 

Rogersville'(Ala.),  160. 

Rome  (Ga.),  61,  64,  75,  115. 

Rosecrans,  Gen.  William  S.,  commands  army,  1-3,  14,  16;  charac 
terized,  12,  13;  plans,  11,  13,  40,  51,  57;  at  Winchester,  52; 
in  Chickamauga  campaign,  55,  58,  59,62,  64,  67;  orders,  83, 
103,  104,  106, 118,152,  153,  172;  at  battle  of  Chickamauga,  72- 
80,  88,  93,  99,  104,  109,  112,  120,  121,  131,  136,  144,  149,  154; 
retreats  to  Chattanooga,  125;  defends  Chattanooga,  157,  158, 
160;  reinforced,  158,  159;  relieved,  164;  results,  232;  reports, 
48,  84,  89,  144. 

Rossville  (Ga.),  Union  troops  at,  19,  63,  76;  during  battle  of 
Chickamauga,  108,  109,  112,  114-116,  118,  withdrawal  to,  119, 
121,  123,  129,  132,  133,  136,  147,  151,  152,  155;  abandoned,  125; 
advance  from,  144;  in  Chattanooga  campaign,  201-206;  Hooker 
at,  221,  222.  See  also  Gaps:  Rossville. 

Rousseau,  Geri.  Lovell  H.,  commands  division  17,  28,  44,  47,  190; 
on  furlough,  21;  rejoins  army,  125;  at  Chattanooga,  166; 
Nashville,  167. 

Rousseau  Battery,  219. 

Ruger,  Gen.  Thomas  H.,  at  Chattanooga,  168;  guarding  railway, 


ST.  Louis,  Wisconsin  troops  at,  31,  32,  231. 

Salem  (Tenn.),  41. 

Scandinavians,  as  Wisconsin  soldiers,  29, 

Schurz,  Gen.  Carl,  at  Wauhatchie,  177,  178;  Missionary  Ridge, 
205,  212,  229. 

Scribner,  Gen.  Benjamin  F.,  commands  brigade,  28;  at  Chicka 
mauga,  100,  129. 

Searles,  Lieut.  Charles  A.,  killed  129. 

Sequatchie  Valley,  described,  31;  troops  in,  54,  55,  57,  58,  60; 
raided,  156,  159. 

Sheffield,  Col.  James  L.,  at  Chickamauga,  97. 

Shelby ville  (Tenn.),  40,  42;  captured,  44,  46. 

Shellmound  (Tenn.),  59,  177. 

Shenandoah  Valley,  war  in,  15. 


INDEX 

Sheridan,  Gen.  Philip  H.,  West  Point  graduate,  17;  commands 
division  47,  56,  60;  at  Chickamauga,  87,  93-96,  107-111,  115, 
142,  145,  149,  151;  Chattanooga,  165,  167;  Orchard  Knob,  190, 
217:  Missionary  Ridge,  204,  205,  208,  227;  commended,  170, 
171;  characterized,  22. 

Sherman,  Col.  Francis  T.,  at  Chattanooga,  165,  167;  Missionary 
Ridge,  204,  227. 

Sherman,  Gen.  William  T.,  reinforces  Chattanooga,  159,  183-185, 
187;  commands  Western  army,  169,  234;  at  Chattanooga,  231; 
Tunnel  Hill,  206,  211,  213,  221;  Missionary  Ridge,  186,  187, 
192,  193,  201-205,  208,  212.-214,  217,  222,  226,  229,  230:  March 
to  the  Sea,  5,  10;  commended,  171;  Memoirs,  207. 

Sirwell,  Col.  William,  at  Chickamauga,  113. 

Slocum,  Gen.  H.  W.,  reinforces  Rosecrans,  159. 

Smith,  Gen.  A.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  204. 

Smith,  Gen.  James  A.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  205. 

Smith,  Gen.  John  E.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  204,  213,  226. 

Smith,  Col.  Orlando,  at  Wauhatchie,  179. 

Smith,  Gen.  Preston,  at  Chickamauga,  89;  killed,  90. 

Smith,  Gen.  W.  F.,  chief  engineer,  164,  169,  172,  174,  183,  184. 

Snodgrass,  — ,  house  near  Chickamauga,  107,  112,  116. 

Snodgrass  Hill,  battle  at,  81,  120,  122,  151,  154. 

South  Carolina,  invaded,  10. 

Stanley,  Gen.  David  S.,  commands  cavalry,  18,  46;  of  regular 
army,  23;  on  furlough,  61;  at  Chickamauga,  93,  100,  113. 

Stanley,  Col.  Timothy  R.,  at  Chickamauga,  142. 

Stanton,  Edwin  M.,  secretary  of  war,  171,  217. 

Starkweather,  Col.  John  C.,  brigade  commander,  28,  69;  at  Chick 
amauga,  101,  126-130;  at  Chattanooga,  166,  204,  206,  225; 
Stevenson,  167;  report,  128,  129. 

Steedman,  Gen.  James  B.,  commands  division,  19;  at  Chicka 
mauga,  83,  114,  117,  120,  138,  142,  144;  commended,  148. 

Steinwehr,  Gen.  Adolph  von,  at  Wauhatchie,  188;  Missionary 
Ridge,  212. 

Stevenson,  Gen.  Carter  L.,  on  Lookout  Mountain,  192,  195,  197, 
199;  at  Missionary  Ridge,  205,  206;  report,  198,  199. 

Stevenson  (Ala.),  railroad  junction,  28,  52,  53,  56,  59;  supplies  at, 
7,  161-163:  garrison,  57, 166;  road  to,  156;  headquarters,  167. 

[252] 


INDEX 

Stewart,  Gen.  A.  P.,  Confederate  officer,  44;  at  Chickamauga,  96, 
97,  104,  105,  139,  141,  143;  Missionary  Ridge,  205,  206,  214, 
216,  217. 

Stoughton,  Gen.  William  L.,  at  Missionary  Ridge,  204. 

Stovall,  Gen.  Marcellus  A.,  at  Ohickamauga,  99,  100,   104. 

Summerville  (Ga.),  63,  75. 

Sweet,  Col.  Benjamin  J.,  20;  wounded,  29. 

TENNESSEE,  actions  in,  27;  in  two  districts,  167;  barrens  of,  39-41; 
railway  in,  6;  forts,  16;  Union  troops,  169,  231,  232;  troops 
from,  10,  25,  66. 

Thedford's  Ford  (Ga.),  70. 

Thomas,  Gen.  George  H.,  commands  corps,  12,63,  64;  in  Tulla- 
homa  campaign,  43,  47;  at  Chickamauga,  22,  72,  74,  75,  78, 
79,  82-84,  88,  91-94,  103-117,120,121,127;  denominated  "Rock 
of  Chickamauga",  82;  protects  his  corps,  139;  withstands  at 
tacks,  144-146;  withdraws,  112,118-126,  152,  153;  at  Chatta 
nooga,  155,  232;  commands  army,  164,  168;  besieged,  171,172; 
plans  for  advance,  183,  184,  186,  187,  193,  .218;  reconnoisance. 
188,  189;  at  Orchard  Knob,  190,  191;  Missionary  Ridge,  202-215, 
220-222;  reports,  119-121,  123,200,  216;  commended,  148,149, 
171:  characterized,  14,  15,  81. 

Thompson,  Lieut.  Oliver,  killed  121. 

Thruston,  Gen.  Gates  P.,  at  Chickamauga,  110,  122. 

Thurman's  (Term.),  57. 

Tracy  City  (Tenn.),  56. 

Trenton  (Ga.),  troops  at,  61,  176,  187. 

Triune  (Tenn.),  41. 

Tullahoma  (Tenn.),  1,  6;  advance  toward,  14;  fighting  near,  45, 
47;  Bragg  at,  52,53,98;  campaign  for,  28,30,39-50,  134,  224. 

Turchin,  Gen.  John  B.,  commands  cavalry,  18,  19;  at  Chickamau 
ga,  92,  93;  withdraws,  122,  123;  at  Chattanooga,  166; 
Brown's  Ferry,  175;  Missionary  Ridge,  204;  commended, 
148. 

VALLEY  HEAD  (Ala.),  55,  61. 

Van  Cleve,  Gen.  Horatio  P.,  commands  division,  18,  60;  in  Tul 
lahoma  campaign,  43;  at  Chickamauga,  78,  86,  88,  93-95,  97, 
104,  107-109,  113,  133,  140,  142. 

[  253  J 


INDEX 

Van  Derveer,  Col.  Ferdinand,  at  Chickamauga,  93,103,106,111, 
114,  140;  Chattanooga,  166;  Missionary  Ridge,  204:  com 
mended,  148. 

Van  Home,  Thomas  B.,  Army  of  the  Cumberland,  110. 

Vicksburg  (Miss.),  siege  of,  231. 

Viniard, ,  house  near  Chickamauga,  81. 

Virginia,  troops  from,  54,  66,  70,  78. 

Vittetoe, ,  house  near  Chickamauga,  81. 

Von  Baumbach,  Maj.  Carl,  at  Chickamauga,  132;  Missionary 
Ridge,  227-229. 

WAGNER,  Gen.  George  D.,  in  Chickamauga  campaign,  58,  60-62; 
at  Chattanooga,  165;  Missionary  Ridge,  204. 

Walker,  Gen,  W.  H.  T.,  Confederate  officer,  68,  69;  at  Chicka 
mauga,  77,82,85,89,96-98,102,110,139,141;  Lookout  Moun- 
ain,  192;  Missionary  Ridge,  205,  206. 

Walthall,  Gen.  Edward  C.,  at  Chickamauga,  98;  Lookout  Mount 
ain,  197,  199. 

WARS:  Mexican,  15,  17,  21,  34,  35;  Indian,  15. 

Wartrace  (Term.),  40,  42. 

Washington  (D.  C.),  orders  from,  4,  67. 

Wauhatchie  (Term.),  61;  action  at,  176-180. 

West,  Captain  George  M.,  killed,  130. 

West,  Col.  Theodore  S.,  commands  regiment,  30;  at  Chicka 
mauga,  132. 

West  Point  (N.  Y.)  Military  Academy,  graduates,  12,  15-17,  21- 
23,  35. 

West  Virginia,  troops  in,  8. 

Wheeler,  Gen.  Joseph,  cavalry  commander,  33,  181;  at  Chicka 
mauga,  70,  79,  99;  raiding,  156,  159-161. 

Whiteside  (Term.),  177. 

Whittaker,  Gen.  Walter  C.,  at  Chickamauga,  83,  114;  Chatta 
nooga,  165;  Wauhatchie,  179;  Lookout  Mountain,  186;  com 
mended,  148. 

Wilder,  Gen.  John  T.,  brigade  commander,  44:  in  Tullahoma 
campaign,  43,  44;  Chickamauga  campaign,  58,  60,  62,  64;  at 
battle  of  Chickamauga,  72,  77,  82,  97,  109,  111,  153;  at  Chat 
tanooga,  158. 

[254] 


INDEX 

Willard,  Capt.  J.  P.,  aide  to  Thomas,  122. 

Williams,  Gen.  Alpheus  S.,  at  Chattanooga,  168;  guarding  rail 
way,  177. 

Wiilich,  Gen.  August,  in  Tullahoma  campaign,  42,43;  at  Chicka- 
mauga,  93,  111,  118;  withdraws,  123;  at  Chattanooga,  164, 
165;  Orchard  Knob,  190,  191;  Missionary  Ridge,  204,  225,  226; 
commended,  148. 

Wilson,  Col.  Claudius  C.,  at  Chickamauga,  85. 

Wilson,  Gen.  James  H.,  cavalry  raid,  170. 

Winchester  (Tenn.),  52,  53,  160. 

Winkler.  Maj.  Frederick  C.,  commands  regiment,  177;  at  Mis 
sionary  Ridge,  229. 

Wisconsin,  troops  from,  25;  in  army  of  Cumberland,  27-33;  in 
Tullahoma  campaign,  44,  50;  at  Dug  Gap,  69;  Chicka 
mauga,  126-134;  reinforce  Chattanooga,  177,  178;  at  Mission 
ary  Ridge,  225-232.  1st  Infantry,  27-29,  44,  69,  126-129, 

167,  225;  2nd  infantry,  227;  3rd  Infantry,    168,    177;  10th   In 
fantry,  27-29,  50,  69,  126,  129,    130,    167,    201,    225;    13th    In 
fantry,  20;  15th  Infantry,  27,  29,  59,  87,  126,    130,     131,    167, 
191,  192,  225,  226;  18th  Infantry,  226,  227;  21st    Infantry,    20, 
27,  29,  30,  44,  69,   126-129,  167,    225;    24th    Infantry,    27,    30, 
126,  131,  132,  167,  227-229;  26th  Infantry,    168,  177,   178,  229; 
1st  Cavalry,  20,  27,  30,  50,  132,  133,  159;  1st  Heavy  Artillery, 

168,  230;  3rd  Battery,  20,  27,  31,  133,  168,    229;   5th    Battery, 
27,  31,  32,  133,  168,  230;  6th  Battery,  230,    231;    8th    Battery, 
32,  33,  133,  134,    168,    229,  230;  10th    Battery,     168,    229-231; 
12th  Battery,  230,  231. 

Wolseley,  Field-Marshal  Sir  G.  J.,  Viscount,  commends  Ameri 
can  officer,  36. 

Wood,  Gen.  S.  A.  M.,  at  Chickamauga,  101. 

Wood,  Gen.  Thomas  J.,  of  regular  army,  23;  commands  divis 
ions,  18,  58;  at  Chickamauga,  80,  87,  93-96,  104-107, 109,  111, 
113,  110,  117,  131,  142,  145,  147,  152;  withdraws,  123;  at  Chat 
tanooga,  165,  168;  Orchard  Knob,  190-192;  Missionary  Ridge, 
203-205,  225. 

Woodbury  (Tenn.),  41. 

Woods,  Gen.  Charles  R.,  at  Lookout  Mountain,  193;  relieved,  203. 

ZOLLTCOFFBR,  Gen.  Felix  K.,  15. 

[255] 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 
BERKELEY 

THIS  BOOK  IS  UUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 

- 


LIBRARY  USE 

"URN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 


LD62A-30w,-2,'71 
(P2003slO)9412A-A-3: 


.General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


218786 


-. 

v,  4- 


